An Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism*

HIRO SAITO
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa

A major problem with the emerging sociological literature on cosmopolitanism is that it has not adequately theorized mechanisms that mediate the presumed causal relationship between globalization and the development of cosmopolitan orientations. To solve this problem, I draw on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT) to theorize the development of three key elements of cosmopolitanism: cultural omnivorousness, ethnic tolerance, and cosmopolitics. ANT illuminates how humans and nonhumans of multiple nationalities develop attachments with one another to create network structures that sustain cosmopolitanism. ANT also helps the sociology of cosmopolitanism become more reflexive and critical of its implicit normative claims.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Ulrich Beck (2000) put forward a thesis of “cosmopolitanization,” urging sociologists to study cosmopolitanism as an empirical phenomenon. Beck posited that cosmopolitanism was not simply a normative ideal entertained by philosophers but had actually come to exist in practices of everyday life in an increasingly global world. In response to his claims, sociologists first engaged in theoretical debates and raised critical questions, such as whether cosmopolitanization is distinct from globalization and how access to cosmopolitanism might be restricted by structural inequalities (Calhoun 2003; Roudometof 2005). As these debates unfolded and helped cosmopolitanism become a recognizable sociological keyword, empirical studies began to spring up and identified a few variables, such as age and education, as correlates of cosmopolitan orientations (Mau et al. 2008; Olofsson and Öhman 2007; Phillips and Smith 2008; Pichler 2009; Woodward et al. 2008). More than a decade after Beck’s original call, the sociology of cosmopolitanism appears to be taking off.

Nonetheless, these theoretical debates and empirical studies have yet to produce a coherent research program. This is not just because the field is still in its infancy. It is also because Beck and his colleagues (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Beck and Sznaider 2006) continue to discuss cosmopolitanism without theorizing its mechanisms: neither the original cosmopolitanization thesis, nor subsequent empirical research, specifies how precisely a cosmopolitan orientation comes about. This poses a critical problem since mechanisms are fundamental building blocks of sociological explanation (Gross 2009; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).

The goal of this article is to explore the mechanisms of cosmopolitanism and provide a more solid theoretical foundation for emerging research on the topic. To this end, I build on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT). “Network” is one of the most theoretically robust concepts distilled from the so-called relational

*Address correspondence to: Hiro Saito, Department of Sociology, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Saunders Hall 247, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822. Tel.: 808-956-7693. E-mail: hs9@hawaii.edu. For their helpful comments on earlier versions of the article, I thank the reviewers at Sociological Theory as well as participants in the Power, History, and Social Change Workshop at the University of Michigan.
perspective in sociology (Emirbayer 1997; Somers 1998; Tilly 2008). Among various forms of network analysis, ANT may appear an unlikely candidate for theorizing mechanisms because it is typically seen as descriptive rather than explanatory. For Latour, however, “description” is an alternative form of “explanation”—distinct from a variable-based, causal-analytic approach (Latour 1988, 2005a; also see Abbott 2001). I argue that ANT can help the sociology of cosmopolitanism increase its explanatory power precisely because it is the most descriptive form of network analysis.

To demonstrate how ANT can advance the sociology of cosmopolitanism, I first clarify the causal argument implicit in Beck’s cosmopolitanization thesis: globalization, consisting of the institutionalization of world society and the transnational circulation of foreign people and objects, leads to cosmopolitanism as a subjective orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures. I then draw on ANT to specify mechanisms that mediate the presumed causal relationship between globalization and the development of cosmopolitanism. Specifically, I argue that cosmopolitan openness is of two kinds: openness to foreign nonhumans, and openness to foreign humans. I examine these two kinds of openness as instances of “cultural omnivorousness” and “ethnic tolerance,” respectively. In addition, I consider how foreign nonhumans and humans combine to create a transnational public to debate global risks and work out collective solutions—to engage in “cosmopolitics.” In short, this article proposes ANT-based mechanisms of cultural omnivorousness, ethnic tolerance, and cosmopolitics as three key elements of cosmopolitanism.

While using ANT to theorize mechanisms, I also tackle another important problem in the sociology of cosmopolitanism: the conflation of explanation and prescription. As the sociology of cosmopolitanism originally emerged as a critical-theoretic enterprise (Beck 2003b, 2004, 2006; Delanty 2009), it tends to claim that cosmopolitanization will, and should, culminate in a “reflexive cosmopolitanism” by which people consciously try to become citizens of the world and constitute a transnational public of cosmopolitics. Yet to the extent this is so, the sociology of cosmopolitanism risks invoking social science to prematurely close public discussion of whether such a transnational public is desirable in the first place, what principles this public should adopt, and who should be included. I show how ANT, which privileges the participant’s perspective over the observer’s, can make the sociology of cosmopolitanism more reflexive and critical of its implicit normative claims.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COSMOPOLITANISM

Philosophers such as the Stoics and Immanuel Kant discussed cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal of allegiance to humanity as a whole (Nussbaum 1996). Sociologists of cosmopolitanism, however, have proposed to study it as an empirical phenomenon. Although the definition of cosmopolitanism varies, sociologists’ conceptualizations converge on the understanding of cosmopolitanism as an orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures (Beck 2006; Beck and Sznaider 2006; Delanty 2009; Skrbis et al. 2004; Szerszynski and Urry 2006). This minimum definitional agreement appears to be rooted in Ulf Hannerz’s seminal study of cosmopolitanism as “an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other … an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (1990:239). Since “divergent cultural experiences” involve encounters with both foreign people and their practices, “a willingness to engage with the Other” entails openness to both foreign others and cultures.
Yet sociologists of cosmopolitanism do not limit it to an “intellectual and aesthetic stance.” Rather, they conceptualize it more broadly as a disposition or subjective orientation that influences people's practices and identities. Ulrich Beck, for example, defines cosmopolitanism as an “outlook,” a subjective horizon characterized by the internalized otherness of others, the co-presence or coexistence of rival lifestyles ... the ability to see oneself from the viewpoint of those who are culturally other—as well as to practise this within one's own experiential space through the imaginative crossing of boundaries. (2004:153)

Here, cosmopolitanism is defined neither as a normative ideal nor as a highbrow intellectual and aesthetic stance. Instead, Beck and other sociologists see it as a quotidian empirical phenomenon: people's disposition to think, feel, and imagine beyond existing group boundaries and to transform their everyday practices and identities.

To be sure, people with this type of orientation must have existed throughout human history. In this sense, the cosmopolitan orientation is not new. Nonetheless, sociologists of cosmopolitanism argue that cosmopolitanism today has a distinct feature: its cause lies in a large-scale transformation of social environment, which Beck has called “cosmopolitanization.” This refers to a “multidimensional process” that includes the transnational circulation of cultural commodities, communication, news coverage, ecological and other forms of risks, people (tourists and immigrants), criminal and political activities, and intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) (Beck 2000:96–97). What all these different phenomena have in common, according to Beck, is that they challenge nationalism, the politically and culturally dominant principle for creating and maintaining group boundaries in the modern world. Nationalism is not simply a political doctrine but also an ontology that divides the world into nations as self-sufficient “containers” and delimits a person's identity within national borders (Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997). Cosmopolitanization undermines the experiential validity of the nationalist ontology at the level of people's everyday practices and makes them “latent” or “unconscious” cosmopolitans: people develop the orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures even without conscious normative intentions (Beck 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006). Thus, the distinct feature of contemporary cosmopolitanism is that it has become widespread at an unprecedented scale, driven by a set of economic, political, social, and cultural transformations at the global level.

