Searching for *Satya* through *Ahimsa*:
Gandhi’s Challenge to Western Discourses of Power

Manfred B. Steger

1. The Problematic

Most students of politics would concur with Gene Sharp’s observation that “power is inherent in practically all social and political relationships” and that its control is “the basic problem in political theory.” At the same time, however, a number of academic observers have contritely confessed to theoretical stagnation in power studies. So why hasn’t there been better progress? One might be tempted to cast the blame on the old problem of insufficient interdisciplinary interaction, leading to alienation, overspecialization, and isolation in the social sciences in general, and political and social theory in particular. Although there is some truth to this view, I submit that a deeper explanation for the current malaise of power studies lies in its limited approach to the problem of violence – a topic put into sharper scholarly focus in the last decade by John Keane, Mary Kaldor, and others as a result of genocide, terrorism, and the global war on terror. How can we explain, Keane asks, that the long twentieth century of genocidal wars, concentration camps, and ethnic hatred has produced so little imaginative reflection on the conceptual meaning, causes and effects, and ethical-political implications of violence and its alternatives?

Responding to this critical challenge, I argue in this essay that the paucity of imaginative reflection on the relationship between power and violence discloses what Alfred North Whitehead has called a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” – the neglect of a high degree of abstraction involved when power as a complex sociopolitical phenomenon is considered merely as far as it exemplifies preconceived categories of thought. While criticizing traditional Western modes of representing power primarily in terms of violence, I nonetheless resist the temptation to enter etiological discussions about the alleged “innateness” of aggression so prevalent in the familiar “nature versus nurture” debate. Even those who choose to argue with Freud for the ultimate futility of suppressing human aggressive tendencies can hardly discount that ideas, language, and specific social practices play some role in how we conceptualize “biological drives.” The reification of violence as a “natural” and, therefore, “inevitable” feature of the human condition – still a widespread assumption among prominent “realists” – represents only one conceptual possibility among others. In fact, it is because of the cultural hegemony of the realist paradigm that we often remain unaware of alternative imaginaries of “non-violent political power which would educate the individual to freedom.”

Employing his philosophical leitmotif of the search for satya (truth, being) through the practice of ahimsa (nonviolence; “renouncing the will to kill or damage”), Mohandas
K. Gandhi attempted to formulate such an instructive alternative. Heeding critical voices that have rightly urged theorists of nonviolence to provide more precise definitions of their key terms, I follow Arne Naess’s suggestion to consider “violence” in its root sense of “violation” – referring not only to open, physical forms of violence, but also to emotional injury and psychic terror, such as those present when people are subjugated, repressed, and exploited. In its widest sense, of course, a definition of violence also encompasses all those forms of indirect exploitation and structural marginalization which limit reflexivity and self-realization.

Using Gandhi’s perspective to bring to light some insufficiently thematized underpinnings of Western liberal, Marxist, and poststructuralist discourses of power, the present essay is designed as a problem-centered exercise in interpretive inquiry. Constituting the “indispensable, defining feature of political theory understood as an intellectual craft,” such inquiries challenge Western political and social theorists to put to the test the adequacy of their views on political power through a cross-cultural search for new meanings. Thus, such inquiries respond to what Fred Dallmayr calls “propitious moments in the history of political philosophy,” when “Western and Eastern thought for the first time can become partners in a genuine global dialogue.” Finally, in an era of globalization characterized by shrinking time and space, such interpretative endeavors also appeal to the kind of phronesis that can actually be used and applied by global political activists. The reassertion of a problem-driven critical theory in the social sciences, in turn, reinvigorates the impulse to understand and address the pressing political problems of the early twenty-first century. By raising the crucial question of how political power can be conceptualized and practiced in nonviolent ways, Gandhi focused on the importance of linking political theory to the practical task of defusing the loci of violence in society. My concluding remarks will therefore touch upon the more general problem of linking critical theory to the dimension of praxis in our age of globalization.

Let me add a final word of caution. The concept of nonviolence is clearly value-laden and can hardly be disentangled from the normative-ethical perspective of the user. Critics of the Mahatma and the proliferating Gandhi literature have repeatedly made this important point. In the present essay, I am neither uncritically promoting “Gandhism” as the perfect solution to the complex problem of political power nor do I care to belittle existing Western perspectives. Such dogmatism would actually discourage the emergence of fruitful, cross-cultural discussions on the character of violent and nonviolent forms of coercion and existing networks of power.

2. Power and Violence: The Liberal View

A few years ago, Douglas Rae suggested that the modern history of power studies in American political science began in earnest with Robert Dahl’s pluralist reply to elite theorists of power. Given the confines of this essay, I will neither attempt to provide a broad overview of well-known behaviorist arguments on power nor will I discuss the
ensuing waves of criticism which culminated in the “faces of power” debates. Adequate expositions of this theme have been offered elsewhere. Rather, I wish to reconsider some features of Dahl’s conceptual universe pertinent to my subject – particularly those providing the liberal foundation for his celebrated definition that, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”

The defining elements of Dahl’s liberal “agency model of power” derive from basic philosophical assumptions made by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and other early modern liberal thinkers. Indeed, many commentators have emphasized the intimate connection between modern behaviorist conceptions of power and Hobbesian atomism, Galilean mechanicism, and Humean causicism. This emerging intellectual constellation both expressed and justified a new outlook in which humans began to perceive themselves as the autonomous makers of their world, and political power came to be seen as a generalized capacity to act with quantifiable properties or resources to be found in the causal relations between discrete (male) individuals whose bodies were interacting with each other and their “external” environment in mechanical fashion. No doubt, the epistemological and metaphysical dualism associated with Descartes’ rationalism inspired the political and moral imaginations of the liberal “self” as an ontologically independent “entity” driven by insatiable passion and desires, inhabiting a violent and hostile world bereft of civility, friendship, and compassion. Sovereign power, laying claim over the separate powers of these individuals, acquired the “legitimate right to act” through presumed acts of consent on the part of the members of the newly-founded political community.

