Understanding terrorism

Psychosocial Roots,
Consequences,
and Interventions

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The most salient fact about the word terrorism is that it establishes a superseding, redundant, unnecessary category. Even terrorist incidents, after all, are essentially a common crime—the crime of arson, kidnapping, murder, or the like. As a result, no need exists to establish a new category, a new type. Any terrorist incident can be fully prosecuted under one or another of the existing criminal statutes. Just to muddy the waters further, every victim of the common crimes of arson, kidnapping, murder, or the like has been terrorized, whether the perpetrator claims to be a terrorist or not. Furthermore, the terror felt by the direct victims radiates out to the larger community and influences others and affects their sense of security as well as social and political policies. Hence logically, no distinction exists between common criminal incidents and so-called terrorist incidents. A murder by the local mafia gang is essentially the same as a murder by the local terrorist cell. Murder, in the final analysis, is murder.

However, if "terrorism" is little more than a difference searching for a distinctive, an ordinary crime by another name, the terrorists do not see it that way. They do not think they are criminals committing crimes. Rather,
adopting the language of war, they see themselves as "freedom-fighters," "soldiers" on the front lines of some "war against oppression and injustice." Yet quotes, whatever the terrorist's self-understanding, in reality, their language is disingenuous. They possess none of the characteristics of soldiers but all of the characteristics of common criminals. According to the Geneva Convention, a "soldier" is one who meets the following four conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. The Geneva Convention of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), Article 13 (2). As is true in any criminal organization, a terrorist might be "commanded" by a person responsible for his subordinates, but terrorists fail to meet the other conditions. More important terrorists do resemble common criminals—both in the crimes they commit and in their sordid, clandestine nature of their lives.

However, terrorists do differ from common criminals in two respects: First, with few exceptions, terrorists' causes are much more spectacular than ordinary crimes of the same type. Second, terrorists say that their crimes are not motivated by any self-interest but, rather, are committed solely in the interests of others, the causes they believe to be sacrificial. In contrast, criminals are motivated by the interest of criminals in focus, the public relations or theatrical aspect of the crime and, second, the apprehension of one of the perpetrators of a self-sacrificing motivation. To put the same thing in different words, the terror generated by common crimes is largely an unintended consequence of those crimes, which are committed for other self-serving reasons. Terroristas are the engine; they commit the crimes specifically for the terror they generate. Moreover, because their crimes are not self-interested, the most theatrical issuing and effects serve the terrorists' public relations aim.

What all this head-spinning descriptive additive up to, I would suggest, is the inexplicable characteristics. But I am sure, no crime can be justified. By definition, arson, kidnapping, murder, and the like are ethically reprehensible. Although not justifiable, common crimes are easily understood and explained. The explanation in every case is emotional. The crime serves the perceived self-interest of the perpetrator, whose greed or lust or vengeance is thus satisfied. Whatever a crime does not serve the perpetrator's perceived self-interest, it becomes, logically, inexplicable.

Terrorism is just such an inexplicable crime. Both the exaggerated, the theatrical, the criminal character of the crime itself, and the terrorism's claim that they have committed the crime for the benefit of others, create a mirroring confusion between self-interested crime and self-sacrificing love. One of the characteristics of love is its willingness on the part of the lover to sacrifice his or her interests for those of the beloved. Terrorists see themselves in this self-sacri-

fying role. Yet, is there any other word beside pervasive to describe a lover who commits not just crimes but spectacularly theatrical crimes for his beloved? Is this not the language of the altruist? "I love you." "I kidnap, murder, and destroy buildings because I love you." Like all altruists, terrorists with people to believe that their crimes are acts of self-sacrificial love, when, in reality, they are unjustified prevarications, the delusional self-sacrifice of the terrorists masquerading as self-sacrifice. For, simply: whenever criminals portray themselves as self-sacrificing martyrs for a cause, confusion and cognitive dissonance are the only possible results. Significantly, the September 11 selection left no one explaining why they hijacked the planes, turned them into bombs, and murdered thousands. What, after all, could they have written to explain such horrors? Would anything they could have said make us understand their crimes?