Although Beck tries to distinguish “cosmopolitanization” from “globalization,” the two concepts refer to the same environmental change: growing flows of economic, political, social, and cultural activities across national borders and corresponding transformations of institutions and practices inside nation-states. The commonality between the two concepts is evidenced by the fact that the transnational phenomena Beck includes under the rubric of cosmopolitanization are staple research topics for the sociology of globalization. Indeed, Beck (2002) himself equates...
cosmopolitanization with “internalized globalization,” which is the same as “glo-
calization” (Robertson 1995). For Beck and other sociologists of cosmopolitanism,
internalized globalization or glocalization enables people to imaginatively traverse
national borders and interact with foreign others by appropriating foreign cultural
objects, including food, music, movies, and sports (Beck 2006; Skrbis et al. 2004;
Tomlinson 2002). In Beck’s view, the concept of cosmopolitanization also includes
the phenomenon that John Meyer and his colleagues (Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer
2000) consider to be the sine qua non of globalization: the institutionalization of
world society through the worldwide diffusion of ideas, discourses, and norms that
define people as members of humanity, as well as the establishment of IGOs and
INGOs. Globalization in this institutionalist sense is the same as cosmopolitaniza-
tion, which entails “an institutionalized learning process” (Beck 2000:87) or “insti-
tutionalized cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2002, 2004). For Beck, the establishment of
IGOs and INGOs, as well as the dissemination of human rights, is a conscious
attempt to institutionalize the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism and therefore a
part of cosmopolitanization. Thus, when compared to the sociology of globaliza-
tion, Beck’s concept of “cosmopolitanization” appears to be simply a new label for a
phenomenon that has been already studied.

Upon closer inspection, however, Beck’s cosmopolitanization thesis promises a
novel contribution to sociology, for it proposes a causal relationship between the en-
vironmental change—whether it is called “globalization” or “cosmopolitanization”—
and the subjective orientation of openness to foreign others and cultures. Although
the sociology of globalization has analyzed various institutional and organizational
changes, it has not systematically examined their psychological effects. In the so-
ciology of globalization, subjective orientations make only a brief and occasional
appearance as “consciousness of the world as a whole” (Guillén 2001; Robertson
1992). This is why recent empirical studies of cosmopolitanism have built on Beck’s
thesis to examine people’s attitudes toward foreign others and cultures.

These studies have shown more or less consistently that age and education have
statistically significant effects on cosmopolitanism as openness to foreign others
and cultures: younger and better-educated respondents are more likely to express
cosmopolitan orientations (Mau et al. 2008; Olofsson and Öhman 2007; Phillips
and Smith 2008; Pichler 2008, 2009; Schueth and O’Loughlin 2008). They have
also found that cosmopolitanism appears to have multiple dimensions: the likelihood
of people expressing cosmopolitan orientations varies depending on specific issues
or domains addressed by questionnaires (Mau et al. 2008; Olofsson and Öhman
2007; Skrbis and Woodward 2007; Woodward et al. 2008). These empirical findings
have made important contributions to the sociology of cosmopolitanism. Yet they
have a fundamental shortcoming: they do not directly address the presumed causal
relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism, the theoretical backbone
of the cosmopolitanization thesis. When empirical studies test the significance of
variables, such as age and education, they assume globalization as a context in

2Beck criticizes John Meyer for presupposing the national-international dualism that perpetuates
methodological nationalism (Beck 2004:142; Beck and Sznaider 2006:17). But his criticism is somewhat
contrived, for Beck himself acknowledges that nations and nationalism persist and even coexist with cos-
mopolitanism. The theory of world society takes the national-international dichotomy seriously because
the dichotomy is still entrenched in existing institutions, practices, and schemas.

3Contrary to Craig Calhoun’s assertion (2003), class is not consistently significant, at least statistically.
Florian Pichler’s studies of cosmopolitanism in Europe (2008, 2009), however, found that occupations
had statistically significant effects: professionals and managers were more likely to hold cosmopolitan
outlooks.
which the variables exert causal effects. Since the effects of globalization are not directly examined, it is impossible to know whether the effects of the variables on cosmopolitanism have anything to do with cosmopolitanization.

Of course, future empirical studies may introduce globalization as an independent variable and test the mediating effects of other variables. Nonetheless, I argue that such variable-based thinking would still have difficulty capturing a distinct feature of the contemporary world characterized by “the extraordinary growth of connections among human beings and variously organized social groups—relationships mediated by markets and media, migrations and infectious diseases” (Calhoun 2008a:114). Put another way, globalization has transformed the world into a “network society” built on multiplex connections that link actions and identities across national borders (Castells 1996). Since variable-based thinking assumes that actors are independent of one another, it is not suited to examine the effects of globalization as a fundamentally relational phenomenon. Moreover, while variable-based thinking is good at clarifying who is more likely to be cosmopolitan, it is relatively poor at specifying how they become cosmopolitan. Indeed, Beck himself acknowledges that “cosmopolitanization does not automatically produce cosmopolitan sentiments. It can just as naturally give rise to the opposite, to the rebirth of ethnic nationalism” (2003a:27). However, he simply characterizes this as a “dialectic of cosmopolitan society and its enemies” and does not explain why some people become cosmopolitan while others do not. Before sociologists can forge ahead with empirical studies, they need to rethink Beck’s cosmopolitanization thesis in terms of mechanisms of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis the relational nature of globalization.

I argue that network analysis is the best candidate for this theoretical task. Since network analysis presents the most rigorous form of relational thinking consistent with the theoretical foundations of sociology (Emirbayer 1997; Somers 1998; Tilly 2008), it is better equipped than variable-based analysis to examine the effects of globalization as a relational phenomenon. However, there is a potential problem in utilizing network analysis for the sociology of cosmopolitanism: its treatment of cultural meaning and subjectivity is weak (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). Since openness to foreign others and cultures necessarily entails cultural and subjective dimensions, the tendency of network analysis to focus on forms of interactions and ignore their contents may turn out to be problematic. Yet one strand of network analysis has been always immune to this problem: ANT.

ASSEMBLING AN ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY OF COSMOPOLITANISM

Over the last few decades, Bruno Latour and other European theorists have developed ANT-based on material semiotics (Callon 1986; Latour 1996, 2005a; Law 2008; Law and Hassard 1999). ANT is radically different from formal types of network analysis dominant in the United States as it conceptualizes both humans and non-humans as actors, studies connection-making as coterminous with meaning-making, and represents networks from a participant’s viewpoint. It also describes network formation as an alternative form of social explanation distinct from variable-based causal analysis (Latour 1988). However, ANT’s distinctiveness as a strongly semiotic
form of network analysis has been undercut in recent years, since Harrison White and his colleagues began to theorize the relationship between networks and cultural and subjective meaning (Carley 1991; Fuhse 2009; Ikegami 2005; Mische and White 1998; Mohr and White 2008; White 1992). As a result, ANT and the new culturally oriented American version of network analysis now share many features (Müttzel 2009; Pachucki and Breiger 2010). This convergence makes both forms of network analysis look equally capable of theorizing mechanisms through which growing connections among actors concatenate into networks that sustain cosmopolitanism.

