Cosmopolitan Nation-Building: The Institutional Contradiction and Politics of Postwar Japanese Education

Hiro SAITO*

The education system has been a quintessential state apparatus of nation-building since the emergence of the modern nation-state; however, recent comparative studies demonstrate the growing presence of cosmopolitanism in education policies and school curricula around the world. This trend indicates that the education system now operates according to two different institutional logics, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. To understand how the education system negotiates the potential contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, in this paper, I analyze the case of postwar Japanese education. Theoretically, I synthesize studies of institutional logics and social movements: while the former shed light on a contradiction between different institutional logics as a source of political contestation, the latter help to explain how political actors select solutions to the contradiction. Empirically, I show how a series of education reforms modified the original solution that had prioritized cosmopolitanism over nationalism, culminating in the new Fundamental Law of Education that redefined the two institutional logics as symbiotic. My analysis thus suggests that the Japanese education system is evolving into a state apparatus of cosmopolitan nation-building in an increasingly global world.

1. Introduction

In social science disciplines, the education system has been considered a quintessential state apparatus of nation-building that inculcates national identity and naturalizes the nation-state as the most important unit of social life (Gellner 1997; Smith 1998). Against a backdrop of globalization, however, recent comparative studies have demonstrated that school curricula define students increasingly as members of ‘world society’ according to cosmopolitan conceptions anchored in world culture (Benavot and Braslavsky 2007). This worldwide trend in education first emerged after World War II and accelerated in the past few decades in conjunction with the expansion of transnational economic, political and social activities (Sassen 2003), and the intensification of awareness of the world as a whole (Robertson 1992).

Hiro SAITO is an assistant professor of Sociology and faculty member of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. His research interests include social theory, culture, education and collective memory. His recent publications include ‘Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitan Education’ in The Journal of Curriculum Studies (2010) and ‘Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism’ in Sociological Theory (forthcoming). He can be reached at the Department of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Sanders Hall 247, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA, or by e-mail at: hs9@hawaii.edu.

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The ongoing transformation of education systems across the world raises an important question about the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The question concerns the very nature of the education system, specifically its ‘institutional logic’ (Scott 2001; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). An institutional logic is a set of assumptions, categories and norms that organize relevant actors’ identities and practices to reproduce a given institution: institutional logics are integral to the structuration of all institutions. Since the modern nation-state first emerged, nationalism has been a dominant institutional logic of the education system. Nationalism prioritizes the ‘nation’ over other categories and legitimates education policies, school curricula, and reforms that are consistent with its logic. In contrast, cosmopolitanism prioritizes the ‘world’ and legitimates discourses and practices that transcend the nation. The worldwide trend in education therefore points to the emergence of an ‘institutional contradiction’ (Friedland and Alford 1991) between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. How, then, do political actors negotiate and resolve the institutional contradiction in organizing education policies, school curricula, and reforms in an increasingly global world?

To answer that question and re-examine the nature of the education system as a state apparatus of nation-building, this paper analyzes the case of post-World War II Japan. Since Japan has grappled with the relationship between the nation and the world throughout its modern history (Robertson 1992; Delanty 2003; Lincicome 2009), it offers extensive data on the negotiation between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The Japanese data are not only extensive but also clean: that Japan has a centralized education system based on the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) makes it relatively easy to observe interactions between the two institutional logics of education, in contrast with decentralized education systems that lack foundational rules at the national level.

Below, I first elaborate the nature of the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in education. Next, I introduce the theory of social movements to clarify mechanisms that mediate how political actors select solutions to the institutional contradiction and how they stabilize or challenge the selected solution. In light of the theories of institutional contradiction and social movements, I then examine the history of the Japanese education system since the end of World War II. The historical analysis illustrates how political actors gradually modified the original solution that had prioritized cosmopolitanism over nationalism during the Allied Occupation, eventually replacing it with the new FLE that legitimated the composite of the two institutional logics.

### Institutional Logics of Education

When nationalism as a political doctrine gathered force in Europe from the early 19th century onward, the state began to deploy the education system systematically to homogenize the population in terms of national culture and identity (Gellner 1983; Smith 1998). According to Pierre Bourdieu’s succinct formulation, the state deploys the education system to establish and inculcate ‘common forms and categories of perception and appreciation . . . in short, state forms of classification’ constitutive of ‘(national) common sense . . . [and] what is commonly designated as national identity (or, in a more traditional language, national character)’ (Bourdieu 1999: 61, 68). In the 20th century, the education system as a state apparatus of nation-building came to be institutionalized throughout the world (Thomas et al. 1987). As a dominant institutional logic of education, nationalism legitimated policies and curricula that prioritized the nation (and its auxiliary concepts, such as ‘national identity’ and ‘national interest’) over other categories.

Studies of globalization suggest, however, that the link between the state and the nation has been reconfigured significantly in recent decades (Held et al. 1999; Sassen 2007). Specifically, they have shown that the state partially denationalizes its institutions to facilitate transnational economic,
political, and social activities. As part of the ongoing reconfiguration of nation-states, education systems across the world institutionalize cosmopolitanism that takes world society or ‘humanity’ as a primary reference. Summarizing recent cross-national studies of education policies and school curricula, John Meyer observed:

There is the rise of the individual person seen as a member of global society . . . And there is, consequently, the need to reorganize the conceptions of national society around notions of it being embedded in a world society, its capacity to progress in that world society (Meyer 2007: 264).

This ongoing institutionalization of cosmopolitanism as a new logic of education is illustrated by the rise of human rights education that emphasizes international understanding, global awareness, and world citizenship (Ramirez, Suarez and Meyer 2007). As the United Nations (UN) and international non-governmental organizations promoted cosmopolitan conceptions and norms anchored in world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999; Lechner and Boli 2005), the education system came to be redefined as a vehicle for not only building the nation but also helping the individual acquire competencies and values to participate successfully in world society.