Though Dahl’s contemporary discussion of polyarchies, interest groups, and democratic accountability seems to have little in common with the seventeenth-century political discourse and its fixation on sovereign power and violent conflict, we must not forget that our twentieth-century exaltation of Western “civilization” – together with our illusory sense of “ontological security” – have been rooted in the politics of “pacifying society.” Emerging as the constitutive political fiction of modern liberalism, “civil society” was built around the idea of a community of autonomous persons. However, given the important Hobbesian caveat that individual paths (of bodies) toward self-realization were “necessarily” obstructing each other, liberalism depended heavily on intricate schemes of various forms of “legitimate violence.” As Geraldine Finn emphasizes, the liberal tendency to derive an undifferentiated category of “violence” from supposedly intrinsic “facts” of corporeality itself not only obfuscates the politics of particular acts of violence but also pre-empts an interrogative phenomenology of violence in relation to politics.

Instead, liberalism uncritically links “legitimate” mechanisms of punishment and social control to civil society and the emerging centralized structure of modern, limited government. Taking shape in “a tangle of the literal and metaphorical,” the liberal system of law and its democratic political institutions were thus built on consistent representations of “natural” aggression, looming violent disruptions, and other “imaginings and threats of force, disorder, and pain.” Liberal thinkers have regarded violence as
constitutive of political power because, without the employment of force and punishment, there can be “no power at all.” In other words, even “legitimate” power rested on the “instinctual” fear of violent death that drives reluctant brutes from the “state of nature” to the contractual constitution of an artificial (and rational-violent) Leviathan.

But while violence may always constitute a very real human possibility, it may not be an unavoidable fatality. Unwilling to maintain such conceptual flexibility, liberal thinkers went on to cement their vision of political order with the invention of the modern “realist” political discourse, which was rooted in seventeenth-century notions of “fundamental” and “sacred” laws of nature based on “natural imperatives” of self-preservation and individualized punishment. The body politic based on the social contract merely delegated to state institutions the “unalienable right” to match ontological violence with the calculated and centralized use of political violence. Lingering doubts expressed by Frankfurt School thinkers like Walter Benjamin who asked whether the alleged rationality of legal coercion doesn’t actually reveal “something rotten in law itself” were further diffused through the careful incorporation of formal principles of Christian morality. While the logic of efficient, controlled, and purposive violence assumed conceptual priority over the “moral goodness” of “right reason,” the emerging liberal discourse of instrumental ratiocination nonetheless relied heavily on Augustine’s celebrated response to “pagan” charges of Christian otherworldliness.

Amplified in Martin Luther’s defense of secular authority, the Augustinian dualism of civitas terrena and civitas Dei clearly supported the “realism” of the modern liberal state and its dichotomization between individual, private, moral judgments and public standards relying on expediency and effectiveness. Although this “liberal art of separation” (Michael Walzer) served as a bulwark against parochial prejudice, arbitrariness, and religious intolerance, it also facilitated the positivist disjunction between politics and ethics and the birth of social sciences dedicated to the most efficient prolongation of the body politic. Celebrated in Max Weber’s distinction between an “ethic of ultimate ends” and an “ethic of responsibility,” the liberal gestalt of political power found its full expression as economized, limited violence operating in the arena of power politics among modern nation-states (“Machtpolitik”).

Indeed, the influence of Max Weber on this rather limited liberal view on power can hardly be exaggerated. After all, his famous definition of the state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” quickly emerged as the standard definition of social scientists in liberal democracies. Claiming that “all political structures use force,” Weber famously argued that all political organizations equally exerted power in terms of “legitimate violence,” they only differed “in the manner in which and the extent to which they use or threaten to use it [force, violence] against other political organizations.” Following Weber, liberal theorists would henceforth content themselves with power theories that raised procedural-legal questions regarding the “legitimacy” of the liberal-democratic state. Known today by its somewhat amorphous designation “democratic theory,” such contemporary “rights talk” often eschews critical examinations of liberalism’s
constitutive myth of violence in favor of analytic debates focused on the right use of violence and the right to use violence.26

From the perspective of this essay, then, the most troubling question arises not merely from liberalism’s reflexive divorce of politics from morality, but from its fundamental assumption that violence constitutes the natural mode of political power. With very few exceptions, liberal political theorists have failed to challenge this one-dimensional conception of power as bringing “violence to bear on someone else’s person or possessions.”27 In fact, liberal-democratic theory provides very little incentive for the formulation of alternative discourses of power. Dismissed as “hopelessly utopian” and “politically impotent,” models such as Gandhi’s vision of participatory, nonviolent democracy hardly ever affect mainstream political and social theory.28 As a result, liberal democracies perpetuate the assumption of the “naturalness” of violence, and a new generation of citizens resigns itself to the “fact” that the maintenance of our individual liberties as well as our political institutions of representative democracy “inevitably” involves some forms of violence. Recently, this assumption has been echoed by a chorus of “liberal realists” arguing for the alleged “necessity” of a US-led War on Terror in the name of building “democracy.”29