Nonetheless, ANT is still distinct in terms of its focus on nonhumans, the participant’s viewpoint, and its commitment to description-as-explanation. I suggest this lasting distinctiveness of ANT is essential for advancing the sociology of cosmopolitanism. To begin with, ANT’s attention to both humans and nonhumans matches the definition of cosmopolitanism as openness to foreign others (humans) and cultures (nonhumans). This conceptual parallel makes it easier to synthesize ANT and the sociology of cosmopolitanism. More specifically, as I will explain below, ANT is capable of explaining different modalities of cosmopolitanism that prior research has delineated—elite, rooted, and banal—in terms of differential concatenations of attachments among humans and nonhumans. In addition, while ANT lacks the elegance of formal network analysis, its decidedly descriptive orientation is appropriate for the sociology of cosmopolitanism as a new research program. Description is an effective way to propose, rather than test, mechanisms. In this respect, ANT’s commitment to description converges with Andrew Abbott’s (2001) argument that description is foundational to social science and narration operates as the final form of social explanation even in variable-based causal analysis. Serious description is a key to the development of social-scientific theory.

In this section, then, I illustrate how ANT helps to theorize mechanisms of cosmopolitanism. I break down cosmopolitanism into three elements: cultural omnivorousness, ethnic tolerance, and cosmopolitics. Although the currently prevailing definition of cosmopolitanism is “openness to foreign others and cultures,” the two kinds of openness do not always go together. In fact, openness to foreign cultures appears to be more prevalent than openness to foreign others (Skrbis and Woodward 2007). Keeping the distinction between the two types of openness is not only empirically sound but also helps the sociology of cosmopolitanism connect with existing studies of cultural omnivorousness and ethnic tolerance. Cultural omnivorousness refers to a disposition to appreciate a wide variety of cultural objects, and ethnic tolerance encompasses positive attitudes toward ethnic outgroups. Clearly, these two orientations of omnivorousness and tolerance are manifestations of cosmopolitanism as openness to foreign others and cultures. Existing studies in these fields thus provide the sociology of cosmopolitanism with hints for theorizing mechanisms of cosmopolitanism. The third element of cosmopolitanism is the formation of “cosmopolitics.” Whereas cultural omnivorousness and ethnic tolerance refer to

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5Given its explicit attention to nonhumans (Cerulo 2009), ANT is also better equipped to theorize mechanisms of cosmopolitanism than symbolic interactionism, another theoretical framework that can help incorporate cultural and subjective meaning into network analysis (Fine and Kleinman 1983) but downplays the role of nonhumans in meaning-making processes.

6Sociologists of cosmopolitanism seem to be too self-referential to make use of existing studies, perhaps because they are eager to institutionalize a new and autonomous field of sociology. In the spirit of ANT, however, I propose another route: distinctive contributions of the sociology of cosmopolitanism become clearer and stronger if they connect more, not less, with existing sociological studies.
individual subjective orientations, cosmopolitics refers to a collective endeavor to form a transnational public and debate global risks as citizens of the world. Put another way, if cultural omnivorousness and ethnic tolerance refer to aesthetic and ethical dimensions of cosmopolitanism, respectively, cosmopolitics defines its political dimension.

This last element of cosmopolitanism is the least theorized since recent empirical studies have examined cosmopolitanism only in terms of individual attitudes. However, cosmopolitics is perhaps the most controversial and politically consequential element of the sociology of cosmopolitanism. Here, ANT turns out to have another advantage over other forms of network analysis since it can put an important normative “brake” on the sociology of cosmopolitanism. The seemingly simple social-scientific prediction “cosmopolitanization will lead to cosmopolitanism” is in effect coupled with the critical-theoretic prescription “it would be good if cosmopolitanization led to cosmopolitanism.” This conflation of explanation and prescription manifests itself most clearly in Beck’s theory of world risk society (1999, 2002, 2003b, 2009). Beck suggests that openness to foreign others and cultures will, and should, eventually lead to “reflexive cosmopolitanism” and its political correlate, cosmopolitics. In contrast, ANT insists on the importance of studying the viewpoints of participants and regarding social science as only one of many “ethnomethods” to explain the world (Latour 2000, 2004c, 2005a). Thus, ANT forces the sociology of cosmopolitanism to be reflexive of its performativity and cautions against invoking social science to prescribe the politics of the transnational public. Contrary to the popular perception that ANT is unable to explore normative issues (Delanty 2009), Latour’s writings since the early 1990s have consistently engaged with contemporary political problems (1993, 1999, 2003b, 2004b, 2005b). Indeed, ANT is probably the only form of network analysis that can engage with the sociology of cosmopolitanism on both explanatory and normative fronts, as evinced by sustained dialogues between Latour and Beck (Beck 1999, 2009; Latour 2003a, 2004a).

Before I proceed to deploy ANT to theorize mechanisms of cultural omnivorousness, ethnic tolerance, and cosmopolitics as key elements of cosmopolitanism, I should like to briefly discuss “attachment” as a crucial building block of ANT-based explanation: “From now on, when we speak of actor we should always add the large network of attachments making it act” (Latour 2005a:217–18). For Latour, “attachment” is constitutive of both actors and networks. Even though Latour does not elaborate what he means by “attachment,” I suggest that it should include the psychological sense of the term, that is, the most rudimentary form of identification (Chodorow 1999; Erikson 1959, 1968; James 1950). For actor-network theorists, this conceptual move may appear to be a step back at first because it apparently reintroduces the subject-object distinction that they want to do away with. Nonetheless, the psychological concept of attachment highlights the crucial role of nonhumans in shaping subjectivity of human actors. Indeed, Latour himself intimates psychological underpinnings of ANT as follows: “You need to subscribe to a lot of subjectifiers to become a subject... We might end up gaining some ‘intra-psyches’ only if we are entering into a relationship with a lot of ‘extra-psyches’” (2005a:216). Thus, Latour’s suggestion dovetails with a central thesis of cultural psychology that human subjectivity is fundamentally mediated by cultural objects and practices (Bruner 1990; Cole 1996; Rogoff 2003; Strauss and Quinn 1997). From the ANT perspective, then,

7Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion (1999) build on ANT and propose to study “subject-networks” as processes through which attachments give rise to the subject and subjectivity.
the formation of cosmopolitanism is coterminous with the growth of attachments among humans and nonhumans in certain configurations. What configurations sustain cosmopolitanism? How do they grow? The following sections try to answer these questions.

*Openness to Foreign Nonhumans: Cultural Omnivorousness*

First, let me illustrate the simplest mechanism of development of openness to foreign nonhumans. Let $A_1$ and $a_1$ be a human and a nonhuman belonging to Group A, and $b_1$ a nonhuman belonging to Group B. Suppose that while an attachment has existed between $A_1$ and $a_1$, $b_1$ now enters the situation. If $A_1$ develops a new attachment to $b_1$, $A_1$ is open to a foreign nonhuman. Whether such an attachment develops depends, first of all, on $A_1$’s individual threshold for accepting a foreign nonhuman. Even though networks play a decisive role in shaping the person's threshold, there are human-developmental factors that cannot be reduced to effects of networks. Age, one of the variables that the recent empirical studies have found to be associated with cosmopolitanism, is a good example. Younger people tend to be more open psychologically to foreign cultures because they are still in the process of exploring and experimenting with their identities (Arnett 2002; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Erikson 1959, 1968). In a similar vein, it is necessary to consider individual properties of foreign nonhumans. Various cultural objects, such as $b_1$, can come into contact with $A_1$ and $a_1$ because they have acquired the ability to traverse national borders at an unprecedented scale and speed, powered by growing networks of communications and transportation (Appadurai 1996). However, different cultural objects have differential abilities to traverse national borders: those from the center (e.g., the “West”) are likely to be more mobile than those from the periphery because of existing hierarchies among different nation-states and regions (Hannerz 1996).

