(En)gendering Colonialism: Masculinities in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that indigenous men in the Pacific engage in gender practices that historically have had widely different consequences for their positions of power or marginality. I focus my analysis on the production of modern Polynesian masculinities in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa (New Zealand), highlighting the importance of the intersection of European and American colonialism(s) with indigenous forms of social organization. I look specifically at the participation of indigenous men in the military and sports, two of the most important sites for the production of masculinities where indigenous men contend with hegemonic ideologies of gender and culture. I end with some critical reflections on the possibilities and limitations of reviving traditional indigenous masculinities in decolonization movements in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa.

If colonialism is the organizing principle that structures attempts at decolonization, then any attempt to theorise the possibilities implied by the notion of “Native masculinity” must take account of the colonial context in which these particular subjectivities are produced. (Matahaera-Atariki 1999:111)

One of the most important areas of research in gender, postcolonial and cultural studies is the analysis of indigenous masculinities in colonial contexts. This line of investigation not only foregrounds the gendered, raced and classed dynamics of colonialism and nationalism, but it also works to delineate the possibilities for alternative gender practices that challenge hegemonic structures of white, middle-class patriarchy. In theorizing the production of masculinities in (neo)colonial systems, we must remember that hegemonies are always incomplete, allowing an interplay between structure and agency – an interplay that involves and transforms indigenous ideologies of gender and power. Such an approach to hegemonic power relations allows us to explore the ways in which men and women who are complexly situated in multiple contexts can draw upon dominant gender constructs for contradictory and even subversive purposes. Specifically, in this paper I argue that indigenous men in the Pacific engage in both hegemonic and marginalized gender practices and have historically occupied differently gendered positions of power and disempowerment depending upon the context. I focus my analysis on the production of modern Polynesian1 masculinities in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa (New Zealand), highlighting the importance of understanding the intersection of European and American imperialism(s) and colonialism(s) with indigenous systems of social organization. I then look at the participation of Kanaka Maoli and Tangata Māori (indigenous
peoples of Hawai‘i and Aotearoa) men in the military and sports, two of the most important arenas for the production of masculinities today. Indigenous men variously take up or ignore hegemonic ideologies promoted in these institutional sites, in the process achieving masculinities that defy any simple categorization as either “Western” or “Polynesian”. I end with some critical reflections on the possibilities and limitations of reviving “traditional” indigenous masculinities in the context of decolonization movements in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa.

Before I begin, I would like to acknowledge my own “situatedness” (Haraway 1991) as a 26-year-old, middle-class, heterosexual Kanaka ‘Oiwi (Native Hawaiian) man committed to the decolonization of Hawai‘i and the Pacific. I choose to focus on Hawai‘i and Aotearoa because of the deep ancestral connexions and historical, cultural and linguistic affinities shared between the indigenous peoples, as well as the distinction they share of being two of the most heavily colonized areas in the Pacific.

In both Hawai‘i and Aotearoa, indigenous men and women are engaged in struggles for decolonization, self-determination, land, mana (spiritual power) and healing as a people. Many of these struggles have been notably gendered, just as gender relations have become increasingly politicized. More importantly, there has been a considerable amount of sharing and networking between the Kānaka Maoli and the Tangata Māori as both look to each other for support in their efforts of reclamation. ‘Oiwi men often glorify the Māori as representing the epitome of “real” Polynesian masculinity, that of the fearless warrior. Not surprisingly, many of the newly “masculinized” cultural practices being carried out by Kānaka today are heavily influenced and even directly borrowed from the Māori, e.g. the haka (dance), martial arts, oratory styles and ceremonial protocols. I will return to this phenomenon at the end of the paper, but for now I would suggest that it speaks directly to the gendered nature of cultural nationalism and identity formation. To understand this more clearly though, we need to develop a theory of gender power and examine the historical specificities of colonialism in the Pacific.

Theorizing masculinities in the Pacific

Feminist scholars since the 1970s have pointed to the necessity of looking at gender relations as an important component in the study of indigenous Oceanic societies (Jolly and MacIntyre 1989; Ortner 1981; Ralston and Thomas 1987). Caroline Ralston notes that aside from the study of initiation rites in Melanesian men’s houses, initially there had been very little scholarship “which problematize[d] the meanings and practices of male worlds” rather than merely reproducing androcentric accounts of men that were “paraded as objective” or universal (Ralston 1992:162). More recently, a number of studies have looked at the transformation of masculinities through the processes of colonization, missionization and modernization (Brison 1995; Fife 1995). One of the most productive sites for the study of masculinities in Oceania has been Aotearoa, where Native and non-Native scholars have examined the representations of Māori and Pakeha masculinities in film, television and both popular and academic literature (Law et al. 1999; DuPuis 1996; Phillips 1984, 1987).