The “civility” of modernity, therefore, does not indicate the absence of violence. Liberal law calls the pain and death it afflicts on the body “peace,” which crushes and kills “with a steadfastness equal to a violence undisciplined by legitimacy.”30 In the end, the liberal order remains suspended in discursive and cultural practices that simultaneously accept, deny, and redistribute the violence of its origins. Thus, it is not hard to concur with John Keane that one of the reasons for political theory’s “frozen political imagination” about violence and power and its consequent glum silence about nonviolence derives from the “confused and confusing mélange of unspoken prejudices and significant assumptions” of the dominant liberal paradigm.31

3. Power and Violence: The Marxist View

It only takes a superficial acquaintance with Marxist theory to anticipate its systematic critique of the Newtonian world of liberalism. Opting for a social ontology which is relational as well as transformational, Marx and Engels rejected empiricist dualism in favor of a theory of class struggle in capitalist society where structural powers are distributed and reproduced within and across these very class relations.32 They viewed human beings as historically evolved and relatively enduring “ensembles of social relations” who can individuate themselves only in and through society. While Marx and Engels considered human agency a socially conditioned phenomenon, they nonetheless emphasized the productive ability of human beings “to make their own history . . . under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.”33

Embracing the Hegelian notion of the self as an interdependent potentiality unfolding in history, Marx and Engels irrevocably broke with a Cartesian rationalism that neatly separated existence and essence, subject and object, humans and nature. It appeared that one could reasonably expect the authors of The German Ideology to apply
the same critical scrutiny to an essentialism of violence that provided the framework for the liberal agency model of power. However, in spite of their considerable efforts to fill the social void left behind by Hobbes’ epistemological individualism, Marx and Engels failed to do so. Evoking an image of nature as a “completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force,” that pitches “sheep-like,” animalistic brutes against each other, ideas of cooperation and mutual aid remained largely subsumed under the general assumption of persistent, violent social struggles existing within the teleological framework of scientific socialism.34 As a result, Marx and Engels merely added a new dialectical wrinkle to modernity’s agenda of inventing a new science of political power based on exact rational categories of causal relations, force, and violence.

On the relationship of power and violence, the conceptual continuities between liberalism and Marxism are therefore far more striking than their considerable differences. As introduced in their key writings, Marx and Engels’ image of power remains that of a “central force” wielded by historically privileged classes both as defensive and offensive forms of violence.35 Their crucial idea of the working class’ seizure of state power reifies the role of violence as the modus vivendi of a socialist Realpolitik. Indeed, even the strikingly illiberal notion of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is born of the same fear that “good” forms of violence may be vulnerable to “bad” ones (wielded by bourgeois counter-revolutionaries). In spite of occasional “evolutionary” innuendoes, the founders of scientific socialism ultimately remained committed to their general vision of the pivotal role of violence as both the means and logical endpoint of political power. As Engels put it, “Setting the moral question aside, as a revolutionary I welcome any means – both the most violent one and the seemingly most restrained – that will lead to the end.”36

Sharing the Machiavellian conceptual roots of their liberal “class enemies,” classical Marxists unflinchingly accepted this “realism of violence” which demands the systematic subordination of “morality” to a materialist “iron logic” of “political necessity.” At the beginning of this century, this notion of power wielded as an instrument of class domination found its most extreme manifestation in Georges Sorel’s anarcho-syndicalism and Lenin’s Bolshevik belief in the “revolutionary conquest of political power by the armed proletariat.”37 Eduard Bernstein and his little band of ethical socialists who occasionally dared to challenge the equation of power with “violent force” were subject to the same ridicule and marginalization as Emma Goldmann, when she announced that “no revolution can ever succeed as a factor of liberation unless the means used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency with the purposes to be achieved.”38 The dominance of Western discourses of political power associated with absolutism and the rise of sovereign European nation-states explains why orthodox Marxist intellectuals steadfastly denied a “moral raison d’être” of any present or past legal orders.39

It was not until the rise of fascism that Marxist intellectuals associated with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research expanded their discussion of power by turning to a systematic discussion of ideology, culture, and authoritarianism. In Italy, Antonio Gramsci developed his influential idea of power as the “hegemony” of ideological
leitmotifs designed by elites to produce and reproduce popular consent. However, post-World War II Marxists – most prominently adherents to Louis Althusser’s school of structuralist Marxism and state theorists like Nicos Poulantzas, Ralph Miliband, and James O’Connor – either bypassed the question of violence altogether or found themselves in agreement with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ontological claim that “inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot.”

The great debates of the 1960s and 1970s between neo-Marxists and their liberal critics centered on economic reductionism, moral relativism, reification of categories, and historical teleology. Although the former responded to these objections by expanding Marx’s original project to address vital areas such as the state, civil society, and the environment, the relationship of power and violence still remained an underexploited theme. As Hannah Arendt pointed out, the main voices on both sides of the ideological fence exhibited the same instrumental tendency to equate political power with the “organization of violence” and the “effectiveness of command.”

This narrative only began to change when a new generation of radical social theorists began to weave Marxian, Gramscian, and Weberian categories into a more comprehensive theory of society and consciousness by focusing on the role of intent, interests, and culture as well as on the interaction between agency and structure. Moreover, some proponents of the “new social movements” began to wonder aloud why a supposedly historicist Marxist model accepted so easily a reified causal view of power operating in seemingly fixed loci of human domination. Before long, Ernesto Laclau and others self-consciously announced an era of “post-Marxism,” offering a comprehensive critique of Marxist “class essentialism” – the tendency to view social identities and class interests petrified in a totalizing structure which completely disregards the pluralistic and multifarious character of power and political struggles.