Although these individual properties of humans and nonhumans are important, whether an attachment develops between $A_1$ and $b_1$ depends crucially on another member of Group A to whom $A_1$ is attached. Let $A_2$ be that human. First, $A_2$’s attitude toward $b_1$ matters. If $A_2$ dislikes $b_1$, on the one hand, $A_1$ may hesitate to develop an attachment to it. If $A_2$ is indifferent or positive to $b_1$, on the other hand, $A_1$ is more likely to develop an attachment to it. Second, the strength of $A_1$’s attachment to $A_2$ makes a difference. If $A_1$’s attachment to $A_2$ is moderate, $A_1$ may develop an attachment to $b_1$ even if $A_2$ dislikes it. In turn, if $A_2$’s attachment to $A_1$ is strong, even when $A_2$ is initially indifferent or negative to $b_1$, $A_2$ may be influenced by $A_1$’s positive attitude toward $b_1$ and subsequently develop an attachment to it. Thus, whether $A_1$ gets attached to $b_1$, as well as whether $A_1$’s attachment to $b_1$ influences $A_2$, depends on the nature of the relationship between the two humans.

At first glance, this formulation is similar to the idea of “structural balance” based on Fritz Heider’s balance theory (Cartwright and Harary 1956; Crandall et al. 2007; Davis 1963; Greenwald et al. 2002; Heider 1958). Nonetheless, the scope of balance theory is too restricted to understand the real world where unbalanced situations

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8Balance theory posits that there is a psychological tendency toward creating a “unit relationship” or harmonious whole of perceptual elements. Balance theory typically illustrates this point by using a triangle consisting of a person (P), an other (O), and a perceptual object (X). If there is a positive relation between P and O and between O and X, P tends to develop a similarly positive attitude toward X. This is because the posited psychological tendency toward a harmonious unit relationship inhibits an unbalanced situation where the relation between P and X is negative while those between P and O and between O and X are positive.
exist due to varying degrees of strength and valence of attachments as well as their directionality (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Consider, for instance, introducing into the four-actor model that I described above a more realistic assumption that posits the strength and valence of attachment as continuous variables rather than simple dichotomies, such as strong-weak and positive-negative. If the attachment between $A_1$ and $A_2$ is only moderate, the situation can be unbalanced so that $A_1$ develops an attachment to $b_1$ while $A_2$ does not. Even when the attachment between $A_1$ and $A_2$ is strong, $A_1$ can still develop an attachment to $b_1$ if $A_2$ is indifferent to $b_1$. Since the concepts of structural balance and its successor, transitivity, emphasize centripetal forces, they tend to downplay “divergent currents” among interactants (Simmel 1955:15), that is, centrifugal forces as sources of social changes, such as cosmopolitanization. They also ignore meaning-making processes underlying interactions (Fuhse 2009); for example, the principle of transitivity—if there is an attachment between $A_1$ and $A_2$ and between $A_1$ and $b_1$, then there is likely an attachment between $A_2$ and $b_1$—does not hold if Groups A and B are considered incompatible. While structural balance and transitivity offer elegant explanations, their applicability is generally limited to cases of small groups. Given this limitation, I use them mainly as conceptual heuristics to supplement less elegant but more realistic ANT-based explanations of cosmopolitanism.

So far, I have described how human members of Group A can directly increase their openness to foreign cultures, nonhuman members of Group B. This increase is direct in the sense that $A_1$ is exposed face to face to $b_1$ that has traveled from elsewhere; however, there is another, indirect way by which $A_1$ increases his or her openness via his or her weak attachment to $B_1$, a human member of Group B. This indirect development of openness to foreign cultures has been documented by Bonnie Erickson (1996) and Omar Lizardo (2006): popular-cultural objects, such as sports, provide focal points of interactions for people from different class backgrounds. People then develop weak ties that cut across class boundaries, and, through these weak ties, nonredundant information about cultural objects belonging to different classes flows. Consequently, people become more omnivorous in terms of their cultural tastes. To be sure, Erickson and Lizardo have analyzed “cultural omnivorousness,” not cosmopolitanism per se, but there is an important parallel between the sociologies of cultural omnivorousness and cosmopolitanism. The sociology of cultural omnivorousness has examined people’s openness to cultural objects that are associated with different social classes (Ollivier 2008; Peterson 1997, 2005; Peterson and Kern 1996; van Eijck 2000). For instance, music genres that are considered lowbrow are “foreign” to upper-class persons. This means that upper-class persons who enjoy both highbrow and lowbrow music genres can be regarded as “cosmopolitans.” In turn, those who develop an appreciation of cultural objects belonging to foreign groups can be regarded as “omnivores.” Indeed, cosmopolitans are by definition omnivores because cosmopolitanism encompasses “an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (Hannerz 1990:239). Although future research needs to clarify whether those who are open with regard to social class are also open with regard to ethnicity or nationality (and vice versa), I argue that networks operate as homologous mechanisms in both cases.

Thus, the causal sequence proposed by Erickson and Lizardo can be translated into ANT as follows: both $A_1$ and $B_1$ are attached to $a_1$, some popular-cultural object that has achieved transnational currency; $a_1$ then brokers interaction between $A_1$ and $B_1$, say, through an online forum dedicated to $a_1$; as $A_1$ and $B_1$ interact with each other, they learn more about each other’s culture; and $A_1$ develops an
a. Cultural omnivorousness “2.0”

b. Banal cosmopolitanism (A₁, A₃)

Figure 1. Network structures of openness to foreign nonhumans. (a) Cultural omnivorousness “2.0.” (b) Banal cosmopolitanism (A₁, A₃).

attachment to b₁, and B₁ to a₂ (Figure 1a).⁹ Put somewhat differently, popular-cultural objects serve as focal points of “publics,” interstitial and transient sites where members from different groups interact, reconfigure existing networks, and generate new cultural practices and identities (Ikegami 2005; Mische and White 1998). Today, these publics are no longer confined within national borders because globalization enables people from around the world to encounter similar sets of popular-cultural objects. Popular culture, which played a decisive role in the formation of nation-states, now affords people the chance to form transnational publics and gives them opportunities to increase their openness to foreign cultures.¹⁰

The foregoing discussion not only illuminates how omnivorousness or openness to foreign cultures develops but also helps to give a precise definition to “banal cosmopolitanism.” In the sociology of cosmopolitanism, banal cosmopolitans are defined as ordinary people who have incorporated foreign cultural idioms and objects into practices of their everyday life (Skrbis et al. 2004; Tomlinson 2002). As Beck has argued, banal cosmopolitanism “is closely bound up with all kinds of consumption … the huge variety of meals, food, restaurants and menus routinely

⁹To keep my presentation clear and simple, I assume that valences of attachments are positive and attachments are undirected. Straight, fragmented, and dashed lines in the figure symbolize strong, moderate, and weak attachments, respectively. A circle represents a human, and a rectangle a nonhuman. Note that the figure is different from a “two-mode network” in conventional network analysis. A two-mode network consists of two sets of actants, typically humans and nonhumans (e.g., actors and movies). It captures only how a set of humans is connected to a set of nonhumans, but not how actants within each set are connected to each other. In contrast, ANT does not separate humans and nonhumans into different sets of networks.