The contemporary education system thus confronts an institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Institutional sociologists Friedland and Alford (1991) originally introduced the theory of institutional contradiction to explain how individuals and organizations negotiate potential contradictions between logics of multiple institutions of society—the market, the state, democracy, family and religion. While their original formulation located multiple institutional logics and their contradictions at the societal level, subsequent studies have generalized it to include competitions among multiple logics at lower levels of analysis—within subsystems and organizations (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). As comparative studies have demonstrated that both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are institutionalized in education systems across the world, the question is then how the contradiction between the two institutional logics is negotiated in reality. Here, the theory of institutional contradiction offers useful conceptual tools to answer this question.

**Typical Solutions to Institutional Contradictions**

While several case studies have examined how competing institutional logics are negotiated within particular organizations (Heimer 1999; Thornton and Ocasio 1999; Binder 2007), critical theorists Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) provide a general conceptual framework for studying how people resolve contradictions between institutional logics. Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that disagreement emerges when actors invoke different logics of justification grounded in different worldviews. Actors can move to resolve their disagreement only after they agree on which logic of justification they should use. Once they agree to use the same logic of justification, they can use it as a common frame of reference for interpreting the situation and evaluating proposed actions to take.

More often than not, however, actors cannot agree on which logic of justification should be used as a common frame of reference. Actors then try to ‘resolve’ their disagreement by making a compromise between competing logics. In the case of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, a compromise would dictate that the education system should serve both the nation and the world. Here Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that a typical way of solidifying a compromise is

to place objects composed of elements stemming from different worlds at the service of the common good and endow them with their own identity . . . The multiplication of composite objects that corroborate one another and their identification with a common form thus help work out and stabilize a compromise (278–279).
This kind of compromise is found in sociological discussion of cosmopolitanism itself (Beck 2006; Calhoun 2008; Delanty 2009). On the one hand, social theorists argue that the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism has to presuppose the stabilizing forces of the nation-state and nationalism. On the other hand, they suggest that nationalism can be modified in a cosmopolitan direction, to create ‘cosmopolitan nation-states’ and ‘cosmopolitan national citizens’. As these composite objects proliferate, a compromise between the two institutional logics appears more natural and acquires stability. In the case of the Japanese education system, the concepts of ‘Japanese in the world’ (sekai no naka no nihonjin) and ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’ (kokusaitekina nihonjin) are the prominent examples of composites of nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

While Boltanski and Thévenot suggest a multiplication of composite objects as a mechanism that helps stabilize compromises between different institutional logics, I propose a more general mechanism of stabilization that can be applied to both types of solution, prioritizing one institutional logic and making a compromise. This mechanism can be called ‘deep-structuration’: solutions to institutional contradictions get stabilized when they acquire ‘depth’ in the sense that ‘they are present in a relatively wide range of institutional spheres, practices, and discourses ... taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them’ (Sewell 2005: 146). A solution becomes ‘deep-structural’ when it is inscribed into the institutional core of a given system. This is not only because people place in the institutional core conceptions and norms that they consider to be of fundamental importance. The institutional core also has the advantage of ‘path-dependence’ (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004) because it forms earlier than other, outer institutional layers of the system. Here, the Constitution is a good example. What is codified in the Constitution is enduring not simply because people believe in its fundamental legitimacy, but also because a vast number of everyday practices, policy discussions, legislations, and organizations within a given polity depend on the Constitution for their legitimacy.

Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion of stabilization of solutions to institutional contradictions begs important questions concerning the politics of institutions. How do actors decide to adopt one solution over others? What enables them to institutionalize the adopted solution into the core of the system? While political contestations are part and parcel of any institution (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Stinchcombe 1997), institutional contradictions serve specifically as focal points of such contestations. To answer the questions of the political processes revolving around institutional contradictions, the next section proposes to combine the theory of institutional logics with that of social movements.

**Political Mechanisms in Resolving Institutional Contradictions**

A point of departure for studying the politics of institutions is the fact that they follow a life cycle: ‘successful institutionalization is preceded and followed by the emergence of new competitors or alternative models’ (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 218). Not only does the initial round of institutionalization of a solution involve political contestations, but what has been institutionalized also remains open to new contestations. Given the path-dependent stability of the institutional core, new solutions are often ‘grafted’ or ‘layered’ onto the existing system without radically transforming its overall trajectory (Thelen 2004). However, there can also be ‘eventful’ transformations that entail a cascade of structural reconfigurations that fundamentally alter an overall trajectory of the system (Sewell 2005). Eventful institutional transformations are typically preceded by the long-term buildup of minor incremental changes that reach a certain threshold and create structural potentialities for significant institutional transformations (Pierson 2004). When those potentialities intersect with proper
actions, the long-term build-ups and short-term actions can combine to transform the system as a whole (Abbott 2001).

At the initial adoption of a solution and at the peak of its contestation—two most critical moments in the cycle of institutional politics—‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Rao, Morrill and Zald 2000) play a crucial role in determining outcomes. They orchestrate three mechanisms to actualize potentialities for significant institutional transformations: ‘mobilization structures’, ‘political opportunities’ and ‘framing processes’ (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Mobilization structures (Zald and McCarthy 1987) include formal organizations and informal networks capable of mobilizing efforts to change existing institutional arrangements. Political opportunities (McAdam 1999) refer to structural openings in the political system; for example, social movements gain a new political opportunity when a significant elite realignment occurs within the system. Framing processes (Snow and Benford 1988) are signifying practices to increase the resonance of a given social movement with the public and garner their support. When actors manage to orchestrate these three mechanisms around structural potentialities that have built up, they are likely to succeed in either founding new institutions or transforming existing ones at the most fundamental level.