In theorizing the production of masculinities in the colonial situation, I am especially concerned with the ways in which particular visions and ideals of masculinity are promoted above others as defining what it means to be a “proper”
or “successful” man, and the ways that these figurations work to naturalize and maintain systems of gendered, raced and class-based oppression and domination (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). For this reason I find it useful to examine the ways in which “hegemonic masculinities” (those dominant ideals of what men should be and how they should act) legitimate patriarchal structures and subordinate femininities and other “marginalized masculinities” along the multiple lines of ethnicity, race, class, property, age, sexuality, the nation and so on (Connell 1995:76–81).

At the same time though, hegemonic masculinities and subaltern masculinities should not be seen as two homogenous and discreet productions that are separated by distinct boundaries. To do so would be to replicate the debilitating dichotomies upon which colonial hegemonies and authority rests, as well as to miss the complexities of what actually takes place “on the ground”. We need to see gendered social actors as complexly situated, located and positioned in multiple settings and contexts. In so doing, we can attend to the ways in which men and women have access to different “points of privilege and subordination” through such positionings (Anzaldua 1987; Haraway 1991; Sandoval 1991).

**En-gendering men in the Pacific**

Such an approach to situated gender practices has generally been absent in the depictions of Oceanic men. Rather, what one finds is the recurrence of the tropes of the “noble savage” and the “ignoble savage”, usually associated with the contradistinctions between Polynesians/Melanesians, light-skinned/dark-skinned, and civilized/uncivilized (Jolly 1997; Thomas 1997). These alternate views of the noble and ignoble savage have historically structured the ways in which indigenous Pacific Islanders have been viewed by outsiders. Anthropologists too have variously contributed to the notions of “primitivism” that have attended such representations. Early ethnographic descriptions were heavily Euro- and andro-centric, commonly portraying Polynesian men as strong, active, sexually dominating, kapu or “sacred”, and holding titles of chieftainship that were usually passed down patrilineally; women on the other hand were portrayed as being weak, passive, restricted in their movements and actions, sexually sanctioned, and noa or “profane”, especially during the time of their menstruation when they are seen as polluting (Howard and Kirkpatrick 1989:78). Men conduct warfare and carry out heavy, outdoor tasks such as farming, deep-sea fishing, preparing earth ovens, and carving canoes and images; women perform light tasks such as weeding, cleaning, taking care of children, fishing on the reef, cooking, weaving mats, and pounding tapa (barkcloth) (ibid.:79). Ortner (1981) also highlights enforced virginity on unmarried girls, high frequencies of rape, and the subordination of wives to husbands in the household; ultimately she argues that Polynesian societies are male-dominant hegemonies (1996).

On the other hand, ample evidence has been produced that contradicts such an easy characterization. Critics point to the existence of highly powerful and sacred women (Gunson 1987), the fact that rank trumps gender in Polynesian societies, the frequency by which descent was reckoned bilaterally, the formalized relations of reverence and deference between brothers and sisters, and the alternative interpretation that women were not “profane” and repelling the gods but actually attracting them during the time of menstruation (Hanson
Additionally, alternative gender practices and sexualities prevalent throughout Polynesia complicate any stable dichotomy between men and women (Besnier 1994; Elliston 1999).

The central problem here is the extent to which we can read gender into different cultural and historical systems. In many Polynesian societies, gender cannot be easily separated out and left to stand on its own as a meaningful construct for understanding social life (Elliston 1997; Thomas 1987). Pre-colonial gender practices of masculinity and femininity should more appropriately be understood as always articulated and deeply interpolated with other social organizational principles such as rank, place, kinship and birth order. One needs to analyze carefully the ways in which pre-colonial indigenous epistemologies (to the extent they can be known) organized ideas of personhood, identity, sociality, agency and desire differently than modern Euro-American ways of construing these concepts, and in what contexts and sets of relations the gendering of social actors became more or less salient. Because of the constraints of this paper, I do not here explore these very important dimensions of pre-colonial social life, but instead raise these issues to suggest that a different set of dynamics was in play before the intrusion of Western imperialism.  

Colonizing masculinities in Hawai‘i and Aotearoa

A number of recent critical feminist perspectives in anthropology, postcolonial studies, and cultural studies have brought to light the highly gendered nature of colonialism (Enloe 1989; McClintock 1995; Stoler 1991, 1997). In the Pacific, Jolly and Macintyre’s (1989) work demonstrates the ways in which colonialism was built upon the reordering of the family and gender practices, especially along the lines of Christian precepts. Merry (2000) argues that laws creating new forms of marriage and new restrictions on sexuality were central to the civilizing process in nineteenth-century Hawai‘i. The bourgeois family was constructed as the model to be emulated and was enforced by law. Masculinity was now defined by ownership and control of property, which included both land, women and children. This was in stark contrast to pre-colonial practices in which men were stewards of the land, women exercised autonomy in conjugal relationships, and the family unit was an extended rather than nuclear one (Merry 2000:230).