In a most curious way, therefore, common criminals are basically honest, whereas terrorists are basically dishonest. Common criminals honestly acknowledge that they are motivated by simple greed. They also honestly understand that what they are doing is wrong. This self-understanding means that they attempt to accomplish their crimes as successfully as possible, so, as to avoid detection and arrest. The public is persuaded by spectacular theatrical crimes, they understand, is not in their best interests. When caught, their self-understanding also leads them to deny that they perpetrated the crimes, which, they honestly acknowledge, is harmless. The utility and simplicity of their self-sacrificing motivation and self-understanding is reflected in their unity and simplicity of their reactions to them. They are not, easily, turned on and off, nor are they emotionally involved. They are renegades, locked up and thrown away the key.

Terrorism, in contrast, is disoriented about their motives, which they mixed. In their public manifestations, they claim that they are motivated by the need to remedy some great political or social injustice. In private conversations, however, they reveal that they are really socially isolated "true believers," lashing out against an irredeemably corrupt world that can be saved only by destroying it. On account of their mixed motivations, terrorists do not admit that their crimes are wrong; indeed, they think that their crimes are not crimes but, instead, are fully justified by the absolute corruption of the world. On the one hand, and the absolute purity of their own motives, on the other hand. This mixed motivation produces an inherently unstable situation. In the first place, when sentenced, their confused self-understanding leads them either to profoundly guilty plea to their crimes, because they are not crimes in their eyes, or to express the crimes as righteous blows against oppression but to plead that they did not take part in the incidents with which they are charged. In the second place, the crimes themselves are perpetrated in the most spectacular and theatrical manner possible, so as to

either in their enthusiasm or their frustration, cue out for more justice faster. Justice is not a quantity, however, it cannot come faster or slower; it can come only when opponents join together in a more perfect community. Thus, the satyagrahis, unlike the terrorist, knows that whatever the passions and conflicts of the moment might be, both sides to the dispute ultimately must live in harmony with each other. And so, whenever emotions of revenge, retaliation, or retribution arose among these followers, Gandhi and his spiritual heirs swung into action, closed down the protest riot that allowed emotion to outpace common sense, and began the process of retraining and reindoctrinating their followers, unlike terrorists who feed precisely on these raw emotions.

The third difference between the satyagrahi and the terrorist grows out of the second. For, the satyagrahi’s knowledge that they and their opponents must live together in harmony with each other, and that conflict has ended, as all conflicts must, means that the satyagrahi sees as much for the means used as for the end sought. As a contrast, the terrorists, not caring for future harmony but only the cause of the moment, believe that their end justifies their means. This observation brings one to the heart of the ethics of terrorism. The ethics of terrorism turn upon an evaluation of the ends sought and the means employed. For terrorists, the absolute value of the end—the justness of the cause found in their public manifestos and for which they say they are murdering—fully justifies any means whatsoever. For the satyagrahi, the overarching value of their end—that they and their opponents will live together in peace after the grievances have been redressed—justifies only a limited number of means.

More formally, the evaluation of ends and means is framed by two reciprocal, contingent propositions:

1. When the end sought truly justifies the means chosen, the act is just and, therefore, by definition, not terrorism.
2. When the end sought does not justify the means chosen, the act is unjust and, therefore, by definition, an act of terrorism.

For example, consider two concerning cases: If voting is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to all adults, and registration is a justifiable prerequisite for voting, then is walking to the place of registration either illegal or unjust? In contrast, if a small subset of the Basque people, appealing to the right of self-determination, wish to establish an independent Basque nation-state, then are assassinations, car bombings, bank robberies, and extortion either illegal or just to achieve this independence? Under Franco’s dictatorship! Under the post-Franco Spanish democracy? Those who answer “no” to both cases will not characterize a voter registration march as terrorism, but will recognize the ETA campaign as terrorism. The opposite is of course also true: those who answer “yes” to both cases will characterize a voter registration march as terrorism or, at least, as illegal, and ETA’s campaign as just, if not legal.

EVALUATING ENDS AND MEANS: EXPLANATION VS. JUSTIFICATION

As with any moral judgment, the myriad factors and circumstances of the two categories render the analysis extremely complex and difficult. Fortunately, though, resolving the extreme complexity of these or any other specific cases is very much beyond the scope of this chapter. What is within the scope, however, is the often neglected distinction between justification and explanation, an important distinction already noted above which, not incidentally, allows one to explore further the relationship between ends and means.