Up to now, the theory of social movements has been applied to cases of actors outside of the political system who try to challenge existing laws and policies by influencing actors inside the system. However, I suggest that the theory can be also applied to policymakers who seek institutional transformations from inside the political system. That is, the mechanisms of mobilization structures, political opportunities and framing processes are conceptually general enough to cover any actors and collective actions that aim to transform institutions. For instance, mobilization structures for policymakers would mean political parties and state bureaucracies. To advance their reform agenda, policymakers have to mobilize sufficient support from their own parties and relevant ministries. In the context of postwar Japan, a majority in the Diet did not automatically guarantee an adequate mobilization structure for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This is not only because Japanese politicians were heavily dependent on the expertise of bureaucrats (Curtis 1999), but also because ‘subgovernments’, sets of party members and ministries that specialized in specific policy domains, emerged as crucial units of mobilization (Campbell 1984). Mobilization structures therefore include not simply the number of Diet seats that a given party has secured but also support from relevant ministries.

Next, political opportunities for policymakers would mean significant realignments of actors inside and outside the political system. In the case of postwar Japan, such realignments include the merger of conservative political parties into the LDP in 1955, the LDP’s temporary loss of power in 1993, the short-lived coalition of the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) from 1994 to 1996, and the relatively stable coalition of the LDP and New Komeito (NK) from 2000 to 2009. These realignments created political opportunities for some reforms and closed those for others. Moreover, in the context of the Japanese education system, the Japan Teachers Union (JTU) was an important actor outside the political system. Although the JTU did not have direct access to the government, it had generally succeeded in pressuring the LDP government not to carry out reforms that would significantly compromise the postwar settlement (Schoppa 1991; Aspinall 2001). The declining membership of the JTU, as well as the demise of its political ally the JSP in the 1990s, however, created a new political opportunity favorable to the LDP. Thus, the structure of political opportunities depends on shifting alignments and power relations among relevant actors inside and outside the political system.

Finally, framing processes operate for both social-movement actors and policymakers. How actors frame and present their proposed reform influences the outcome of their reform attempt. Here, a crucial factor is ‘frame resonance’ (Benford and Snow 2000). Generally speaking, the more resonance a given frame can produce in the public, the more public support it can mobilize. The degree of
resonance depends on the frame’s credibility and salience. In the context of postwar Japanese politics, attempts to undo the Occupation reforms often had credibility problems because they were seen as dangerous regressions to the prewar period. Moreover, some reform attempts had greater success than others because they connected to social problems that were salient at the time. As the next section illustrates, a key to the 2006 reform of the FLE was a ‘new-century frame’ that built on the widespread sense of crisis after Japan suffered its worst economic recession since World War II.

Transposing the theory of social movements to the study of institutional logics in the context of the education system, I propose that only when political actors succeed in orchestrating mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and framing processes are they likely to succeed in either institutionalizing or modifying a solution to the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. In light of this synthetic theoretical framework, I will now proceed to analyze the history of postwar Japanese education.

**Japanese Education since World War II**

In this section, I divide the history of postwar Japanese education into three periods during which political actors adopted three distinct solutions to the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism: the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism as an antidote to nationalism in the FLE (1945–1950); the incremental modification of the original solution through a series of institutional layering to normalize a compromise between the two institutional logics (1951–1999) and the reformation of the FLE and deep-structuration of the compromise in the institutional core of the education system (2000–2006).

The following historical analysis is based on three kinds of data. The first are laws regarding education that the Diet legislated. The second are official curricular guidelines, memos and reports produced by the Ministry of Education (MOE) [which was reformed and renamed the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) in 2001]. The third are discussions by policymakers, i.e. politicians, bureaucrats and policy advisers, with regard to the first and second data—e.g. laws by the Diet and official education policies by the MOE (or MEXT). These discussions are documented in newspapers, parliamentary proceedings, publications by advisory councils, and committees and journals published by the MOE and MEXT.

**The Introduction of Cosmopolitanism, 1945–1950**

When Japan surrendered unconditionally on 15 August 1945, the most important goal for Japanese policymakers was to maintain the emperor-centered national polity. On the day after the Shōwa Emperor announced Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers, the MOE issued instructions commanding teachers to commit themselves to the ‘maintenance of the national polity according to the sacred pronouncement of His Majesty’.

When Higashikuniomiya Naruhiko formed a new cabinet on 17 August, however, he appointed Maeda Tamon as the minister of education. Maeda was anomalous for a Japanese policymaker at that time.

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time. In his youth, Maeda had been a student and follower of the Christian intellectual Nitobe Inazō, who had become the first under-secretary-general of the League of Nations in 1920. Maeda himself had represented Japan at the International Labour Organization in Genève from 1923 to 1925 and presided over the Museum of Japanese Culture in New York City from 1938 to 1941. In his memoir Sanshō Seishi (Maeda 1947), Maeda recounted fondly these overseas experiences as formative of his views and aspirations as an educator. He was a human carrier of the idea of world society that the League of Nations had begun to institutionalize before World War II.

Maeda articulated his vision of the new Japanese education system during his nationwide radio speech on 9 September:

Since 15 August, we have been living in a new era. But what is this new era? This new era sets Japan on one and only one path: without any military power, we will go forward with culture. As the truly ethical Japanese nation we shall contribute to progress of the world as a whole.2

Maeda’s vision of cosmopolitan education was laid out systematically in ‘The Educational Principles for Building a New Japan’ that the MOE issued on 15 September. The document consisted of a preamble and 11 articles that redefined the aims of Japanese education. As stated in the preamble, the MOE declared that the postwar education system should serve ‘the purpose of building a new Japan that contributes to world peace and the welfare of humanity’.3

Although Maeda was unusual for his cosmopolitan orientation, he was also a creature of the prewar education system because ‘The Educational Principles for Building a New Japan’ continued to insist on the ‘maintenance of the national polity’. But the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) did not allow it. Having arrived at Yokohama on 28 August, SCAP pursued the elimination of militarist–nationalist ideologies and the promotion of democracy more extensively than Japanese policymakers were prepared to do on their own initiatives. On 31 October, SCAP issued a directive to expel militarist teachers immediately from schools. On 31 December, SCAP suspended the teaching of moral education, Japanese history, and geography—three academic subjects that had promoted nationalism in prewar education—and ordered the MOE to delete militarist and nationalist contents from existing textbooks. SCAP’s policies affected Maeda himself on 4 January 1946, when a directive was issued to expel militarists from public offices. According to the directive, Maeda was defined as a ‘militarist’ since he had taken part in the Imperial Aid Association during the war. Maeda resigned on 10 January.