These works reveal the highly patriarchal nature of colonialism and the ways in which the control of women’s bodies was and is a central feature in the construction of empire in Polynesia. As Fanon (1967:148) noted early on, the structure of the white family, with the dominant patriarchal father and his submissive wife, serves as a model for the structure of colonial society as a whole. This is both reflective and constitutive of the highly (Euro-American) masculinized nature of international politics (Enloe 1989). As such, even anti-colonial nationalisms tend to be structured patriarachally, configuring the woman as the embodiment of tradition and mother of the nation which needs to be protected by militarized masculine men (a construction which also has no place for gay men) (Enloe 1989; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989).

Empire building (and dismantling) relies not only on a reconfiguration of gender relations between men and women, but also on a restructuring of relationships among different groups of men. Sinha’s (1995) theorization of “colonial masculinity” in nineteenth-century India highlights the mutual constitution of
“manly” colonizer and the emasculated colonized man. It is the perception of emasculation and effeminacy that works to mobilize the militant and nationalistic sentiments of colonized men. Importantly, the various constructs of masculinity were tied to specific practices of rule in colonial India; this reflects the fact that notions of masculinity require the daily exercise of power, just as power itself depends on these hegemonic constructs (Enloe 1989:3–4). As a number of other anti-colonial critics have noted, “[t]he demasculinization of colonized men and the hypermasculinity of European males represent principle assertions of white supremacy” (Stoler 1991:56). Likewise, colonialism and nationalism typically spring “from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (Enloe 1989:44).

An understanding of these gendered power relations allows us to better comprehend some of the aspects of nineteenth-century Hawaiian Kingdom politics. The works of Merry (2000) and Silva (1999) reveal that acceptance by the world powers as a nation required a display of properly masculine, modern civilization. Efforts to maintain Hawaiian sovereignty thus included (among many other things) the adoption of Western (patriarchal) law and the display and celebration of the masculine heroism of the Kanaka past. As the biggest threat came from the cadre of élite American expatriate men living in the islands, Hawaiian men used nationalist newspapers to critique haole (foreign) dominance, both through political speeches as well as through published stories of male heroes such as Kaweloleimakua. Kawelo was a legendary chief from Kaauʻi who embodied the exemplar of ʻŌiwi masculinity. A devout worshipper of his gods and generous leader, his prowess in fighting, farming, and dancing the hula was unparalleled. Importantly, he was also a chief from a junior line who defeated and usurped the power of his oppressive cousin who was ruler of the island; the allegorical parallels to the colonial situation were well understood by the readers (Silva 1999:17–58).

Despite these interventions (some of which were more subversive than others), the racialized and gendered forces of American colonialism undermined the attempts at securing Hawaiian sovereignty and eventually the monarchy was illegally overthrown. Ferguson and Turnbull (1999) argue that the ascendance of American hegemony in the islands can be understood as the colonial feminization of Hawai‘i and its people. They also trace the ways in which the transformation of beaches for the tourist economy of the twentieth century resulted in the replacement of ʻŌiwi fishermen “by the domesticated gentle male Hawaiians” (recalling the noble savage) who “paddled canoes”, “taught tourists to surf”, “strung leis, sang, and strummed ukuleles” (ibid.:38). It is the feminization and infantilization of Hawai‘i and her children that facilitated/s the sexual and colonial takings of land, resources and mana.

Yet as Stoler and others have made clear, to see sexual domination as merely a social metaphor for Euro-American supremacy and power is to miss the pragmatics of how “gender-specific sexual sanctions demarcated positions of power by refashioning middle-class conventions of respectability, which, in turn, prescribed the personal and public boundaries of race” (1997:374). The key site for the affirmation and maintenance of the bourgeois self was in the regulation of the domestic sphere and of the conduct and the bodies of white women who were figured as the bearers of a proper colonial morality and bourgeois respectability (ibid.:380). Colonized men were often ascribed a
heightened “primitive” sexuality which was perceived as a threat to white women. Yet as Stoler explains, the proliferation of rape charges against colonized men had virtually no correlation with the incidence of actual rapes of European women by men of “color”; rather, the policing of the “Black Peril” needs to be understood as an attempt by European communities to maintain the cohesion of colonial systems which were becoming increasingly threatened from within (by other Europeans in the colonies from different class backgrounds) and without (by colonized men) (Stoler 1997:381–2).