4. Power and Violence: The Poststructural (Foucauldian) View

No doubt, theorists of “radical democracy” like Laclau and Mouffe were deeply influenced by the rising tide of what has been loosely labeled “postmodernism” or “poststructuralism,” characterized by a general distrust of totalizing discourses of “reason” and “universal truth.” As Sheldon Wolin notes, perhaps no other poststructuralist writer has done more to illuminate the nature of power than Michel Foucault. In particular, his writings revealed the poverty of Marxist power theory with respect to “ordinary” networks of domination enmeshing women, gays and lesbians, ethnic minorities, and other marginalized social groups.

Is there a constructive dimension to power? What is the relationship between power and negotiation, compliance, and, most importantly, transgressive strategies of resistance? Can we study political power exclusively in terms of “sovereignty”? These were some Foucauldian questions which, from a Gandhian perspective, deserved high marks for helping to refocus and energize the discussion on power in Western political thought. Due to the limited focus of this paper, I will rely solely on Foucault as a main representative of the poststructuralist perspective on power. Moreover, given the French thinker’s wide-ranging intellectual interests, I will only touch the theme that relates
most to this paper: the historical constitution of particular regimes of “truth” through the workings of “disciplinary power” as a more or less stable network of shifting, discursively constructed alliances and resistances.

Foucault’s notion of power as a “multiplicity of force relations” challenged liberal agency models of power while at the same time attacking Marx’s structural determinism. In particular, the French thinker undermined the modern conception of power as “sovereignty” – even in its Marxist versions of class vanguardism or ideas of ruling elites. Emphasizing that the Marxist usage of the term “ideology” itself already indicates its complicity in a modernist discourse of “normalizing” regimes of science and “knowledge,” Foucault’s analysis makes a number of important points.45 First, given its constructive function of constituting human subjectivity, power neither emanates from nor imposes itself on pre-existing, “independent” Cartesian subjects; rather, it works as a pervasive “routine” molding the “body and soul” of its subjects. Power creates and constructs just as much as it destroys and distorts. Hence, there exists a reciprocal relationship between the exercise of political power and the production of regimes of truth/knowledge. Occurring most effectively in the micropolitical arena of everyday discourses rather than at obvious sites such as centralized state structures, “disciplinary power” fosters predictable patterns of “normalcy” at the expense of semiotic openness, difference, and alterity.

Yet, as James Miller has noted, Foucault’s thought, too, follows the modern tradition of Western political theory in its strong tendency to skirt a thorough examination of the reified link between power and cruelty, indicating a surprising continuity between poststructuralist and modernist discourses of power.46 Although the French theorist contests the liberal view of violence inflicted through the exercise of juridical and monarchical power, he nonetheless shares the Hobbesian emphasis on violence as constituting identity. Foucault merely discloses the hidden coercion of a social network producing “docile bodies;” in the end, violence and cruelty still remain the central engines of power in his world of “carceral cities,” “panoptic regimes,” and “disciplinary societies.” Moreover, he accepts Nietzsche’s view of violence as being inscribed in existence as the “instinctive violence” of Schadenfreude – the pleasure generated by causing pain.47 The haunting images in Discipline and Punish – from the 1757 torture of Damiens the regicide to the 1840 opening of the penal colony at Mettray – are but two examples of the varied social manifestations of Nietzsche’s primordial violence. But why maintain such essentialism of violence in a radically historicist project that frowns upon foundationalism in any guise?

For one, Foucault’s strong ontological bias in favor of open semiosis explains his rejection of any sustained narrative. After all, he viewed any discursive practice as both a liberating and limiting mode of being. Functioning as a tactics of “discursive insurgency,” the former challenges unreflective hierarchies encoded in dominant discourses. In their latter mode, sustained narratives are inevitably “doing violence to things.”48 Hence, even if we ignore critics who charge poststructuralism with the dissolution of all points of reference and the assumption of both epistemological relativism and the political passivity of a “perpetual withholding gesture,”49 and instead embrace
William Connolly’s interpretation of Foucault’s thought as advocating a “politics of engagement” and an “ethics of sensibility,” there still remains a serious problem. The “transgression” of conventional limits of experience, while forcing “reason” to recognize and acknowledge what it excludes, nonetheless relies on the familiar image of power as “corrective violence.” The act of transgression itself amounts to a narrative of power, which, if sustained, erects and solidifies new limits to the point where it can direct the conduct of others. Therefore, transgression cannot be dissociated from the violent implications of the “will to truth.”

As noted by J. Daniel Schubert, Foucault’s condemnation of the violence inscribed in modern, disciplinary forms of power ultimately must turn against itself: “Transgression is violent. It can hurt. ... Privilege is not likely to be abandoned without a fight.” While one may not necessarily object to a good political fight, it might be useful to first examine the conceptual parameters, the social consequences, and the political mode of such a fight. Must we really assume that contesting power necessarily involve violence? Following Nietzsche, Foucault offers us but a genealogical reading of history as the “perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence.” Distorted truth simply meets up once again with distorted truth, and transgressive violence recognizes its own normalizing mirror image. Thus, in spite of his truly pioneering departure from liberal and Marxist conceptual models, Foucault retains the familiar image of power as a violent struggle in which “we all fight each other.” Originally directed against the Enlightenment discourse of emancipation, his genealogy of contingent history problematizes modern forms of rationality and dismisses justice as a humanist invention without abandoning Hobbes’ primacy of primordial violence in a war for power. As Foucault puts it, “Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.”