Abe Yoshinari, the principal of the First High School at the time, succeeded Maeda. The most significant event during Abe’s four-month tenure was the arrival of the United States Education Mission. The Mission, which consisted of 27 American educators, came to Japan on 5 March 1946. The Mission submitted the ‘Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan’ to SCAP on 30 March. Criticizing the Japanese education system for its over-centralization and over-standardization, the Report emphasized the importance of the individual as the foundation of democratic Japan and added that democratization should be carried out in reference to world society: ‘The overall objective

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should be the promotion of democratic Japanese education within a world society committed to non-
aggression and peace’ (United States Education Mission to Japan 1946: 15). Indeed, the aims of the
new Japanese education should be ‘in harmony with the fundamental principles laid down in the
Charter of the United Nations Organizations and in the draft Constitution of the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’ (ibid: 7). For the rest of the Occupation, both SCAP
and Japanese policymakers used the Report as a basis for planning education reforms (Tsuchimochi
1993; Shibata 2005).

Soon after the release of the Report, a political chaos followed the first postwar general election on
10 April. The Liberal Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro won the largest number of seats in the Imperial
Diet, but SCAP intervened and banned him from assuming public office. When Yoshida Shigeru
finally emerged as prime minister on 22 May, Abe resigned and recommended Tanaka Kōtarō as
his successor. Yoshida accepted Abe’s recommendation, and Tanaka became the new minister of
education.

Tanaka was as unusual as Maeda for policymakers at that time. Tanaka had been a law professor at
the University of Tokyo who specialized in ‘world law’, the comparative study of laws across civiliza-
tions to uncover their common moral foundations. Tanaka was also a Roman Catholic. Since Tanaka
believed strongly in the importance of moral education, he had initially supported the idea of keeping
the Imperial Rescript on Education that had defined the moral basis of prewar Japanese education
(Sugihara 1983). By the time the Report was published in April 1946, however, it became clear that
it would be impossible to keep the Rescript. Instead, Tanaka began to formulate plans to create dem-
ocratically—through legislation—something similar to the Rescript for the postwar education sys-
tem.4 By the end of September, the MOE produced the first draft of the FLE. Even though
Yoshida replaced Tanaka with Takahashi Sei’ichiro, a professor of economics at Keio University, in
January 1947, the MOE continued to work on the draft and submitted the final draft to the Privy
Council for review on 5 March. The government made one last revision according to the Council’s
recommendation and submitted a bill to the Imperial Diet on 12 March.

The bill consisted of a preamble and 11 articles, just like the previously issued ‘Educational Princi-
pies for Building a New Japan’. The preamble specified the spirit of the FLE as follows:

We have established the Constitution of Japan and declared our determination to create a democratic and
cultured nation, and contribute to world peace and the welfare of humankind. Realization of this ideal
depends fundamentally on the power of education. We shall educate human beings who revere the dignity
of the individual as well as seek truth and peace ardently. We must also thoroughly promote education that
aims to create a culture that is universal and yet full of uniqueness.5

The FLE did not define recipients of education as Japanese but ‘human beings who revere the
dignity of the individual’. Although ‘the Constitution of Japan’ implied that the bill was framed in
terms of the Japanese nation-state, the FLE nonetheless emphasized cosmopolitanism in terms of
the contribution to ‘world peace and the welfare of humankind’ and the education of ‘human beings’.

4. The Imperial Diet Committee on Reform of the Imperial Constitution, 15 July 1946.
index.htm (accessed 1 June 2009).
This signaled a significant departure from the prewar education system founded on the idea of the imperial nation. The Diet discussed the preamble and each of the 11 articles, but it suggested no revision. The bill was passed on 31 March.

Concurrent with the passage of the FLE, the MOE issued the Draft Course of Study to provide teachers with curricular guidelines that translated the Law into more concrete terms. The first chapter of the Draft Course of Study defined the ‘overall aims of education’ concerning four dimensions of human life: individual, family, society, and economy. The section on ‘society’ contained nine goals, from the first: to ‘cultivate attitudes to love the whole of humanity, revere liberty and the dignity of other persons, forgive others, and respect their opinions’; to the ninth and final goal: to ‘understand world history, geography, science, arts, morality, and religions, and acquire the will to strive for peace in cooperation with the rest of the world’.6 This emphasis on world society in the school curriculum enjoyed popular support. After UNESCO was established in November 1946, Japanese teachers, educators and university professors in several cities began to form non-governmental organizations based on the constitution of UNESCO. Education for world peace seemed to have a strong resonance with Japanese teachers because they were often remorseful for having sent their students to the war (Dower 1999). In May 1948, they established the National Federation of UNESCO Associations in Japan. The Japanese government then joined UNESCO in June 1951, three months before signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. At the 1951 General Conference of UNESCO, Maeda, the former minister of education who attended the conference as a Japanese representative, declared that ‘the spirit of UNESCO is the guiding principle for reconstructing Japan as a peaceful, democratic nation’.7 In the same year, the Diet passed a law to establish the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO within the MOE for the purpose of promoting domestic educational activities that aimed to accomplish the objectives of UNESCO.