In Hawai’i, the Massie case of 1931–32 captured many of these gendered dynamics. By the 1930s, racial and class tensions had escalated as Kanaka Maoli and immigrant workers and their descendants openly contested the hegemony of the haole (white) élite in the islands (Rosa 1999:12). Likewise an influx of “mainlanders” from the continent created new enclaves of white (mostly military) Americans who expressed open disdain for the high number of “colored” people in the islands (Rosa 2000:98). In 1931, five young working-class men (two Native Hawaiians, one Hawaiian-Chinese, and two Japanese Americans) were accused of raping Thalia Massie, the twenty-year-old wife of a Naval lieutenant stationed at Pearl Harbor and daughter of a rich Kentucky family. When the case ended in a mistrial because of inconsistencies in the testimonies and the establishment of the five young men’s presence elsewhere at the time of the rape, two acts of “vigilantism” were carried out in which Horace Ida (Japanese) was abducted and beaten by a group of Navy men and Joseph Kahawai (the Hawaiian identified as being the “darkest” of the youths) was kidnapped and shot to death by Massie’s mother, husband and two Naval midshipmen. The four were later convicted for manslaughter and sentenced to ten years hard labor, but immediately had their sentences commuted by the Territorial Governor (who apparently was under pressure from Congress and the Navy) to one day (Rosa 2000:95–6). Rosa notes that Thalia Massie’s story of the rape became a powerful mobilizing force for the haole community to defend white womanhood against the “Natives” (here constructed as the nasty, ignoble savage); more importantly, the story was a rallying call to the haole community to guard and preserve the gendered boundaries of race and class which maintained white privilege and property in the islands (Rosa 1999:89–104). The key point here is to understand the ways in which the colonial politics of exclusion hinged upon the regulation and policing of the sexual and domestic life of the colonizer and colonized, and the ways in which different relations of power articulate with gender, race and class. One also sees the operation of a more basic opposition of nature/culture, with “education” and domestication a means of transforming the Native male into a more finished product, again setting up the dichotomy of noble/ignoble savage masculinity.

Though an extreme example, the Massie trials and the killing of Kahawai bring into high relief the physical and symbolic violence enacted upon indigenous men in the colonial context. In settler colonies such as Aotearoa and Hawai’i, the effects of colonization on indigenous men has been a topic of great concern. In both populations, indigenous men account for some of the worst statistics in health, crime, poverty, unemployment, incarceration, and alcohol and drug abuse in their respective societies. The 1991 Hui Hauora Tāne held on the Takapuwahia Marae, Porirua, focused on the health of Māori men. The report details the ways in which Pakeha colonization worked to marginalize Māori men by devaluing
their positions in society, appropriating their lands, removing their economic and cultural assets, and denying them their rangatiratanga (self-determination) (Te Wahanga Hauora Maori 1991). Likewise, a 1997 report *Māori Family Violence in Aotearoa* published by Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Māori Development) points out that colonization led to the loss of traditional beliefs, separation from the land, breakdown of traditional structures of leadership and community, and poor achievement in education and employment. These factors have all contributed to the abusive and hypermasculine behaviors exhibited in Māori men today (Te Puni Kokiri 1997). Similar findings were reported by Crabbe (1997) in a study on alcohol/substance abuse and family violence by Hawaiian men. One article in *Honolulu*, a magazine of popular journalism, even ran an article entitled “The Destruction of the Hawaiian Male” (Nunes and Whitney 1994). Obviously, these conclusions do not extend to all Māori and Ōiwi men, for indeed there are many men who have adjusted well to Western societies. However, these various reports do illustrate how colonial masculinities have worked to disempower and marginalize Native men.

Pyke (1996) notes that lower-class men often exhibit hypermasculine behaviors (e.g. heightened physical prowess, drug and alcohol abuse, sexual conquests and spousal abuse) to compensate for their subordinated status. Connell explains that this “protest masculinity” (or “compensatory masculinity” in Pyke’s [1996:531] words) arises from an experience of powerlessness and leads to an exaggerated claim to the gendered position of masculine power” (1995:113). These hypermasculinities are often found in lower-status men, motorcycle clubs, and urban (especially ethnic) gangs (Pyke 1996:531; Connell 1995:111). Additionally, there is “a lot of concern with face” and “keeping up a front” (Connell 1995:111), and that these displays of hypermasculine behavior are often situational and context dependent (Pyke 1996:542).

Pyke also notes that while compensatory behaviors may be seen as a response to hegemonic masculinity, they also work as its unintentional booster (1996:531). Higher-class men point out the violence and misogyny of hypermasculine practices “as an example of the untamed masculine brutality that they supposedly, do not share” (532), thereby reaffirming their superiority and dominance over lower-class men. When these lower-class men are also colonized men, these behaviors articulate with even larger colonial stereotypes and presumptions that have historically been used to disempower their people. A perfect example is the Māori character Jake Heke of the film *Once Were Warriors* (1994). Born of slave heritage, he spends his days and nights drinking and fighting at the local pub and then takes the party home to his home in the housing projects of South Auckland where he regularly beats his wife (who is herself of chiefly heritage). He has long been alienated from his past and those warrior traditions which may help him achieve a more positive Native masculinity. For the uncritical viewer, this image of the modern Māori man is accepted as “normal”, precisely because of the fact that violence is in their nature (Wall 1998).