¹⁰It is important to note, however, that while I have presented the situation where the increase of openness is mutual, it can be one-sided. If B₁ is an immigrant to Group A’s territory where strict assimilation policies are enforced, B₁’s attachment to nonhumans of Group A would multiply, whereas A₁ can remain indifferent to nonhumans of Group B.
present in nearly every city anywhere in the world [and] also penetrates other spheres of everyday culture—music, for example” (2004:151). Building on ANT, I suggest that banal cosmopolitanism emerges when humans and nonhumans of Group A develop attachments to nonhumans of Group B or any other foreign group (Figure 1b). In the contemporary world, humans do not have to travel to acquire a banal form of cosmopolitanism because foreign nonhumans travel across national borders and help to reconfigure local networks and cultural meanings (Clifford 1997). Some of these banal cosmopolitans are so-called connoisseurs who have developed intense attachments to multiple foreign nonhumans to the extent that their subjective horizons transcend national borders. Since banal cosmopolitans reside within nation-states, they tend to look like nationals, but these nationals are penetrated subjectively by cosmopolitanization wherein “[w]hat counts as national is in its essence increasingly transnational or cosmopolitan” (Beck 2004:153).

Although the foregoing discussion focused on mechanisms of development of openness to foreign cultures, it could not help touching on the problem of openness to foreign others because nonhumans and humans are inextricably networked in real life. In the discussion of indirect development of openness to foreign cultures, for example, I posited only a weak attachment between A1 and B1, brokered by a1, and therefore postponed discussion of two important questions. Can a strong attachment develop between A1 and B1 in that situation and, if so, how? And when an attachment—weak, moderate, or strong—between A1 and B1 develops, does it also influence the subjective orientations of other members of Groups A and B with whom A1 and B1 are attached? I turn to these questions next.

**Openness to Foreign Humans: Ethnic Tolerance**

Again, I start with a three-actor model to illustrate the simplest mechanism of the development of openness to foreign humans. The possibility of openness to foreign humans arises when A1 comes into contact with B1, and it is realized if an attachment develops between the two. As is the case with openness to foreign cultures, whether A1 and B1 develop such an attachment depends on multiple factors. The first factor, of course, is the presence of foci of interactions (Hallinan and Williams 1987; Moody 2001). Even though the number of traveling humans increases at the global level, it does not lead to cross-group interactions and attachments unless there are focal organizations or activities that generate regular contact among different groups of humans.

The availability of foci of interactions by itself, however, is not sufficient for the development of attachment between A1 and B1. It is also necessary to consider the meaning of a given contact situation. Here, “intergroup contact theory” (Pettigrew 1998) helps to clarify the type of contact situations conducive to the development of attachment between A1 and B1. Originally proposed by Gordon Allport (1954), intergroup contact theory states that intergroup contact reduces prejudice when the following four conditions are met: groups expect and perceive equal status; groups share common goals; groups cooperate to achieve common goals; and intergroup contact is encouraged. These conditions are more or less consistent with conceptions and norms of world culture, especially its commitment to human rights and international cooperation (Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2007). However, world culture is not institutionalized evenly across the world; for instance, dictatorial regimes are generally reluctant to institutionalize world culture, and intense ethnic conflicts also make its implementation difficult. These geographical variations notwithstanding,
contact situations today appear to have become generally more positive than in the past by virtue of institutionalization of world culture.\textsuperscript{11}

If foci of interactions bring \(A_1\) and \(B_1\) together under the four conditions of positive intergroup contact, an attachment can develop between the two in two steps. First, they begin to see each other as unique individuals rather than as members of the outgroup. That is, they temporarily “decategorize” one another in terms of group membership. Eventually, they may “recategorize” themselves as members of a larger group, such as “Asians” or, ultimately, “humanity” (Pettigrew 1998). While the first step enables cross-group attachment by suspending group categories, the second step enables it by enlarging a group category. Put in symbolic-interactional terms, two friends from different groups learn to take the attitude of each other as a particular other first and then the attitude of the outgroup as the generalized foreign other, making their perspectives and identities more inclusive (Aboulafia 2001; Galinsky et al. 2005). Throughout these symbolic interactions, \(A_1\) and \(B_1\) also reduce their outgroup anxiety, which in turn reduces their outgroup prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008). In this regard, intergroup contact theory connects with another line of research that has examined the relationship between various forms of intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes (Riek et al. 2006): “realistic threats” (Bobo 1983), “perceived threats” (Quillian 1995), and “group esteem threats” (Tajfel and Turner 1979), as well as combinations of these threats (Stephan and Stephan 2000), tend to increase negative outgroup attitudes. By reducing these forms of intergroup threat, intergroup contact reduces negative attitudes toward outgroups. Thus, \(A_1\)’s attachment to \(B_1\) can have an important consequence for his or her attitude toward Group B as a whole.

Nonetheless, the transition from the first step of decategorization to the second step of recategorization is not automatic. If \(A_1\) and \(B_1\) stop at the first step, their openness to foreign others can be limited; for instance, they can continue to interact with each other as unique individuals while maintaining their prejudices at the group level. Only when \(A_1\) and \(B_1\) take the second step will openness to generalized foreign others emerge to transform their outgroup attitudes. I suggest that people can move from decategorization to recategorization—the stronger form of openness at the group level—when they begin to multiply their attachments with members of foreign groups. Such a multiplication of attachments can begin via the principle of transitivity, provided that foci of interactions and conditions of positive intergroup contact exist: if \(A_1\) is strongly attached to \(B_1\), and \(B_1\) to \(B_2\), \(A_1\) is likely to develop a strong attachment to \(B_2\), and the same principle applies to a multiplication of \(B_1\)’s attachments to members of Group A.

In reality, however, one person can make only so many friends. It is therefore likely that the growth of \(A_1\)’s and \(B_1\)’s cross-group attachments to members of their respective outgroups reaches a limit somewhere between two extremes: (i) all members of Groups A and B are friends with one another and (ii) \(A_1\)’s and \(B_1\)’s mutual friends form a clique that breaks away from Groups A and B. While the former (i) is empirically impossible beyond small-group settings, the latter (ii) results in the logical absence of openness to foreign others (because now everyone belongs to the same group). This means that \(A_1\) and \(B_1\) must develop not only strong but also moderate and weak attachments to outgroup members. Only when strong, moderate,

\textsuperscript{11}Despite the progressive institutionalization of world culture, one or more of these four conditions tends to be missing in real life. This is why an increase in diversity and intergroup contact can lead to a decrease in intergroup (as well as intragroup) trust and solidarities (Putnam 2007).
and weak attachments are combined will A₁, B₁, and their mutual friends form a “cluster” of cosmopolitans within a global network that encompasses all members of Groups A and B.

I suggest that different configurations of strong, moderate, and weak ties across groups produce two different modalities of cosmopolitanism: elite and rooted. Elite cosmopolitans are those who have strong attachments that traverse group boundaries while having only weak attachments with people in countries of their primary residence (Figure 2a). Put another way, these elite cosmopolitans are embedded in transnational networks of elite co-cosmopolitans. In existing studies, they are often called “frequent travelers” (Calhoun 2003), the “transnational capitalist class” (Skir 1997, 2002), or the “global class” (Sassen 2007). Members of this group are made up of executives of multinational corporations and high-ranking officials of IGOs. They are cosmopolitan in the sense of having strong attachments with one another across national borders and being positioned to make joint decisions that influence the economy and politics at the global level. Since these elite cosmopolitans tend to live in their own “bubbles” and rarely interact with locals, they can be paradoxically “parochial” (Bauman 2001; Beaverstock et al. 2004; Castells 1996).