While exposing as “fiction” all rational dichotomies and the alleged “naturalness” of social phenomena, Foucault nonetheless falls prey to Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which places power within a conceptual framework of the “inevitability” and “naturalness” of violence. As Brent Pickett observes, Foucault’s notion of resistance either remains trapped in modern power, or celebrates a resistance without limits. On one hand, he seeks to avoid making any pronouncements on how to use his ideas in political practice, but, on the other, he can place no limits on forms of resistance. Given his understanding of modern power as “savagely violent,” the French thinker is thus forced to accept that strategies of resistance will mirror modern society, implicitly sanctioning even the most violent forms of resistance. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Foucault elaborates his theory of power in intentionally shocking metaphors of violence – be it in his notion of the “beheading of the King [power as sovereignty],” the “slaying of man and history,” or in his stern admonition to the readers of Discipline and Punish to always stay attuned to the “distant roar of the battle.”
5. Mahatma Gandhi’s Nonviolent Search for Truth

Though showing some interest in Asian philosophical traditions, such as the Islamic sources of the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the intellectual foundations of Japanese Zen Buddhism, Foucault never offered a systematic treatment of non-Western political themes. He only mentions Gandhi’s name once or twice in passing. Still, one finds a number of striking similarities in the two men’s respective political analyses: an account of modern power as ubiquitous, diffuse, and circulating; a radical impulse toward decentralization and pluralism – sometimes even bordering on anarchy; an emphasis on the indissoluble entanglement of knowledge (truth) and power; attacks on the fundamental dichotomies of Western culture; the anarchist’s distaste for hierarchy, the skeptic’s rejection of traditional metaphysics; and the democrat’s conviction that the exercise of political power always depends on the cooperation and obedience of its subjects. Viewing resistance and power as correlative elements, both Foucault and Gandhi cherished political struggles and transgressive practices as ways of self-creation – the opening of new spaces in which a variety of discourses challenging oppressive “normalcy” can flourish.

At the same time, however, there remain significant theoretical differences, most importantly with respect to the possibility of transforming repressive power relations and, most importantly, the relationship between power and violence. In Foucauldian terms, Gandhi remains essentially an Enlightenment thinker who supports an emancipatory political project in terms of an ethically-motivated “quest for truth.” In spite of Foucault’s increasing ambivalence toward the Enlightenment – a tendency evident in his potent final lectures at the Collège de France on the Greek practice of parrhesia (“truth-telling in politics”) and his ensuing formulation of an “ethics of care” – he never tired of warning against using theory to ground political practice in a “will to truth.”

Conversely, while sharing Foucault’s deep concerns with the practices of Western “civilization,” Gandhi emphasized the crucial role of moral reason in a politically anchored, nonviolent search for first principles. Resisting the Foucauldian temptation to equate “truth” with a “system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements,” he held fast to immanent critique as the most appropriate vehicle for resistance and transgression. Gandhi’s defense of radical political action directed against oppressive rules and traditions corresponded to his preference for a critical conception of theory as rational critique charging modern Western political systems and their institutions with violating their own stated principles. From a Gandhian perspective, nonviolent direct action is not a counterproductive enterprise tainted with the same pathologies of modern disciplinary power, but the most effective way of frustrating unaccountable power networks through the transformation of popular obedience. The Mahatma and his followers thus considered a praxis-oriented “will to find truth” as an indispensable vehicle for achieving a better understanding of how power operated in a colonial context.

Before discussing the basic elements of Gandhi’s political thought – satya (truth, being), agraha (firmness, force, power), and ahimsa (nonviolence) – let us recall that the
Mahatma saw himself primarily writing for the marginalized and downtrodden, such as the Indian caste of *dalits* ("Untouchables"), who were searching for concrete ways out of their persistent experiences of suffering. While he may be exaggerating in claiming that Gandhi had little interest in transcendental foundations and "had no ontological conception of God," Arne Naess makes an important point in emphasizing the strong pragmatic tone of Gandhi’s writings. His utterances can hardly be detached from their cultural context, reflecting the concreteness of his political location within an intricate web of existing power relations which routinely undermined a sense of human dignity and cultural self-expression. Thus, it was only through concrete political struggles that he developed his new model of political power as a nonviolent search for truth (*satyagraha*).

Indeed, the practice of nonviolently resisting British colonialism was directly linked to the constructive task of creating new forms of political, social, and cultural identity. *Satyagrahis* ("adherents to truth-power") therefore could not unilaterally impart privileged philosophical knowledge to the masses; rather, they developed their own theoretical understanding of nonviolent political power out of their daily interactions with those social groups most exposed to the effects of normalizing colonial power. Indeed, Gandhi’s political theory represents less a cognitive affair than a problem-driven, theoretical extension of concrete experiences of domination and resistance at the level of everyday existence. Racism, for example, was not merely a conceptual problem; it was embodied by the colonial policeman who threw the young Indian barrister out of the first-class cabin of a train bound for Maritzburg or the English barber in Pretoria who refused to cut the hair of a "bloody coolie." Such moments of ill treatment served as the crucial catalysts for Gandhi’s formidable challenge to modern Western discourses of power.

From the outset, Gandhi strongly resisted the dogmatic route of the theorist acting as the creator of political truth by identifying a set of “true” theoretical formulations designed to serve as the metaphysical blueprint for the “correct” political order. Deeply influenced by the Jain philosophy of *anekantavada* – the many-sidedness of all phenomena – Gandhi defended throughout his life the importance of an ethical and spiritual pluralism rooted in the fragmentariness of our understanding of *satya*. Noting the derivation of the term from the Sanskrit verb *sat* ("to be" or "to exist"), Gandhi opted for what Partha Chatterjee calls an “experimental epistemic basis of truth,” which differs sharply from the underlying subject-object bifurcation of Cartesian rationalism and its various philosophical offshoots. Although Gandhi never hesitated to interweave ontological components of *satya* – such as the Indian *advaita vedanta* view of truth as a pre-conceptual “nonduality” (“oneness of all things”) – with more epistemological (truth as “factual correctness”), pragmatic (truth as “selfless political action”), psychological (truth as “honesty”), and religious (truth as “God”) notions of *satya*, he remained nonetheless firmly wedded to the skeptic’s position regarding the difficulty of ever grasping *satya* in its fullness.