The significance of film is its cultural power as an institution to define exemplars of hegemonic masculinities. Indeed, the importance of hegemonic systems is that they are accepted as being proper and desirable because of their connexions to institutional power. As such, I now turn my investigation to the forms of Ōiwi and Māori masculinities achieved in the military and sports. I examine the participation of indigenous men in these institutions to see how
colonial hierarchies are authorized, and, conversely, if these hierarchies can be contested by Polynesian men.

**Military, sports and masculinities**

Two of the most important and deeply interpolated sites for the production of modern masculinities are the military and sports. The military especially is the primary site for the defining of gendered citizenship. Following Kann (1991), Ferguson and Turnbull (1999:158) note that the civic virtue and proper masculinity in the US evolved in a triangle of patriarchal fathers, soldier sons and domesticity (mothers). This patriarchal model of citizenship is articulated with notions of race, class and sexuality, making it more difficult for non-whites, homosexuals or independent women to enter the triangle. This triangle is rooted in the republican tradition of civic virtue and the liberal tradition stressing individualism, equal rights and property. It works to “create men who, lured by the privileges of patriarchal fatherhood, tamed by the ministrations of mothers, and disciplined by the severities of soldiering, could be trusted with extensive individual rights” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:158). For young American men, “the martial ethic in America was an enduring challenge to youth to prove their manhood, practice self-denial, demonstrate obedience, and exhibit the civic virtue that informally qualified them to assume manhood and citizenship in a society that treated masculinity, fatherhood, fraternity, and military service as necessary prerequisites to individualism” (Kann 1991:292, cited in Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:159). Ferguson and Turnbull note that the Japanese-American men who served in the highly decorated 442nd Regimental Combat Team were required to perform masculine acts of heroism and patriotism as American soldiers in order to prove that they were loyal citizens rather than the “enemies within” the United States; “to become real Americans, these males had to become real men” (ibid.:160). However, even this participation did not totally allow them to transcend all barriers as returning servicemen continually ran into racist exclusions.

Ferguson and Turnbull note that the military’s “pedagogy of citizenship” is reproduced throughout the larger society of Hawai‘i in such “capillaries” as the Boy Scouts, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, and the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) (ibid.:173). Though they make no mention of it, the JROTC played a large role in the colonization of élite Hawaiian males who were required to take JROTC at the Kamehameha Schools for Boys in Honolulu, which in the early part of the twentieth century was designated a full military institute (Kahapea 1987:15).

Indeed, though Ferguson and Turnbull provide a cogent argument to the role of the military in the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity, they are conspicuously silent on the engagements of indigenous men within the colonizer’s army. Pukui et al. (1972, II:305) discuss the participation of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi in WWII:

> Though men were frozen in jobs, and draft was deferred in Hawai‘i, the great proportion of Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian men of military age served in the armed forces . . . [I]f we judge by Hawaiian names, at least 56 Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian men who gave their lives in World War II had won such high military honors as the Distinguished Flying Cross with one, two, and three Oak-Leaf Clusters, Bronze and Silver Stars.
One of these men was Alexander Kahapea who graduated from Kamehameha in 1936. Kahapea served as a Captain in the 83rd Infantry Division, Thunderbolt, in the European Theater and became the most highly decorated war veteran from Hawai‘i (Kahapea 1987, 1990:7). Other ‘Ōiwi war heroes mentioned by Pukui et al. include Pfc. Herbert K. Pilila‘au, the first Hawaiian to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor, in the Korean War, and Sergeant First Class Rodney Yano, recipient of the Medal of Honor in Vietnam. Both men lost their lives saving their fellow soldiers and were given their awards posthumously (ibid.:305–6). Despite the significant contributions of Kānaka in the US military, their participation has been so overshadowed by the accomplishments of the Japanese-Americans of the 442nd that the presence of ‘Ōiwi soldiers has been virtually erased. This erasure is, in many ways, consonant with the discourse of “disappearing Hawaiians”.

This non-presence of Kānaka Maoli in narratives of military heroism stands in stark contrast to the extensively lionized Māori Battalions in the two world wars (Cowan 1926; Gardiner 1992). Gardiner argues that various cultural notions (e.g. accruement of personal mana and the mana of the tribe through battle; leadership development; and the exacting of utu, revenge) figured prominently in Māori participation in the wars. Gardiner argues that in World War I, the formation of the first Pioneer Battalion was a part of a larger social movement among Māori to achieve equal status to that of the Pakeha, especially in light of the Imperial policy that denied Māori an opportunity to fight in “white” wars (ibid.:13). More recently, Erai (1995) conducted research with Māori who currently serve in the New Zealand Army. She suggests that responsibilities to the whanau (family) and the larger iwi (tribe) are the legacy of the Māori Battalions or of previous family members who had joined the army, and, interestingly, the belief in a “warrior instinct” inherent in the Māori people (ibid.:36–7). She also noted that there were more opportunities afforded to Māori men than women to advance and enter into relations of “patriarchal bonding” with other men regardless of ethnic or rank divisions (54).