Today, elite cosmopolitans are clustered around Western Europe and North America (Carroll and Carson 2003; Hannerz 1990), centers of imperialism in earlier periods on which contemporary transnational networks have been built. Legacies of imperialism sometimes lead elite transnational professionals to develop imperialist rather than cosmopolitan outlooks (Yeoh and Willis 2005). The risk of parochialism and imperialism among elite cosmopolitans thus shows that there is no intrinsic connection between transnational mobility and cosmopolitanism. Unless transnational mobility leads to the development of attachments to foreign others, “frequent travelers” do not necessarily become elite cosmopolitans.

In contrast, “rooted cosmopolitans” (Appiah 2006; Beck 2003b) possess strong, moderate, and weak attachments with people both inside and outside of countries of their primary residence. While they are likely to have a smaller number of strong attachments with foreign others than elite cosmopolitans, they have a larger number of moderate and weak attachments with foreign others as well as strong attachments with people of their native countries (Figure 2b). This modality of cosmopolitanism is found mostly among immigrants who are connected to people in both their host and home countries. Since the primary means for acquiring rooted cosmopolitanism is immigration, rooted cosmopolitans are less mobile than their elite counterparts who travel frequently. Although it may appear to be difficult to maintain strong attachments with people at distance, doing so is increasingly doable for many immigrants by virtue of advanced communication technologies.

Here, it is important to note that not all immigrants become rooted cosmopolitans. Instead of interacting with people in their host countries, immigrants can choose to confine themselves in their own ethnic communities and become long-distance nationalists: “transnationalism” or transnational ties with co-nationals is not the same as cosmopolitanism (Roudometof 2005). Rooted cosmopolitans are also different from “cultural cowbirds” (Griswold and Wright 2004), newcomers who make efforts to maintain and revitalize their adopted local cultures in essentialist terms—those who have “gone native.” Transnationalism and cultural cowbirds represent the risks of ethnic closure and going native, respectively, in the process of taking root in foreign soils. Unlike transnationalists and cultural cowbirds, rooted cosmopolitans are attached to more than one group.
Despite their differences, both elite and rooted cosmopolitans are capable of transmitting cosmopolitanism to people beyond their small circles of friends. This is because both of them have weak attachments that are conducive to the dissemination of information (Granovetter 1973). Cosmopolitans can help locals increase not only their knowledge of foreign others but also their openness via weak attachments especially if the former occupy influential positions in local communities where they reside (Merton 1968). This is because a person’s perceptions and attitudes are fundamentally interdependent with the people to whom he or she is connected (Dennrell and Le Mens 2007; Friedkin 1998, 2004; Parkinson and Simons 2009). Here, let A2 be a local who is attached to A1, a cosmopolitan, and respects A1’s opinion. In this case, even when A2 never meets with A1’s foreign friend B1, if A2 and A1 evaluate Group B together, A2’s attitude toward Group B can become correlated with A1’s. Put another way, even if A2 initially has a negative attitude toward
Group B, A₂ may nonetheless take a second look at Group B because A₁ has a positive attitude.

In other words, cosmopolitans operate as “mediators” for locals to increase their openness to foreign others. According to Latour, mediators “transform, translate, distort, and modify meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (2005a:39). Mediators are different from “intermediaries” who simply transport meaning without transformation: the former force other members in their networks to reexamine their outgroup prejudices and change their attitudes, whereas the latter do not. I suggest that this type of mediation is an important mechanism that transmits cosmopolitanism in the contemporary world. Even though the volume of immigration has increased, the vast majority of the world’s population does not have direct and extensive contact with immigrants on a daily basis. This means that most people form attitudes toward foreign others through mass media and interaction with their co-nationals; for example, A₂ watches news that negatively represents Group B, and A₂ discusses it with A₁ who knows people from Group B. If A₂ values A₁’s opinion, A₂ begins to not only approach news about Group B more cautiously but also to develop a more positive attitude toward Group B. Thus, A₁ operates as a mediator par excellence by transforming the meaning of the news for A₂.

One interesting question is how far cosmopolitanism can spread by originating from A₁. According to Duncan J. Watts and Peter Sheridan Dodds (2007), there are two types of cascades: local and global. Local cascades of cosmopolitanism would affect a relatively small number of people within one or two steps of A₁, whereas global cascades infect many more people with cosmopolitanism. Watts and Dodds have found that a crucial condition of global cascades is not so much the existence of influential people but “a critical mass of easily influenced individuals influencing other easy-to-influence people” (2007:454). That cosmopolitanism can spread without elite or rooted cosmopolitan influentials is consistent with recent empirical findings that people who belong to networks of well-educated members are likely to be tolerant toward ethnic minorities and immigrants, whether or not they have direct interaction with immigrants (Berg 2009; Côté and Erickson 2009). In other words, A₁ does not even have to know people from Group B to spread cosmopolitanism: if A₁ simply has a positive attitude toward Group B for whatever reason, that can be sufficient to influence A₂’s attitude. If education increases tolerance independently from networks, it is probably because education increases cognitive sophistication as a key source of “sober second thought” about outgroups (Bobo and Licari 1989). This positive effect of education on tolerance may be growing today since conceptions and norms of world culture are actively promoted through the education system (Meyer 2007).

However, this kind of cosmopolitanism based simply on educated individuals is not as robust as other kinds anchored in small groups of people who have strong cross-group attachments. Rooted cosmopolitans who combine strong, moderate, and weak attachments with members of multiple national groups are especially likely to serve as “guardians” of cosmopolitanism when easily influenced members are tipping toward global cascades of anticosmopolitan sentiments, such as xenophobia. In turn, anticosmopolitanism that is anchored in a small group of dedicated anticosmopolitans is likely to be resilient; for example, certain types of voluntary associations tend to have negative effects on intergroup tolerance (Cigler and Joslyn 2002). For better or for worse, networks fundamentally mediate the ways in which individuals develop attitudes toward foreign others.
Finally, it is important to mention individual attributes that operate together with networks in the development of openness to foreign others. People with a secure attachment style, for instance, are likely to benefit more from intergroup contact because they are not afraid of interacting with foreign others, while people with an insecure attachment style may feel threatened by intergroup contact and even strengthen their ethnic prejudices as a result (Mikulincer and Shaver 2001; Van Oudenhoven and Hofstra 2006). People with certain personality types, such as extroverts and individualists, are also more likely to make friends from different groups (Burt et al. 1998; Kalish and Robins 2006). As is the case with the development of openness to foreign cultures, varying degrees of cosmopolitanism among people cannot be reduced completely to effects of different network structures.

In this section, I have used ANT to theorize mechanisms of openness to foreign humans, as well as its different modalities, in terms of concatenations of attachments into different network structures. Now it is time to bring the preceding analyses of networks of foreign humans and nonhumans together to tackle the last and perhaps most important element of cosmopolitanism: the political process called “cosmopolitics” through which humans and nonhumans assemble a transnational public to articulate global risks and debate collective solutions.

**Cosmopolitics of Foreign Humans and Nonhumans: World Risk Society**

Cultural omnivorousness involves regarding foreign nonhumans as aesthetically pleasing, while ethnic tolerance involves regarding foreign humans as ethically important. Generally, theorists of both concepts present cosmopolitanism—openness to foreign others and cultures—as a desirable orientation. However, cosmopolitanism ultimately involves not only aesthetic and ethical orientations but also contentious political practices pertaining to conflicts and problems that cut across national borders (Calhoun 2008a, 2008b). Put another way, while cultural omnivorousness and ethnic tolerance thrive on “good” connections among humans and nonhumans of multiple nationalities, globalization also generates “bad” connections that can make or break cosmopolitanism by testing the limit of openness to foreign others and cultures.