Since Gandhi only acknowledged fallible criteria for truth, his political judgments remained provisional, thereby imposing on the individual three fundamental
responsibilities: tolerance, the selfless devotion (*bhakti*) to communicate with the “Other” (ontologically conceived as the interdependence of all things), and the corresponding moral and political duty to search for more complete manifestations of the necessarily incomplete “relative truths” of dualistic thinking. Still, the “very earnest seeker after Truth” need not share Gandhi’s ontological assumptions as long as he or she was willing to carry forward the great “experiment with truth” by testing his or her political convictions in the social arena: “The quest for truth cannot be prosecuted in a cave. Silence makes no sense where it is necessary to speak. One may live in a cave in certain circumstances, but the common man can be tested only in society.” Keeping a steady eye on the ever-present possibility of “errors” and “mistakes” in one’s relative judgments, Gandhi utilized the critical force of his epistemological stance as the indispensable catalyst in his search for an elusive truth, thereby eschewing the dogmatism of past political leaders who frequently justified their reign of terror by appealing to ideals of “progress” and “liberation.”

Sharing the postmodern suspicion that the pervasiveness of absolute truth claims in any given society indicates a high degree of social domination, Gandhi nonetheless managed to avoid Foucault’s disdain for the “normalizing” power of *logos* by firmly endorsing *satya* as a regulative ideal guiding political practice. Indeed, it would be a grave mistake to interpret Gandhi’s passionate indictment of Western narratives of “modernization” and “utility” as a repudiation of all forms of rationality. For the Mahatma, reason served its most important function in the process of testing relative truth claims, the adjudication of grievances, and the provision of a moral-legal structure. Emphasizing the ability to step into the shoes of the other in order to enlarge one’s own perspective and thus enhance the chances of arriving at a position acceptable to all involved parties, he subscribed to the principle of reciprocity embodied in rational debate as the necessary precondition for the resolution of social conflicts.

On this point, Gandhi’s conceptual scheme seems to correspond to Jürgen Habermas’s regulative ideal of communicative rationality based on the idea of autonomous moral agents readjusting the distortions of reason brought about by “irrational currents” of modernity, such as the conditions of inequality and unaccountability inherent in capitalism. Like Habermas, Gandhi was drawn to the ideal of a substantive democracy based on “truthful” or “authentic” speech pervading social interactions that were uncorrupted by relations of domination and violence. Yet, unlike the German philosopher, Gandhi refused to anchor transcendental truth claims in language and thereby reconstruct a Cartesian dualism of “communicative” versus “strategic” action, “life-world” versus “system,” and “freedom” versus “power.” While it might be possible to connect Gandhi’s concept of *satya* to the idea of a ceaseless “striving for truth” – and hence to a negative Kantian regulative ideal – we must keep in mind that Gandhi rejected the moral absolutism inherent in Kant’s deontological model based on a general kind of behavior that is “good without qualification.” Gandhi repeatedly acknowledged the persistence of moral dilemmas, and he warned against turning his cherished principle of *ahimsa* into a fetish: “It would be smooth sailing, if one could determine the course of one’s action only by one general principle whose application at a given moment was
too obvious to need even a moment’s reflection. But I cannot recall a single act which could be so easily determined.” 75 In other words, certain situations may call for the violation of the ideal of searching for truth through the practice of nonviolence, but this did not render the ideal itself inoperative or irrelevant. In spite of the complexity of moral choices, the political activist was called upon to continue the struggle for a political realization of satya.

Deeply concerned with the practical applicability of truth, Gandhi therefore did not share Habermas’s insistence that theory was not to be confused with the specific political interventions of the activist. 76 Maintaining a tight connection between theory and practice allowed Gandhi to address head-on serious practical difficulties often associated with the political realization of Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” such as the notorious political ineffectiveness of rational discussion and the ensuing moral problem of the proper relationship between means and ends in instances where reason has fallen silent. Indeed, Gandhi emphasized “that mere appeal to reason does not answer where prejudices are age-long and based on supposed religious authority. Reason has to be strengthened by suffering and suffering opens the eyes of understanding.” 77

But what exactly did Gandhi mean by “strengthening reason through suffering”? Isn’t it much more reasonable to avoid suffering and pain at all cost, especially in times when the thin garments of civility were stripped away and the naked imperative of self-preservation prevailed? It is precisely in such situations of political crisis that liberal and Marxist models of power working within the framework of restorative violence seem to offer “commonsensical,” practical guidance for the crucial task of eliminating human suffering caused by arbitrary acts of everyday violence. Inter arma silent leges, and with no common judge of authority to restrain the “partiality and violence of men,” people appear to have no other choice but Locke’s “appeal to heaven” for the creation of a more “rational” and therefore more “economical” order of violence. 78 Despite their unwillingness to consider that even “legitimate” forms of violence fail to conform to their own moral and political imperatives to end the annihilation of life and human dignity, political thinkers in Western traditions appeared to act prudently in embracing the maxim that a “coercible order is morally justified insofar as it is required by the maximal public world.” 79

Gandhi could not disagree more. His most serious challenge to Western discourses of power inheres in his conscious break with the assumption that the nature of political power was to be found in the capacity to unleash “ordering” violence, and thus, that the exercise of political power inevitably involved employing violent means of coercion. Instead, he offered a compelling rationale for why searching for satya through ahimsa might constitute an alternative model of power:

[It] is a method of securing rights by personal suffering; it is the reverse of resistance by arms. When I refuse to do a thing that is repugnant to my conscience, I use soul-force. For instance, the Government of the day has passed a law which is applicable to me. I do not like it. If by using violence I force the Government to repeal the law,
I am employing what may be termed body-force. If I do not obey the law and accept the penalty for its breach, I use soul-force. It involves sacrifice of the self.\textsuperscript{80}

As Dennis Dalton points out, “power” appears to be a much better translation for satyagraha than “soul-force” because “force” is usually associated with “violence.”\textsuperscript{81} After all, it was precisely this supposedly “natural” connection between “power” and “violence” that Gandhi wished to challenge in his assertion that satyagraha represented power “born of Truth and Love or non-violence.”\textsuperscript{82} Denying the validity of any claims to absolute truth, he linked his highly innovative reconceptualization of power with his criticism of dominant realist models of power inherent in Locke’s proclamation of the individual’s “natural right” to judge and punish “wrongdoers” in accordance with the “law of nature.” For Gandhi, the infliction of violence on another person presumed society’s ability to pass ultimate judgment in terms of right and wrong; but since there was never absolute certainty as to the “truth” of one’s own position, there could be no “right” or even competence to punish: “In the application of satyagraha, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of Truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one’s opponent, but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be Truth to one may appear false to the other.”\textsuperscript{83} Even forms of corrective violence undertaken by agents of the state or other “legitimate” claimants of authority amounted to the dogmatic posture of violently enforcing one’s partial understanding of Truth. Thus, Gandhi insisted that the practice of arriving at uncoerced, consensual truth through the practice of ahimsa represented the only rationally defensible course of action.

As praxis, that is, direct political action against forms of oppression or discrimination, satyagraha overcame the Habermasian dilemma of political impotence without violating its theoretical emphasis on nonviolence. It allowed for a settling of conflicts which did not involve the disruption or elimination of dialogue, choice, otherness, self-realization, moral development, and social learning. As Joan Bondurant has put it, “The claim for satyagraha is that through the operation of nonviolent action the truth as judged by the fulfillment of human needs will emerge in the form of a mutually satisfactory and agreed-upon solution.”\textsuperscript{84} Gandhi’s emphasis on ahimsa as the most appropriate means for the search for truth also discloses his affirmation of a somatic, relational self based on the interrelatedness of means and ends and sensitive to the needs of others. This practical reconciliation of self-interest and other-interest could only be consistently applied through the practice of satyagraha. As Gandhi notes, “Means and ends are convertible terms in my political philosophy.”\textsuperscript{85}

But the firm adherence to such an ethic was not a viable option for the fainthearted. To put up a determined resistance to British troops and their deadly firepower without resorting to violence required tremendous courage of the sort that seemed to ignore the biological imperatives of self-preservation. Once again, realism’s politically and psychologically effective story of the omnipresent danger of society’s descent into civil war seems to make the more convincing argument for basing political order on the ineradicable persistence of fear. For Hobbes, to be alive meant to experience the fear of
death – especially the fear of violent death. Hence, there was indeed a fundamental biological “truth” on which political architects could always build their arguments: since human life would never be free of fear, violence was always necessary. Early modern political thinkers skillfully interwove their influential postulations of “natural” imperatives for self-preservation with the development of a psychology of fear in which the fear of physical pain and violent death was the essential component constituting human identity. Political leaders who disregarded fear in favor of love and compassion were seen as foolishly “dreaming up republics and principalities which have never in truth been known to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction rather than self-preservation.” Machiavelli’s influential assumption allowed even moral-existentialist philosophers like Karl Jaspers to make the realist claim that without violence politics had to come to a halt, for politics was essentially “commerce with violence.”

But as Elaine Scarry reminds us, political power entails the power of self-description, meaning that political theorists ought to periodically check their susceptibility to the claims, images, and sources of the prevailing description. No stranger to the experience of fear and violence in times of political crisis, Gandhi obliged, offering his nonviolent alternative to the realist images of self-description. There was, indeed, a stark political and moral choice before the individual: one could either opt to “go on... without minding the insults,” or seek to root out social injustice and “suffer hardships in the process.” Gandhi never denied the existence of fear in the face of the unsettling possibility of having to endure physical pain, torture, and violent death in the course of nonviolent direct actions such as strikes, civil disobedience, and other forms of non-cooperation. But it was precisely because of his clear recognition of the pivotal role of fear in conjuring up different conceptualizations of power that he refused to go along with Hobbes and Machiavelli. For Gandhi, any attempt to exclusively link fear to a realist discourse of power as violence merely served as an effective legitimation of the political status quo. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s insightful observation nicely captures this point:

But the dominant impulse in India under British rule was that of fear, pervasive, oppressing, strangling fear; fear of the army, the police, the widespread secret service; fear of the official class; fear of laws meant to suppress; and of prison; fear of the landlord’s agent; fear of the moneylender; fear of unemployment and starvation, which were always on the threshold. It was against this all-pervading fear that Gandhi’s quiet and determined voice was raised: Be not afraid. Was it so simple as all that? Not quite. And yet fear builds its phantoms which are more fearsome than reality itself, and reality when calmly analyzed and its consequences willingly accepted loses much of its terror.