Here we can see how the experiences of Māori soldiers is structured by their own situatedness in gendered structures and the different points of privilege and subordination they have. Comments by both Māori and ‘Ōiwi suggest that their ethnic/racial identities were quite salient markers of the types of masculinities they made claims to in the military, especially in the case of the Māori Battalions (Cowan 1926; Erai 1995; Gardiner 1992; Pukui et al. 1972, II:306). By proving that their courage and fighting capabilities were equal to, if not superior to, their white counterparts that they were serving with, indigenous men could repudiate the colonizers’ superiority and validate their own masculinities. At the same time though, rather than challenging the social practice of soldiery and the patriarchal triangle of which it is a part, ‘Ōiwi and Māori men are complicit with the maintenance of a Euro-American hegemonic institution which naturalizes colonial rule by mapping it onto a system of gendered, raced and classed power relations.

On the other hand, a strong argument could also be made that ‘Ōiwi and Māori men achieved specifically indigenous forms of masculinity through their involvement in the military. As some of Erai’s male interviewees suggested (as did Gardiner [1992:7–11]), a specifically Māori warrior masculinity may have been achieved. Also, by entering the military in order to fulfil obligations to the
community, increase the mana of one’s family or tribe, improve one’s socio-economic status, or merely to put food on the table, Polynesian men are actively working to promote the survival and growth of their people. In a racist colonial society with very few employment options available to Pacific Islander men, this may have been one of the few options available for Māori and ‘Oiwi men to achieve a masculinity based on notions of family, leadership, providing, strength and mana (Ihimaera 2000).

Many of the same complexities and contradictions encountered by Polynesian men situated in the military are echoed, reinforced and often prefigured in the institution of sports. Indeed, a number of scholars have highlighted the direct links between the military, sports, masculinity, capitalism and imperialism (Burstyn 1999; Hanlon 1999; Wakefield 1997). Burstyn argues that the political-economic changes of late nineteenth-century capitalist societies hinged upon the transformation of hegemonic ideals of masculinity. The earlier ideal of the “the moral and measured being of the eighteenth century” was replaced by “a physically dominating and hypermasculine creation” (ibid.:74) which was tamed through the discipline of “muscular Christianity”. Key to this training was sports, which built strength, created habits of dominance, taught principles of group effort and common goals, and promoted the values of nineteenth-century Christianity, thereby harnessing “men’s sexual impulses in the service of worthy social enterprises”, namely capitalist-imperial expansion (ibid.:92).

In the contemporary context of (neo)colonial global capitalism, multi-billion dollar corporations market sport and sport-related products “as men’s culture and as a hypermasculine spectacle for society as a whole” (ibid.:104). Central to this process are the affects and effects of advertising, which symbolically links the viewer/consumer with the heroic figure of the male athlete/warrior (ibid.:144). Targeting a white middle-class audience, images of strong, physical, working-class men evoke in the “softer” men anxieties and envious identification (ibid.:148). Messner notes that these “tough guys” reaffirm the superiority of men vis-à-vis women and also serve as the “other” against which “modern” men define themselves; “The ‘tough guys’ are, in a sense, contemporary gladiators sacrificed so that elite men can have a clear sense of where they stand in the intermale pecking order” (Messenr 1994:98, cited in Burstyn 1999:208). Racial hierarchies are recapitulated by the image of the “black super-athlete” who represents the “tough guy” par excellence (ibid.:208). At the same time that they are glamorized, they are also vilified as their hypermasculinity is always understood as being “less than human” or even threatening to white property and bodies (ibid.:211; hooks 1992).

In the colonial context of Aotearoa, both the Māori male athlete and his culture are represented in the sport-media complex as the embodiment of primal, savage warriorhood (this is akin to the situation of the Indian mascot North American). Wall (1998:94) calls this stereotype the “Māori as the primitive natural athlete, represented in all areas of sport, especially the contact sports of rugby and rugby league (the latter is particularly relevant with the establishment of the Auckland Warriors, who have adopted the stylized face of a Maori Warrior as their emblem).” Again, this image is rooted in the much older colonial stereotype of the Māori as the bloodthirsty savage.