If the quicksand of formalistic extremism explain how terrorists and their enabling sympathizers can both explain and justify terrorism to themselves, it does not do the same for third-party observers. For, unlike “true believers,” third-party observers usually possess a relatively high tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity in their world. Recognizing the eXistence of uncertainty, non-“true believers” have a perspective that recognizes any and all horrors in the means used to attain their desired ends. They draw the line when the horror is too horrible. They are, therefore, able to understand, first, that the end (always) justifies the means only in a trivial and formal manner. Cognizant of this formal trap, they are, then, able to establish criteria for evaluating the moral acceptability of the means used with respect to the ends sought. That is, they understand that the end never justifies all the means, only some means—what justifies only those means that are (a) proportional, (b) discriminating, and (c) well-intentioned. However, because acts of terror are, by definition, neither proportional, discriminating, nor well-intentioned, the public “justifications” for acts of terror neither explain nor justify such acts for “true believers.”

In fine, the twisted logic of terrorists and other “true believers,” based, as it is, on tortured rationalizations, leads inevitably to insanity, if not to terrorism. Convincing of the absolute truth of their cause, “true believers” cannot imagine that the most horrific means are not fully justified. They cannot imagine that they too could follow the examples of Gandhi, King, Aquino, the East Europeans, Mandela, and others. These satyagrahis all understood that justice is elusive and, hence, that only well-intentioned, discriminating
Cognitive Dissonance and Terrorism Scholarship

When one turns from terrorism to psychological theories of terrorism, the context for understanding terrorist behavior becomes more complex. In the cognitive dissonance model, the focus is on the psychological processes that individuals undergo when they hold contradictory beliefs or attitudes. This model suggests that individuals will experience discomfort when faced with cognitive dissonance, and they will seek to reduce this discomfort by changing their behavior, beliefs, or attitudes. In the context of terrorism, this means that terrorists may experience dissonance when they are confronted with the reality of their actions, and they may seek to justify their actions or minimize the harm they have caused.

The problem with this model is that it does not fully account for the motivations behind terrorism. While terrorism is often motivated by political or ideological beliefs, the cognitive dissonance model does not fully address the role of these motivations in terrorist behavior. For example, a terrorist group may engage in violence to achieve a political goal, but they may also experience dissonance if they believe that their actions are contradictory to their beliefs.

In conclusion, the cognitive dissonance model provides a useful framework for understanding the psychological processes behind terrorist behavior. However, it is important to recognize that terrorism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be fully explained by a single psychological model.

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can recite supposedly explanatory theories of terror, according to Jenkins, they have yet to justify their acts of terror; most especially, they have yet to either explain or justify how their terrorism will achieve their publicly declared goals:

In recent years, terrorists have turned out thousands of pages of manifestos, manuals, announcements, directives, claims, communiques, commentation, critiques, and self-criticism, but they have yet to articulate a clear and convincing theory to explain just how laying a bomb here or pulling a trigger there relates to the achievement of their objectives. (1985, p. 8)

In other words, terrorists have a well-developed theory of the Machiavellian or instrumental use of terror, but they lack even the rudiments of a theory for the effective achievement of political and social goals. In contrast, Gandhi and his followers possess a proven theory for the effective achievement of political and social goals, precisely because they do not possess (indeed, they reject) all Machiavellian and instrumentalist theories of terror, but are figures.

The suspicion creeps in that the experts have spent too much time reading the "thousands of pages of manifestos, manuals, announcements, directives, claims, communiques, commentation, critiques, and self-criticism" and not enough time reflecting upon the fact that terrorism is simply criminals, who, as "true believers," possess a more grandiose self-justification than most criminals.