According to Beck, such bad connections consist of “global risks” (1999, 2009): for example, ecological risks that threaten lives of humans and nonhumans across national borders, and financial risks that can trigger worldwide economic turmoil. In the language of ANT, global risks are transnational networks of risky nonhumans that humans have created: “A perfect translation of ‘risk’ is the word network in the ANT sense” (Latour 2003a:36). Under the historical condition that Beck (2000) calls “first modernity,” risks or unintended side effects of human actions were rendered invisible and separated from society. This strict separation of human subjects and nonhuman objects was the defining feature of modern society (Latour 1993, 1999). The “second age of modernity,” however, has shattered the first modernist dream: people now confront the fact that they are hopelessly entangled with various risky nonhumans.

Although global risks represent bad connections, they also present the possibility of creating a transnational public of cosmopolitics, that is, “world risk society”:

12In turn, Beck acknowledges that his theory of world risk society “shares in the rejection of the dualism of society and nature which Bruno Latour ... effect[s] with such intellectual flair” (2009:90).
World risk society opens public discourse and social science to the challenges of ecological crisis, which, as we now know, are global, local and personal at one and the same time. In the “global age,” the theme of risk unites many otherwise disparate areas of new transnational politics with the question of cosmopolitan democracy. (Beck 1999:5)

In other words, globalization generates a variety of risks (ecological, financial, political, and so on) that traverse national borders and implicate people of multiple nationalities into a world risk society, a latent community facing shared global risks. While people are initially unaware of their interdependencies created by global risks, they gradually realize that they are members of a world risk society. They then mobilize their actions and constitute a transnational public to problematize global risks and debate collective solutions—to participate in cosmopolitics. Here, Beck’s theory of world risk society can be translated into ANT as follows: X represents a risky nonhuman that wreaks havoc on ecological systems, and A1, B1, and C1 are members of different national groups affected by X (Figure 3). Inextricable attachments between X and A1, B1, or C1 can lead to strong attachments among A1, B1, and C1. The formation of such attachments across national borders can in turn create a transnational public of “object-oriented democracy” (Latour 2005b) for debating what to do with X. For both the sociology of cosmopolitanism and ANT, then, risks or risky nonhumans are part and parcel of cosmopolitics.

Despite their commonality in taking globally risky objects as focal points of cosmopolitics, ANT rejects the teleological assumption built into the sociology of cosmopolitanism. Though not addressed by recent empirical studies, Beck’s cosmopolitanization thesis makes a subtle but important distinction between two moments of cosmopolitanism. The first moment is openness to foreign others and cultures as a “side effect” of globalization that does not necessarily involve conscious efforts to become cosmopolitans. For Beck, these “passive,” “latent,” or “unconscious” cosmopolitan orientations are “deformed” in the sense that they are not “noble achievements that had been fought for and won” (2004:135). He then goes on to posit that the first moment of “deformed cosmopolitanism” eventually leads to the second moment of “undeformed” or “reflexive” cosmopolitanism where people consciously cultivate subjective orientations to live up to the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism. He suggests that the transition from deformed to reflexive cosmopolitanism parallels with the one from class-in-itself to class-for-itself (2006:95). The sociology of cosmopolitanism thus ends up presenting the formation of a transnational public as essentially a teleological movement.

ANT rejects such teleological thinking and prevents the sociology of cosmopolitanism from defining the existence and principles of a transnational public to social-scientifically foreclose cosmopolitics proper: “The limitation of Beck’s approach is
that his ‘cosmopolitics’ entails no cosmos and hence no politics either” (Latour 2004a:450). Beck argues that everyone is included in one common cosmos “by the traumatic experiences of the enforced community of global risks that threaten everyone’s existence” (2009:56). A transnational public that emerges out of confrontations with global risks therefore “makes the inclusion of others a reality and/or its maxim” (2009:56). At the same time, however, Beck (2002, 2006) asserts that the transnational public has its “enemies,” such as fundamentalists and terrorists who reject cosmopolitan principles. These enemies are excluded from the transnational public because they reject cosmopolitanism. However, if global risks indeed constitute one common cosmos from which nobody can be excluded, those who reject cosmopolitanism should not and cannot be excluded from cosmopolitics. Thus, Beck’s argument logically breaks down, but the problem is not simply logical. Rather, it is deeply political: if social science, such as the sociology of cosmopolitanism, is invoked to define what one common cosmos is and who should be included into its politics, it can prematurely silence and exclude people who have different visions of the cosmos from the social scientist’s.

From ANT’s “infratheoretical” perspective (Latour 2005a), the sociology of cosmopolitanism is only one of many ways to compose a common cosmos and does not have epistemological privilege over ordinary people’s visions that may well reject the existence of such a common cosmos as a world risk society. Put another way, ANT sees the social-scientific description of world risk society as already a part of cosmopolitics. ANT’s focus on viewpoints of participants therefore puts a brake on the normative impulse of the sociology of cosmopolitanism as a critical theory. For Beck, world risk society is already a reality independent of people’s awareness: what one common cosmos is and who gets included are determined social-scientifically. A task of the sociology of cosmopolitanism is therefore to help ordinary people move from latent to reflexive cosmopolitanism in order to form a transnational public. In contrast, ANT aims to represent to ordinary people ways in which they are already trying to assemble a transnational public for themselves and throw the question at them: “can we overcome the multiplicity of ways of assembling and dissembling and yet raise the question of the one common world? Can we make an assembly out of all the various assemblages in which we are already enmeshed?” (Latour 2005b:37). It is not social scientists but ultimately participants themselves who should decide whether one common cosmos exists and, if so, what it is and what politics it should entail.

Thus, although ANT is not a critical theory (Latour 2004c), it helps the sociology of cosmopolitanism become more self-critical as a critical theory. Specifically, it cautions the sociology of cosmopolitanism against perpetuating “this dream of legislating in order to by-pass an impossibly fractious political arena by using the knowledge of what Society is—what manipulates the people in spite of themselves” (Latour 2000:118). ANT rejects the idea of the social scientist as a legislator and proposes to “study up” ordinary people and their incipient practices of cosmopolitics. In other words, ANT urges social scientists to examine ordinary people’s critical operations on their own terms (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) rather than imposing their critical-theoretic visions.

I argue that ANT’s focus on participants’ viewpoints and critical capacities makes two important contributions to the sociology of cosmopolitanism. First, it helps to make cosmopolitics more democratic. Latour notes that “[Beck’s] cosmopolitics is much too cosmopolite” (2004a:456) to be genuinely political. This is because Beck’s theory of world risk society posits that those who are admitted into cosmopolitics
already subscribe to cosmopolitan principles. Social science is invoked to define boundaries and principles of cosmopolitics and legitimate the exclusion of actors who disagree with the social-scientific definition. In contrast, ANT regards social science as already a participant of cosmopolitics and foregrounds its performativity. ANT's vision of cosmopolitics therefore shares one crucial feature with the theory of radical and plural democracy (Mouffe 1996, 2000): both make plural positions and their antagonistic relations constitutive of democratic politics and argue against the premature closure of political boundaries and deliberations in the name of science or rationality.

Moreover, this injunction against the premature elimination of dissenting voices from cosmopolitics is not limited to extreme cases regarding fundamentalists and terrorists. Beck's vision of cosmopolitanism appears to be generally Eurocentric, as he often mentions the special status of “Europe”: “Cosmopolitanism which has taken up residence in reality is a vital theme of European civilization and European consciousness” (2006:2; also see Beck and Grande 2007). Beck's association of cosmopolitanism with Europe is understandable in light of the legacy of Kant's treatise on world peace and the ongoing European integration. Nonetheless, the European experience must not be conflated with cosmopolitanism. People's visions of how to compose one common cosmos and participate in cosmopolitics may differ across geographical locations, given heterogeneous histories, political climates, and cultural traditions (Delanty and He 2008). By rejecting the epistemological privilege that critical theory often assumes, ANT helps the sociology of cosmopolitanism accept competing visions of one common cosmos and the radically open-ended nature of cosmopolitics in which social scientists are only one of many groups of participants.