The usurpation of the Māori as a sport symbol is rooted in the desires, envies, anxieties and fears of male colonizers whose own masculinity is defined with and
against the colonized man’s. The appropriation of Native masculinity is especially notable in the performance of the haka (indigenous Maori dance) by Maori and non-Maori rugby teams alike. In May 2000, the home page of the New Zealand All Blacks, the team which popularized performance of the haka at matches, spoke of the mythological origins of the haka in Maori culture and its use as an indigenous practice. It stated:

The centrality of the haka within All Black rugby tradition is not a recent development. Since the original “All Black” team of “New Zealand Natives” led by Joseph Warbrick the haka has been closely associated with New Zealand rugby. Its mystique has evolved along the fierce determination, commitment and high level skill which has been the hallmark of New Zealand’s National game. (New Zealand All Blacks 2000)

The utilization of the haka by the New Zealand Natives was contemporaneous with its use by the Māori Pioneer Battalion in World War I. The haka was a strong signifier of Māori identity and masculinity in those contexts, and worked to summon the mana of the atua (deities) when used by the Māori on the rugby fields and battlefields. The problem is that the “Natives” became conflated with the “All Blacks”, just as the “fierce” qualities of the Māori were taken to describe New Zealand as a whole; this equation of Māori with all New Zealanders erases the histories of oppression in which Māori, though not passive, were far from equal participants in the structuring of colonial society. Adding to the appearance of equality are the high numbers of Māori and non-Maori Pacific Islanders on the team. The notable visbility of players that are racially marked as Polynesian taps multiple structures of feeling which are complexly tied to colonial and nationalist histories and to notions of masculinities in Aotearoa, and in many ways works to mask the underlying tensions still extant as Polynesian men “compete on and off the field” (Star 1999).

It is also important to note that such appropriations of identity by the sports-media complex can no longer go uncontested. In June 2000, in the wake of false reports that the All Blacks were going to seek to trademark the haka they perform, the Ngati Toa tribe registered the haka as an iwi (tribal) trademark based on the fact that it their ancestor Te Rauparaha had written it (BBC News 2000; Nga Korero 2000; NZRUGBY.COM 2000). Though the Ngati Toa has allowed the All Blacks to continue to use the haka, they have clearly asserted that control of the haka will stay in the hands of the descendants of Te Rauparaha.

In Hawai‘i, debates over the racist and colonial representations of ‘Ōiwi masculinity as the “Rainbow Warrior” mascot of the University of Hawai‘i football team led to a series of threats to the mascot and his retirement in 1999 (Ohira and Pang 1999; Star-Bulletin Staff 2000). What resulted was the adoption of a stylized letter “H” with a pattern of geometrical shapes meant to replicate the kapa (barkcloth) designs. More interesting, the name “Rainbow Warriors” was changed to just “Warriors”, a change carried out only by the football team. Former NFL player and UH assistant coach Rich Miano stated, “We wanted to have something to do with toughness. I think the rainbow thing . . . doesn’t have what we’re looking for in terms of the mentality of our football players. We want to be the ‘Warriors’.” (Tsai 2000). Athletic director Hugh Yoshida went as far as to comment, “That [rainbow] logo really put a stigma on our program at times in regards to it’s part of the gay community, their flags and so forth. Some of the
student athletes had some feelings in regards to that” (Staff and wire reports 2000). Yoshida’s comments made national headlines as the new logo and name suddenly became the center of controversies surrounding racism and sexism; not insignificantly, these all revolved around the defining, representing and marketing of a “proper” masculinity for Hawai’i’s only collegiate football team.

While the military and sports are largely hegemonic institutions, we should not take for granted that they will always overdetermine the gendered identities of those who participate in these sites. We need to remember that the situated gender practices of indigenous men may often be at odds with or even subversive of the dominant ideologies promoted in such institutions. Burstyn notes that the meaning of sport as symbolic war could work to provide colonized men with “a possible ‘level playing field’... to beat the masters at their own game” (1999:89). Diaz (2000) offers some important insights as he reflects on his participation in the Tamuning Eagles, a youth football program in Guam that was created by Native Hawaiians and Hawaii-born men who worked on Guam for the US Military in the 1970s. Noting the heavily colonized and hegemonic forms of social practices which are en-gendered in such a site, he also shows that the team served as an arena in which indigenous and non-indigenous islanders created surrogate familial ties, localized and articulated hegemonic practices with indigenous ones (such as playing Hawaiian music after games), and contested the military’s presence on the island.

Similarly, the ironies of serving in the colonizer’s army brought about radical transformations in Kanaka Maoli activists such as Kelii “Skippy” Ioane and Keanu Sai. Both men found themselves questioning their service in an institution which was actively maintaining colonial authority in Hawai’i. Yet they also state that their military training has better prepared them for the battles of decolonization, to which they now devote all of their energies. These transformations are representative of the redefining of indigenous masculinities in an era of decolonization.

Conclusion: decolonizing masculinities?

Since the 1960s, ‘Oiwi and Māori people have been engaging in a variety of different struggles for self-determination and decolonization. While the military and sports remain hegemonic in nature, Kanaka Maoli and Tangata Māori men are now also returning to “traditional” institutions for the achievement of indigenous masculinities. Some of these practices include dance, tattooing, ocean voyaging, martial art forms and warrior traditions. Though by no means the sole province of men, such attitudes and practices are often figured in masculine terms, and are therefore seen as desirable for anticolonial projects of reclamation. Smith (1999:104) writes of the Maori:

> It is not surprising that in New Zealand the renewed focus on warrior traditions has come at a time when Maori people sense a turning point which could go either forward or backward. For Maori that tradition is to be found in the often quoted saying of the chief Rewi Maniapoto, *ka whawhai tonu matou, ake tonu ake*, “we will fight on for ever and ever”.