The cognitive dissonance in expert analyses of terrorism becomes more acute when the experts attempt to define terrorism. For example, Jenkins cannot decide whether "terrorism is the use of criminal violence to force a government to change its course of action" (1985, p. 9, p. 2) or whether "terrorism is treason (it is aimed at the people watching)" (1985, p. 9). In terms of simple logic, no need exists to define terrorism at all. All acts of terrorism are already crimes, as both Jenkins and I have already noted above. The dissonance is not reduced by reference to more official definitions of terrorism. For example, the FBI's definition reads, "Terrorism: The Unlawful Use of Force against Persons or Property to Intimidate or Coerce a Government, the Civilian Population, or Segment Thereof, in the Furtherance of Political or Social Objectives" (28 C.F.R. section 0.83), whereas the congressional definitions, found in the law establishing the State Department's Annual Report on Terrorism, is, "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents" (Title 22 USC, Chapter 18, Sec. 2656ff (a) (2)).

One of the FBI's best known (but controversial) terrorism cases is the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City, which resulted in 6 deaths and over 1,000 injuries. The attack was claimed by the Islamic extremist group the Islamic Jihad, which was later designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government. The bombing was intended to cause widespread panic and destruction, and it is considered one of the deadliest acts of terrorism in U.S. history. The incident highlighted the need for a comprehensive terrorist threat assessment, which led to the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center. The Center is responsible for consolidating and analyzing intelligence information related to global terrorist threats, with the goal of protecting the United States. The incident also led to increased security measures in public places and交通枢纽 throughout the country.

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DISHONEST CHRS AND LANGUAGE

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Terrorism, as defined in the introduction to this chapter, is a theatrical crime against persons or property. Casually, this theatrical crime provides no tangible, instrumental benefit to the perpetrators, only symbolic or "psychological" satisfaction. More fully, terrorism is a particularly brutal and sometimes total theater of hate or hysteria because the actual victims are not the target; rather, they are theatrical props utilized in order to produce the maximum horror and fear among the audience, among the target population. As Osama bin Laden has explained, "The September 11 attacks were directed against women and children.... The real targets were America's icons of military and economic power" (Mitt, 2001, p. 3). Thus, the object of the attack is to influence those who witness it, either firsthand or in the media; the object is to influence the viewer indirectly, through fear and shock, directly attacked. As a secondary matter, the attack is also designed to produce a sense of awe at the power and cleverness of the terrorists among the terrorists themselves and their support group.

Because the primary purpose of the attack is to gain the maximum media coverage possible, these terrorists are driven to create the most striking visual effects possible. When compared to guns, knives, or poison, the most striking visual effects are produced by explosions. The explosion itself is a striking sight, and the mixture of fire and explosion are easily effective. News photographs of both the actual explosion and of the wounds are a permanent record, a constant reminder, of the horror for the target population. Indeed, the latter scene stimulates all who see them in view photographs of them. The superb cinematographic effects of explosions, therefore, explain why more than 80% of terrorist acts involve explosions (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1990, p. 45).

Mapping the Agents of Terror

I use "agents of terror" because not all those who believe in terror and create crimes should qualify as terrorists, because "terror" and "agent of terror" are larger terms than the term of terrorism. The agents of terror, then, may be divided by their motivation. That motivation is not hard, but it ranges from the profoundly theatrical to fully instrumental. More concretely, the most theatrical terrorists are apocalyptic, or messianic terrorists who are motivated to achieve a divine mission to save the world by destroying it. At the other extreme, the most instrumental terrorists are simple long criminal whose only greater purpose is to use their power to increase their greed. Somewhere in this middle are the "true terrorists" who do not possess any political motive, or at least say they do. When laid out on an axis, this producers six different types, as depicted in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theatrical Terror</th>
<th>Instrumental Terror</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Destroy to Save&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Self-Interest&quot;</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- **Theatrical Terror**
  - **Messianic Terrorists**
  - **Nastastic **
  - **Vendetta**

- **Instrumental Terror**
  - **Self-Interest**
  - **Sidetaker**
  - **Vendetta**

1. **Messianic terrorists** usually claim their true motivations are some social, religious, or political grievance or injustice, but their true motive is the apocalyptic belief that the world is so corrupt that they must destroy it to save it. Messianic terrorists come in all sizes, shapes, and racial-political forms. Examples are Aamir Shahriyari, Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and most recently Osama bin Laden. They may also become demoralized if they can gain control of a State, as was the case with Hitler, Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge, the Hito Rwandan, and the like.
2. **Wannabe "soldiers"** (a.k.a. "freedom fighters") are usually not messianic. Instead, they use terrorist acts for some specific and limited political goal (e.g., independence). Although they never engage in open combat, only as secret operations, they assert they are "soldiers" fighting for some cause or cause. After, unlike real soldiers, they feel "authorized" to violate all laws to support themselves from common crime (drug, extortion, kidnapping, bank robbing, etc.). Examples of wannabe "soldiers" are the Irish Republican Army, Al Qaeda in the Philippines, ETA, and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.