In short, during the early years of the Occupation, political actors deep-structurated cosmopolitanism into the Japanese education system in the form of the FLE. Cosmopolitanism was further reinforced through the Draft Course of Study and the National Commission for UNESCO. Both Japanese and American policymakers made efforts to institutionalize cosmopolitanism because they considered it a corrective to the prewar education system that had promoted militarism and nationalism. That is, the first postwar solution to the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism aimed to prioritize the latter over the former. This solution was deep-structurated into the institutional core of the education system because the U.S. Occupation created a new political opportunity for promoting the cosmopolitanism that the UN system began to institutionalize at the global level; SCAP, the U.S. Education Mission, and the MOE then provided mobilization structures for the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism; and cosmopolitanism and its auxiliary concepts, such as ‘world peace’, resonated strongly with the Japanese policymakers and public. Thus, when the drastic circumstance of the Occupation temporarily made the Japanese education system institutionally malleable, the political actors effected significant institutional transformation—the embracement of cosmopolitanism in place of nationalism.

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Rehabilitation of Nationalism, 1951–1999

As the Cold War began to intensify in the 1950s, however, the domestic political environment became conducive to a comeback of nationalism. By the time the Korean War started, the Occupation authority had already shifted its policies from comprehensive democratization to quick remilitarization. As a part of this ‘reverse course’ that SCAP initiated, the Japanese government established the Japan Self-Defense Forces in August 1950. In this process of rebuilding Japan’s military capabilities on the eve of independence, conservative policymakers argued that Japanese youth should be taught patriotism. Prime Minister Yoshida criticized the postwar education system for failing to ‘thoroughly teach youths that the history of Japan is unparalleled and that the Japanese land is the most beautiful in the world, for the purpose of cultivating love of the nation (aikokushin).’ Amano Ten’yū, the minister of education appointed by Yoshida, also advocated patriotism on several occasions during the 1951 session of the Diet.

The conservative policymakers’ attempts to re-emphasize nationalism in education gathered force when the Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party merged into the LDP on 15 November 1955, securing a majority in the Diet. In January 1956, Kiyose Ichirō became the first minister of education under the LDP government. He openly criticized the FLE, for he felt that ‘the Law connects the individual to the world directly, but it totally lacks a concept of the nation that mediates the two’.

On 8 February 1956, the LDP government submitted to the Diet a proposal to set up a council to review the postwar education system, especially the FLE, because the system was ‘reformed too rapidly in the peculiar situation under the Occupation. As a result, it is incompatible with the reality [of Japanese society] in more than a few respects’. As a representative of the LDP government, Kiyose argued that he had no problem with the FLE, except that ‘when I read the Law, I cannot help wondering, “Where on earth does it mention loyalty to our Japanese nation?”’

Some moral principles are universal, but we the Japanese people have our own traditions. Moral education comes down to articulating Japanese ideals based on Japanese traditions... I don’t think the eight moral principles defined in the Law fit perfectly with Japanese ideals.

In the end, the proposal did not pass the Diet partly because there were other more urgent bills to discuss and partly because the opposition parties and unions—most notably the JSP and JTU—and major national newspapers strongly criticized the proposal as a dangerous regression to prewar Japanese education. Thus, while the end of the Occupation and the resultant realignment of political parties created a political opportunity for conservative policymakers to reinsert nationalism into the institutional core of the education system, they lacked adequate mobilization structures to surmount resistance from the opposition parties as well as from the public.

8. Mainichi Shinbun, 1 September 1952.
9. 10th Parliament Budget Committee on 1, 6, 7, 9 and 12 February and Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 February 1950.
11. 24th Parliament Lower House Cabinet Committee on 8 February 1956.
Instead of trying to reform the FLE, the LDP government pursued more tractable reforms through its connections with the MOE. Between 1957 and 1972, all three LDP prime ministers were former high-ranking bureaucrats: Kishi Nobusuke (1957–1960), Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964) and Sato Eisaku (1964–1972). This consolidation of ‘bureaucratic-elite rule’ was coterminous with the extensive interpenetration between state bureaucracies and the LDP government (Allinson 1993; Pempel 1998; Curtis 1999). In 1958, the MOE issued a new Course of Study and defined moral education as the central curricular component. The new Course of Study stated that moral education was based on the ‘fundamental principles of education defined in the Fundamental Law of Education’; however, it went on to insist that the aim of moral education is to educate Japanese people (Nihonjin) who never lose reverence for humanity, ... [who] make efforts toward the creation of a unique culture and the development of a democratic nation and society, and [who] voluntarily contribute to peaceful world society and pioneer the future.¹⁴

Unlike the FLE, the new Course of Study defined recipients of education explicitly as ‘Japanese people’ and added a new emphasis on the Japanese people with ‘unique culture’ to the existing school curriculum.

The new Course of Study restored emphasis on nationalism through moral education, while the postwar Japanese economy was taking off under the guidance of the developmental state (Johnson 1995). When Ikeda Hayato became the prime minister in 1960, he launched the famous ‘Income Doubling Plan’. As part of the government’s developmental strategies, the MOE issued Education and Japan’s Development (Nihon no Seibō to Kyōiku) in November 1962. This report analyzed the Japanese education system in terms of its effects on national economic development, drawing extensively on cross-national statistics and documents published by UNESCO and OECD. Specifically, the report recognized that ‘the idea that education is a crucial factor of economic growth has been accepted across the world’ (MOE 1962: 1). Indeed, the 1960s was the decade during which UNESCO and OECD produced a number of studies and recommendations that defined education systems as vehicles for national economic development (Papadopoulos 1994; Valderrama 1995). This model of education that the UN organizations promoted was adopted en masse by former colonies that gained independence. Thus, during the 1960s, the economic development of the nation-state emerged as a primary aim of education (Meyer and Hannan 1979; Meyer, Kamens, and Benavot 1992).