Gandhi insisted on the possibility of overcoming fear with the result of realizing self-rule (swaraj) in both a political and moral sense. The traditional Upanishadic virtue of abhaya (fearlessness) in the face of violence, repression, and even impending death...
was a quality which a satyagrahi could gradually develop through rigorous spiritual, political, and social training in ahimsa: “Just as one must learn the art of killing in the training for violence, so one must learn the art of dying in the training of nonviolence. . . . The votary of nonviolence has to cultivate the capacity for sacrifice of the highest type in order to be free from fear. . . . He who has not overcome all fear cannot practice ahimsa to perfection.”92 Obviously, the Mahatma’s model amounted to a full-scale attack on Machiavelli’s male warrior quality of virtù underlying Western discourses of power.93 Gandhi juxtaposed the “brute force of coercion” with both rational-moral and emotional appeals (suffering) to the political opponent: “The appeal of reason is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering.”94

Seeking to find clearer distinctions between violence and nonviolence, Gandhi scholars have long sought to determine to what extent his notion of satyagraha contains positive elements of coercion such as fasting or instrumental emotional manipulation.95 An answer to this question may ultimately depend on arriving various “qualities of coercion” in terms of identifying “degrees of injury” involved in concrete situations. No doubt, the connections between physical, psychological, and economic levels of coercion and suffering in Gandhi’s political thought constitutes its Achilles heel that requires a detailed analysis. Moreover, a greater scholarly focus on the treatment of the problem of suffering (dukha) in Asian traditions might serve to vitalize the rather apolitical debates on the subject in the Judeo-Christian tradition (with the exception of liberation theology).

6. Concluding Remarks

In summary, then, Gandhi’s perspective on power as holding on to truth through the practice of ahimsa challenges modern Western conceptualizations of power as “imposition on others” through the application of violence. Instead, he opted for a model favoring the idea of common people exercising power nonviolently through voluntary self-suffering and sacrifice for a cause they consider to be “just” according the standard of fulfillment of human needs. Gandhi parted not only with liberal and Marxist conceptual models, but also with the Foucauldian-Nietzschean view that transgression and resistance could ultimately not be separated from the violent exercise of power. In so doing, Gandhi attacked what Richard Rorty has identified as the core of traditional Western culture: the notion of searching for Truth by turning away from “solidarity” towards “objectivity.”96 Conversely, the Mahatma insisted on the importance of pursuing truth in the “thick” communal context. Seen through traditional Western lenses, Gandhi’s firm rejection of the separation of means and ends represents perhaps the most accessible point of entry to survey the full extent of his challenge to our Western empirical-analytic “science of power.”

From Gandhi’s perspective, any model of power which merely reflects and reproduces preconceived categories of violence remains mired in Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” The positivist method of explaining power through a quantitative “measurement” of its properties – how it should apply methodologically to
the collection of what sort of data – serves to sustain a Weberian conceptual universe forever torn apart by the separation of fact and value. Neglecting the exploration of multi-directional networks of mutuality assumed in most Eastern philosophies may not only result in the intellectual stagnation of Western models, but also in the foreclosure of a new, radical politics of transforming identity, culture, and society. Indeed, the main reason for the current malaise of power studies may be found in our inability to escape the conceptual parameters of our philosophical heritage. Gandhi’s search for satya through the application of ahimsa discloses the value of a relational definition of power as a quality residing in the interface between acquiescence and consent, ruler and ruled, and receptivity and agency.

Gandhi’s challenge to Western discourses of power has served as an inspiration to other twentieth-century voices of nonviolence, such as Vaclav Havel, Aung San Suu Kyi, Petra Kelly, and, of course, Martin Luther King Jr., who eloquently restated the core of the Mahatma’s insight: “One of the greatest problems of history is that the concepts of love and power are usually contrasted as polar opposites. Love is identified with a resignation of power and power with the denial of love. . . . What is needed is a realization that power without love is reckless and abusive and that love without power is sentimental and anemic.”

King’s injunction to rethink the relationship between power and violence contain a strong imperative to spiritualize politics and politicize spirituality. Gandhi and his intellectual heirs have approached this hairy issue without abandoning the Enlightenment ideal of individual self-realization or falling prey to a naïve utopianism. In our age of globalization, Gandhi’s view on power not only challenges Western political and social theorists to enlarge the narrow philosophical parameters of their intellectual tradition, but also to offer practical ways of addressing the forms of violence embodied in current forms of global inequality and open-ended warfare.

NOTES


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6. Austin Sarat and Thomas P. Kearns have identified the same problem as it relates to the “troubling lack of systematic thinking about the relationship of law and violence.” See Austin Sarat and Thomas P. Kearns, eds., Law’s Violence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 1. At the 1986 International Colloquium on Brain and Aggression held at the University of Seville, Spain, twenty scholars drafted the Seville Statement on Violence which challenges the widespread belief that human beings are inevitably disposed to war and violence as a result of innate, biologically determined aggressive traits. In August 1987, the Council of Representatives of the American Psychological Association voted to endorse the Seville Statement, and the UNESCO’s adoption followed two years later. For the full content of the Seville Statement, see American Psychologist 45, no. 10 (August 1990): 1167–8.


34. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology” in *ibid.*, 158.
53. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,” in Bouchard, Language, Counter-Memory and Practice, 151.


60. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 133.

61. This Gandhian focus on critique has been elaborated in Ronald Terchek, Gandhi: Struggling for Autonomy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).


63. Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, 24.


71. This question is pursued in more detail in Manfred B. Steger, “Mahatma Gandhi and the Anarchist Legacy of Henry David Thoreau,” Southern Humanities Review 27, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 201–15.


Manfred B. Steger is Professor of Global Studies and Academic Director of the Globalism Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia. His books include Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism (second edition, 2005) and Judging Nonviolence: The Dispute Between Realists and Idealists (2003).