Second, since ANT focuses on ordinary people's critical capacities, it enables the sociology of cosmopolitanism to approach empirically the longstanding critical-theoretic problem of the relationship between facticity and normativity. Although Beck inaugurated the sociology of cosmopolitanism by breaking away from the philosophy that examined cosmopolitanism as a normative ideal, he nonetheless asserts that “[w]hat cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be” (2006:44). For Beck, the relationship between the facticity and normativity of cosmopolitanism is a conceptual question for critical theorists. However, ANT turns the conceptual question into an empirical one by foregrounding the fact that normative ideals held by ordinary people are already a part of empirical reality: ordinary people are “critical theorists” who constantly inject their normative visions into their everyday practices. For example, even people who are firmly embedded within nation-states are capable of invoking cosmopolitanism as a moral and political discourse to express openness and solidarity with foreign others (Lamont and Aksartova 2002; Skrbis and Woodward 2007). This is probably because world culture has been institutionalized to the extent that even ordinary people are familiar with cosmopolitanism as a moral and political discourse. Thus, from the ANT perspective, the relationship between facticity and normativity is not a conceptual but empirical question, which calls for twofold analysis: of how the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism facilitates people's extension of their attachments to foreign others, and of how new attachments to foreign others in turn influence people's normative commitment to the world as a whole as well as their identity as members of humanity.

In short, ANT helps to reorient the sociology of cosmopolitanism from a critical-theoretic task of defining how people should create a transnational public of cosmopolitics to a self-critical task of studying how people, including social scientists,
try to create it on their own terms. Among various forms of network analysis, ANT has the rare ability to confront the normative impulse of the existing sociology of cosmopolitanism. This is because ANT’s approach to networks as something that actors themselves assemble and perform, rather than as something that social scientists demarcate, can be consistently applied to the politically most controversial and consequential element of the sociology of cosmopolitanism. ANT does not reject the sociology of cosmopolitanism as a critical theory, but it injects greater reflexivity, so that the sociology of cosmopolitanism can become more relevant and effective in facilitating the incipient practices of cosmopolitics.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
ANT can be a powerful ally for the sociology of cosmopolitanism. It helps elaborate mechanisms that mediate the causal relationship between cosmopolitanization as an environmental change and cosmopolitanism as a subjective orientation. To begin with, ANT can explain how attachments to foreign humans and nonhumans concatenate into networks capable of sustaining cosmopolitanism as openness to foreign others and cultures. Specifically, ANT illustrates different network structures as determinants of different modalities of cosmopolitanism. The development of multiple attachments to foreign nonhumans leads to banal cosmopolitanism or cultural omnivorousness. If people develop strong attachments across national borders but possess only weak attachments to national groups, they are likely to become elite cosmopolitans embedded in somewhat exclusive transnational networks of co-cosmopolitans. If people acquire a large number of moderate and weak attachments to members of two or more national groups, however, they are likely to become rooted cosmopolitans. Moreover, ANT clarifies how the development of cosmopolitanism culminates in cosmopolitics and, consequently, refines the sociology of cosmopolitanism as a critical theory. ANT cautions the sociology of cosmopolitanism against imposing the social-scientific vision of one common cosmos to close cosmopolitics prematurely. Instead, ANT urges sociologists to see their cosmopolitan vision as only one among many in the contemporary world and investigate how ordinary people themselves labor to assemble a transnational public. While network theory in general is helpful for the sociology of cosmopolitanism to advance as a research program, ANT in particular is able to boost not only its explanatory power but also its critical edge.

In conclusion, I suggest three ways to use ANT to further research on cosmopolitanism, both within and beyond sociology. First, ANT can shed new light on one persistent question in the sociology of cosmopolitanism: the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. In spite of cosmopolitanization, nationalism is not withering away (Calhoun 2007, 2008b; Favell 2008). In fact, the sociology of cosmopolitanism has suggested that cosmopolitanism is not displacing nationalism in a zero-sum manner; rather, “cosmopolitanism does not only negate nationalism but also presupposes it” (Beck and Sznaider 2006:20). While this formulation sounds reasonable, it is also obscure. To unpack more precisely how cosmopolitanism and nationalism are articulated, ANT helps to disaggregate their relationship in terms of attachments. A transnational public, for instance, is both cosmopolitan and national in the sense that it is made up of participants who are attached to both foreign others and co-nationals. If cosmopolitanism presupposes nationalism, it is probably because cosmopolitanism is built up by adding transnational attachments to networks of co-national attachments that nationalism has forged since the emergence of modern nation-states.
Second, it is worthwhile using ANT to clarify how “world society” (Meyer 2000) is assembled. ANT and institutional theory have one important commonality: both theories conceptualize “actor” as a construction. ANT sees actorhood as constructed out of networks of attachments, whereas institutional theory sees it as constructed out of institutional scripts. It is very likely that networks and institutions feed into each other in the development of cosmopolitanism. Institutions of world society can influence actors’ thresholds for developing attachments to foreign humans and nonhumans, and networks can in turn influence whether actors adopt institutions of world society. If world society is not an analytical construct but a real entity, it is possible and important to examine how initially local interactions and attachments came to build up the world society of humans and nonhumans that encompasses the globe. Indeed, the historical formation of world society itself is an important understudied topic in institutional theory: while institutional theory takes world society as the explanans, ANT turns it into the explanandum. Studying how world society has been institutionalized through concatenations of networks can also contribute to the emerging general theoretical problem concerning the relationship between institutions and networks (Martin 2009; Mohr and White 2008).

Finally, ANT has the potential to reorient studies of cosmopolitanism beyond sociology. Although cosmopolitanism has become an important keyword across the social science and the humanities (Cheah and Robbins 1998; Harvey 2000; Pollock et al. 2000; Vertovec and Cohen 2002), it has not yet made a decisive conceptual break from its philosophical tradition wherein cosmopolitanism is seen as the transcendence of attachments: “Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. It is, as Diogenes said, a kind of exile” (Nussbaum 1996:15). In contrast, ANT rearticulates “becoming citizens of the world” as a collective enterprise. People develop cosmopolitanism only when they become well attached to foreign humans and nonhumans. Here, the metaphor of marionettes sums up ANT’s view of cosmopolitanism nicely: “The more strings the marionettes are allowed to have, the more articulated they become” (Latour 2005a:217). Cosmopolitans are analogous to the marionettes—acting with networks of attachments that enable them to develop cultural omnivorosity and ethnic tolerance as well as to participate in cosmopolitics. Thus, ANT can turn the entire intellectual history of cosmopolitanism upside down: cosmopolitanism is fundamentally network-bound. It is not detachments but attachments—that their multiplication, intensification, and concatenation—that make cosmopolitanism possible.

In essence, ANT is a “science of living together.” As such, ANT can be a valuable analytical tool for sociologists as well as for ordinary people to understand key aspects of the world today and their political implications, specifically the facticity and normativity of the unprecedented growth of attachments that collect humans and nonhumans into networks of cosmopolitanism.

REFERENCES


AN ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY OF COSMOPOLITANISM