Against the backdrop of worldwide legitimation of the nation-state, Araki Masuo, the minister of education appointed by Ikeda, requested the Central Council for Education (CCE) in 1963 to make recommendations to improve postsecondary education to sustain high-level economic growth. In 1966, the CCE published ‘The Ideal Person’ as a supplement to its recommendation, for members of the Council were concerned that ‘the phenomenal economic growth brought about selfish and hedonistic tendencies among Japanese’. The report continued,

Today no individual or ethnic group exists without being part of a nation. The nation is the most organic and powerful institution. The individual’s happiness and security depend largely on the nation. A path to contribution to humankind is also made possible by the nation.¹⁵

This passage illustrated the ongoing rearticulation of the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. During the immediate postwar period, cosmopolitanism had been prioritized over nationalism. In the 1960s, however, the idea of nation regained legitimacy, as national economic development came to be defined as a primary aim of education worldwide. Moreover, as Japan achieved the ‘economic miracle’, an increasing number of Japanese began to re-evaluate their national identity in a positive light (Befu 2001). The Tokyo Olympics in 1964 also signaled to many Japanese the rising status of their nation in the world. As a result, nationalism came to be redefined as compatible with cosmopolitanism.

Policymakers began to consolidate the emerging compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism more clearly in the 1970s when the perception of the interdependency of the world grew due to two major historical events. In 1971, the Bretton Woods system was canceled, increasing the interdependency of national economies. Then the 1973 Arab-Israeli War led to a gasoline price hike worldwide, highlighting the dependency of the Japanese economy on the rest of the world. In addition, as the Japanese economy became the third largest in the world, Japan was expected to play a larger role in world society in providing aid to developing countries. This led the CCE to make the following recommendation in 1974 and to educate ‘the Japanese people living in world society’ (kokusai shakai ni ikiru Nihonjin):

As world society faces a number of worldwide problems ... the necessity for international cooperation and the spirit of solidarity are emphasized more than ever. To respond to this call from the world, we must recognize it is extremely important for our country to make the Japanese people sufficiently internationalized.16

In response to the CCE’s recommendation, the Japanese government lobbied the UN to establish United Nations University in Tokyo in 1975, and the MOE started recruiting native English speakers as assistant English teachers in 1977.

At the same time, however, the new Course of Study in 1977 named Kimigayo as the national anthem. The new Course of Study also put ‘greater emphasis on moral education than before’.17 Moreover, in 1982, the MOE inspected new editions of history textbooks and suggested that the ‘invasion’ (shinryaku) of East Asia during World War II could be reworded as ‘advancement’ (shinshutsu) into the region. Thus, the new educational preoccupation, to adapt the Japanese people to the increasingly global world, was coupled with continuing efforts to rehabilitate nationalism in education.

The coupling of nationalism and cosmopolitanism was further stabilized during Nakasone Yasuhiro’s tenure as prime minister from 1982 to 1987. When Nakasone became prime minister, education reform was one of his top priorities. In addition, after he took office, a series of high-profile youth crimes occurred, which deepened the impression that the Japanese education system had serious problems in spite of its apparent success (Hood 2004). Instead of receiving recommendations by the CCE and other councils under the MOE, Nakasone wanted to direct education reforms under his Cabinet. While Nakasone had to make compromises with the MOE and education-specialist

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members of his own party who were resistant to drastic education reforms (Schoppa 1991), he finally managed to set up the Ad Hoc Educational Council in August 1984. From 1985 through 1987, the Council published a total of four reports.

One of the most important issues that the Council debated was how ‘internationalization’ (kokusai) necessitated the education of cosmopolitan Japanese (sekai no naka no nihonjin) (Lincicome 1993). The Council argued that as the world entered the new phase of internationalization,

> We must establish education to help students recognize that good cosmopolitans are good Japanese, who cultivate love of the nation and embody the unique Japanese culture, while educating them to deepen their understanding of the cultures and traditions of other nations (Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyūkai 1987: 72).

Here again, emphasis on world society was coupled tightly with emphasis on the Japanese nation. This kind of cosmopolitanism–nationalism composite appeared recurrently in all four reports that the Council issued; for example, the second report reiterated that no matter how important it was to ‘educate students to develop a broadly international, planetary, and cosmopolitan perspective’, students must be also taught ‘to develop love of the nation as Japanese people . . . and embody the uniqueness of Japanese society and culture’ (ibid: 117). Building on the reform discussion in the 1970s, the Council reports made progress in multiplying cosmopolitanism–nationalism composites in education discourses to stabilize the compromise between the two institutional logics.

Policymakers continued to redefine the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism as symbiotic rather than antithetical during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s. In 1996, the CCE issued a report that defined ‘ikiru chikara’ (zest for living) as the key disposition that new generations of students should acquire:

> We conclude that what children will need from now on is a competence to find tasks by themselves, learn voluntarily, think independently, decide and act autonomously, and solve problems effectively, no matter how society changes . . . We call such a competence ‘ikiru chikara’, which is necessary to live in society characterized by drastic changes (MOE 1996: 20).

The CCE report went on to define this disposition as inseparable from the ‘education of “Japanese who live in world society”’ (ibid: 21). That is, the ‘society characterized by drastic changes’ for which students needed a ‘zest for living’ was not defined simply as a specific national society but as the entire world. To implement the CCE’s recommendation, the MOE introduced ‘integrated studies’ into the school curriculum in 1998. In the new Course of Study, the MOE also made the English language officially mandatory in junior high schools and recommended that elementary schools should consider using periods of integrated study for English lessons and international exchange activities (MEXT 2002).