As I mentioned in the beginning of the paper, many Kānaka Maoli are now practicing “masculinized” traditions that have been directly influenced by or borrowed from Māori practices. There is an ironic parallel here with the
appropriation of Māori masculinity by mainstream society in that both ‘Ōiwi men and white men are seeking to reconnect with a warrior tradition. However, for Kānaka Maoli, many see these forms as being part of a shared Polynesian culture, and the identification of Kānaka as the “older siblings” in Māori traditions allows ‘Ōiwi men to make claims on a shared heritage. The important part of this claim is that masculinity is identified with authentic traditions of pre-colonial Polynesian society that were able to resist the perceived feminization and emasculation that accompanied colonization in Hawai‘i. As Harper (1996:IX) notes in regards to African-American men, claims to an “authentic” identity “are largely animated by a profound anxiety about the status specifically of . . . masculinity”. For Kanaka Maoli, these anxieties are resolved by reconnecting with the masculinity of their ancestors and their Polynesian brothers.

However, these same ideologies of gendered power and authority have come under heavy critique by indigenous Maoli and Māori women (Trask 1984, 1999; Hoskins 2000). In their view, the articulation of masculine power and authority with sovereignty and self-determination represents a double-colonization for indigenous women as they become disempowered by both larger white society and their own men.

In light of such critique, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and Tangata Maori men are hard pressed to find tactics of producing decolonized masculinities. One possibility may be the structuring of gender practices along the lines of pono. Kame’eleihiwa (1993, 1999) argues that the philosophy of pono in gender relations entails balance, well-being and righteousness. Most of all it is an understanding that the entities of Ku (the man) and Hina (the woman) need to be in balance for all things to be right. This philosophy is specifically laid out by Pukui et al. (1972) in various discussions of health and healing. Many ‘Ōiwi and Māori people today are struggling to find how exactly such a balance between Ku/Hina and Tu/Hine is to be achieved. It is here, perhaps, that there lies a chance for effective change.

The decolonization of indigenous masculinities will require not only a restructuring of the way in which we see ourselves, but also the ways in which we perform ourselves and be ourselves. We must be able to read the ways in which masculinities articulated in decolonization movements may alternatively work to empower and disempower our people in new and old ways. It is misleading to draw a distinct line between masculinities produced in colonizing and in decolonizing contexts; in both situations, gender practices are defined in relation to both men and women of colonizer and colonized societies. The trick is to find ways in which newer practices enable us to reclaim mana in ways that will help us to better negotiate the larger frameworks of gendered, raced and classed power dynamics which both structure and are structured by our actions as men and women.

Notes

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1. I recognize that the use of the terms “Polynesia(n)”, “Melanesia(n)” and “Micronesia(n)” impute a false sense of homogeneity and discreetness and that these anthropologically defined cultural boundaries are both arbitrary and problematic
(Thomas 1997). However, many indigenous Pacific Islanders within Polynesia have chosen to adopt the term either out of convention or as a “strategic essentialism” for the forging of trans-Polynesian ties; such was the case when Witi Ihimaera (2000), a gay Maori novelist, gave his speech on reclaiming Polynesian masculinities at the University of Hawai‘i. I use the term out of convenience but not with an uncritical acceptance of the baggage they carry.

Of course the same argument on terminology can and has been made for the concepts “the Pacific/Pacific Island(ers)” or “Ocean/Oceanic” (see Hau‘ofa 1993). I use both “Pacific Islands” and “Oceania” (and the corollary labels for the indigenous Pacific Island/Oceanic inhabitants) interchangeably throughout this essay. I agree with Hau‘ofa’s (1993) assertion that we need to reorient our perspectives as Island people to the larger interconnections we share with all other Oceaneans; however, I still find use for the term Pacific.

2. I use the terms Kanaka Maoli, ‘Oiwi Maoli, Kanaka ‘Oiwi, ‘Oiwi, Kanaka, and Kanaka ‘Oiwi Maoli synonymously with indigenous Hawaiians. I use the terms Tangata Maoli and Maori for the indigenous people of Aotearoa. All are indigenous terms which these people use to identify themselves with (with the addition of Tangata Whenua for Maori, a term which I do not use because of my own unfamiliarity with it).

3. See Linnekin (1990) and Kame‘eleihiwa (1999) for attempts at reconstructing the place of Hawaiian women in pre-colonial social and cultural orders, and see Ralston (1993) for a reconstruction of Maori women’s practices.

References


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**Filmography**


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