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18. Integrated studies raises an interesting question about the relationship between cosmopolitanism and neoliberalism in education. In contrast with cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes ethical orientations toward foreign others and the world as a whole, neoliberalism legitimates education reforms that aim to inculcate in students instrumental orientations and competencies to compete in the global economy (Apple, Kenway, and Singh 2005; Burbules and Torres 2000). Nonetheless, neoliberalism does have affinity with cosmopolitanism in that both prioritize the ‘world’ over the ‘nation’. Do cosmopolitanism and neoliberalism contradict each other because of their different orientations, or do they reinforce each other because of their affinity? To answer the question, the case of Japanese education can serve as an anomaly (Cave 2001) to push researchers to problematize, refine and extend existing explanations based on American and European cases.
While emphasizing the student’s ‘zest for living’ in a global world, the 1996 CCE report also emphasized the importance of nationalism in education:

In order to help students develop attitudes to understand and respect foreign cultures and co-exist with foreign peoples, it is crucial to educate them to have deep understandings of our national history, culture, and traditions (MOE 1996: 74).

In the same year, the MOE issued the administrative directive to require public schools to accompany the hoisting of the *Hinomaru* flag with *Kimigayo*. After the LDP came back to power in January 1996, the LDP-led coalition government succeeded in legislating a new law in August 1999 that formally designated the *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem. Given the new legislation, the MOE issued another administrative directive to reinforce its earlier policy that required public schools to observe the *Hinomaru* and sing *Kimigayo* at important school events.

Thus, the education reforms from the mid-1950s through the 1990s reconfigured the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Policymakers no longer saw nationalism as the antithesis of cosmopolitanism. In fact, the two institutional logics of education came to be rearticulated as not only compatible but also beneficial and indispensable to each other. To be sure, the compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism happened only at the level of the Course of Study and policy recommendations. Despite its dominance of the government, the LDP still lacked a set of adequate mobilization structures, political opportunities and frames to institutionalize the compromise into the core of the education system: the FLE continued to prioritize the world over the nation. Nonetheless, the incremental changes in outer institutional layers of the education system did normalize composites of the world and the nation, such as ‘Japan in world society’ and ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’. Indeed, this normalization was going to gain momentum at the turn of the century.

**Education for the New Century, 2000–2006**

While the end of the recession was not yet in sight, policymakers began to use the word ‘crisis’ to describe the education system. In September 2000, the mid-term report of the National Commission on Education Reform (NCER) stated, ‘Japanese education is at a crossroads right now, facing a crisis, even the possibility of collapse. The current situations surrounding education—bullying, school refusal, school violence, and classroom disruptions—are extremely serious’.

Indeed, the feeling of crisis permeated not only the education system but also the country at large. According to government statistics, the percentage of Japanese who thought that Japan was headed in the wrong direction increased from 31.4 in 1990 to 72.2 in 1997. The number of suicides also increased significantly in the late 1990s.

At this historical juncture, the language of ‘crisis’ intersected with that of ‘new century’. The NCER called for fundamental reforms of the Japanese education system to solve the crisis, so that Japan could
start fresh in the new century. The NCER final report in December 2000 recommended that Japanese citizens and the government should debate how to reform the FLE for the new century. Given the NCER’s recommendation, the MEXT launched ‘The 21st-Century Educational Renewal Plan’ in January 2001 by calling for fundamental education reforms in the eschatological language of the new century. As education minister Machimura Nobutaka put it, the Plan aimed to ‘clarify overall guidelines for education reforms, which is one of the most important tasks necessary for realizing “New Japan”’. In November, the MEXT proceeded to request that the CCE explore the possibility of reforming the FLE. Thus, although earlier calls for reforming the FLE had been perceived as a dangerous regression to prewar education, the widespread sense of crisis in the 1990s reversed the perception: a reform of the FLE was reframed as a necessary and legitimate policy agenda for adapting the Japanese education system to the realities of the new century.

The year 2001 also marked an important structural change in the political system: the central government reform. Since the end of World War II, the Japanese state had consisted of a total of 22 ministries. In 1998, however, the Diet passed a bill to strengthen the power of the Cabinet Office and consolidate functions of state bureaucracies. This bill had been proposed in the midst of the worst postwar recession in order to make the political system capable of planning and implementing reforms more efficiently. The bill took effect in 2001, reducing the number of ministries to 12 and consolidating some of their previous functions into the Cabinet Office. This structural change of the Japanese political system increased the power of the government, especially that of the prime minister, to initiate reforms (Takenaka 2006). Put another way, the prime minister acquired greater power to discipline subgovernments and other mobilization structures to pursue his reform agendas. In the context of education, this meant that the education subgovernment, in particular the MEXT that had once resisted Nakasone’s reform attempt, lost some leverage against reform-minded prime ministers.

Moreover, this formal institutional change of the political system happened against a backdrop of a decline of opposition parties and their support organizations. While the JTU had begun to lose membership slowly in the 1960s, it declined sharply after its leadership struggle intensified in the 1980s, and eventually led its leftwing faction to break away to form the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union in 1991 (Aspinall 2001). The JSP, hitherto the JTU’s political ally, also lost public support drastically after it partnered with the LDP to form a coalition government in 1994. These shifts in power relations among relevant actors inside and outside the political system created a new political opportunity for conservative policymakers to further institutionalize the compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the education system. Thus, mobilization structures, political opportunity, and a frame necessary for reforming the FLE were beginning to coalesce in March 2003 when the CCE recommended that the FLE should be reformed to meet the new challenges of the 21st century.

Koizumi Jun’ichirō, then prime minister of the LDP–NK coalition government, however, did not immediately pursue a reform of the FLE because he prioritized other legislative agendas, such as pension and health care reforms and privatization of the postal service. The coalition government took a step toward reforming the FLE in 2005, only after Koizumi led the LDP to win more than half of the seats in the lower house. Prior to the 2005 election, the NK had been reluctant to pursue such

reforms. Since the LDP became capable of forming a government on its own, the NK agreed to the reform, so as to main a coalition partner of the LDP. Nonetheless, the LDP and the NK continued to disagree about how to introduce ‘patriotism’ (aikokushin) into the new FLE. While the LDP insisted on the phrase, ‘to love our nation’ (kuni o aisuru), the NK wanted to tone down patriotism and suggested another phrase, ‘to value our nation’ (kuni o taietsu ni suru). In April 2006, the NK finally agreed with the LDP about adopting the phrase ‘love our nation’, provided that the nation should be understood as excluding state institutions, and that other phrases should be added to affirm the educational importance of respecting other countries and contributing to world society. The LDP accommodated the NK’s demand so that it could maintain the coalition as evidence of broader political support for the FLE reform. In May that year, the LDP–NK government sent a reform bill to the lower house of the Diet.

Although opposition parties objected to the bill strongly, they were also divided. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party, agreed with the government on the principle of patriotism but disagreed about the letter. The DPJ argued that the phrase ‘to love Japan’ (Nihon o aisuru) was better than ‘love our nation’ because it did not have a connotation of the state-centered ultra-nationalism reminiscent of prewar Japan that the word ‘nation’ still evoked. The Communist and Socialist Parties opposed squarely the idea of legally specifying the inculcation of patriotism as an aim of education. The Communist Party criticized the proposed reform for prioritizing the state over the individual. Similarly, the Socialist Party argued that the proposed reform ‘tries to bind the individual’s thought by law, which amounts to a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of thought ... Moreover, “patriotism” means demanding our loyalty to a nation [Japan] that would engage in war abroad’. 22

Because of these disagreements, the government and the opposition parties could not work out bipartisan amendments of the bill during the 2006 regular session of the Diet; however, the LDP–NK coalition voted to extend deliberation of the bill to the next session. Then, during the 2006 summer recess, the LDP elected a new leader, Abe Shinzō. Abe was ideologically more conservative than his predecessor Koizumi. For example, Abe and two other LDP politicians had published the book Declaration of the ‘Conservative Revolution’: Why We Chose to be Anti-Liberal (‘Hoshu Kakumei’ Sengen: Anchi Riberaru e no Sentaku) in 1996. The book showed that Abe was an unabashed nationalist. He lamented that ‘it was a shame that the Diet passed the “apology” resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II’, for he did not think that Japan should apologize to Asian countries it had invaded during World War II (Abe, Kurimoto, and Etō 1996: 54). Abe was sworn into the office of prime minister on 26 September 2006, and he recalled the Diet for a special session. The lower house resumed a discussion of the reform bill on 25 October, but the LDP–NK government and opposition parties still could not reach a compromise. On 12 December, the very last day of the special session, the government moved to vote on the bill. Since the LDP–NK coalition had a majority in the Diet, the reform bill was passed while members of the opposition parties boycotted the vote in protest.

The preamble of the new FLE added ‘inheritance of traditions’ as an overarching educational objective. The second article also stated that one of the most fundamental goals of Japanese education was to ‘cultivate attitudes to respect tradition and culture, and love our nation that created them’.

These changes signaled greater significance of the Japanese nation for education policies and school curricula, compared with the old FLE that defined students primarily as human beings. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the new FLE did not simply re-entrench nationalism. Rather, the new FLE deep-structurated the existing compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism that the earlier reforms had already built up. While the new FLE did introduce the phrase emphasizing national identity and patriotism, it also retained the commitment to ‘world peace and the welfare of humanity’ in the preamble and added to the second article the new phrase ‘respect other countries and cultivate attitudes to contribute to the peace and progress of world society’. This compromise between the two institutional logics was evinced by the contents of the 2008 Course of Study based on the new FLE. On the one hand, the new Course of Study required *budō* (traditional Japanese martial arts) in physical education in junior high schools. On the other hand, it required English from fifth grade and expanded geography education in junior high schools.

Taken together, these curricular changes under the new FLE suggest that the trajectory of the Japanese education system was now firmly anchored in the compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

**Conclusion and Implications**

This paper has combined the theories of institutional logics and social movements to examine how Japanese political actors negotiated the institutional contradiction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the education system since World War II. My historical analysis has shown that political actors originally prioritized cosmopolitanism over nationalism in the aftermath of the war. In the subsequent decades, conservative policymakers rehabilitated nationalism by redefining its relationship with cosmopolitanism as synthetic rather than antithetical. They created nationalism–cosmopolitanism composites, such as ‘cosmopolitan Japanese’, to stabilize the compromise between the two institutional logics. The composites populated the outer institutional layers of the education system at first. When the new century frame, strong mobilization structures, and greater political opportunity coalesced in the early 2000s, however, conservative policymakers, led by the institutional entrepreneurs Koizumi and Abe, succeeded in deep-structurating the compromise between nationalism and cosmopolitanism into the institutional core of the education system.

The 2006 reform of the FLE is of vital importance for the Japanese education system because it ‘locked in’ the previously built-up institutional trajectory. The reforms that conservative political actors had implemented since the end of the Occupation could have been reversed if the FLE had continued to prioritize cosmopolitanism over nationalism; however, as the institutional core of the

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education system now legitimates the compromise between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, the latter is likely to persist even if globalization progresses further. In turn, no matter how much conservative political actors would like to promote nationalism in education, they cannot implement nationalist reforms without incorporating cosmopolitanism. In short, the 2006 reform shows that the Japanese education system has evolved into a state apparatus of ‘cosmopolitan nation-building’, where nation and world society are conjoined as a composite institutional logic.

This paper demonstrates the fruitfulness of studying transformations of the education system in terms of political contestations over contradictions between different institutional logics. The institutional contradictions are very likely to continue to serve as focal points of political contestations and generate more data that can help social scientists better understand the evolving relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in an increasingly global world.

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