*Democracy is a word developed by H. J. Lasswell (1927) to designate an ideology and mass media organized in government around the power of people.*
3. Gangsters and the mafia use terror to maintain control of their businesses or turf. Sometimes a gang or a mafia invoke a political cover for their criminal activities. More often, gangs and mafia are just in it for the loot. Examples of this “political” type of gang are the Ruses in Nigeria, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor’s forces in Liberia, or Khun Sa and the Shan Liberation Army in Burma.

4. Honest criminals produce terror as an “unintended” consequence of their crimes. They are self-interested and are not motivated by politics or a sense of injustice.

5. State security services can be either menacing or brutally instrumented depending on their circumstances. If they are menacing, then, like menacing terrorists, they are very likely to become democial, as happened in Nazi Germany and Pol Pot’s Cambodia. If they are instrumental, then they are simply brutal. That is, they use terror and torture to maintain state power, as in the Argentine and Chilean “Dirty Wars.”

6. Guerrillas and partisans are not usually menacing, although Mao’s Chinese People’s Army is one exception. They are, instead, political and use terror for specific political and ideological reasons. With respect to terrorism, the situation is more complex. Guerrillas who do engage in open combat are clearly soldiers under the Geneva Convention (I), cited above. However, those who do not engage in open combat, but, instead, engage in Agit-Prop and other forms of terror are not soldiers, but terrorists. Because an individual can be reassigned from a combat unit to an Agit-Prop unit and back, it can be confusing to determine who is a terrorist and who is not. In addition, sabotage may be considered an act of terrorism. By the enemy, although it may not be an occasion to legitimate military activity. Examples include the French Maquis and Soviet and Yugoslav partisans in World War II and the Viet Cong.

Terrorists

The criminal character of gangsters, the mafia, and honest criminals is undisputed. State security services are better characterized as torturers or assassins, not terrorists. Their acts of terror usually lack the ideologically meaningful terrorist act. By contrast, the terrorist is uniquely homicidal. Typically, terrorists are actors with a specific set of characteristics. Generally, terrorists are “true believers” whose acts of terror are, first, crimes and, second, theater (i.e., committed for their media value and not for any substantive instrumental value). According to the definition of terrorism, are an alienated, socially isolated, but often charismatic, criminal engaged in theatrical crimes.

ENABLING TERRORISM: THE SOCIAL MILIEU

Although theatrical criminals or terrorists are extremely few in number and socially isolated, they do not operate in a vacuum. Like other criminals, they are enabled or disabled by the social and political conditions around them. Or, to begin on a more positive note, humans are social animals. As a result, everything they do is influenced by their social environment. Humans are also self-conscious individuals, and, as such, they are autonomous moral agents. As a result, they must take responsibility for their decisions and actions. Out of the dynamic interaction of the social milieu with its individual members and the individual members with their social milieu comes the decision and actions that produce mankind’s collective history and individual biography. As a result of this dynamic interaction, one cannot say that the terrorists’ social milieu “creates” him. To do so is to deny the terrorist his individuality, his moral agency. Like all criminals, only terrorists can “create” terrorists. Terrorists do this through the personal decisions that they make and act on that they take. That said, one must immediately recognize that some social milieus are more favorable to the creation of terrorists than others.

In the paragraph that follows, I identify these social factors as (a) enabling leadership, (b) enabling history, and (c) enabling sympathizers. For now, however, I simply note that three general conditions also appear to be influential: (a) youth bulge, (b) poverty and gross injustice, and (c) a culture of disrespect and intolerance.

To be held by the obvious, societies with relative prosperity and a culture of respect and tolerance tend to have low rates of crime, in contrast, societies or groups with high levels of poverty, injustice, and a culture of disrespect toward "outsiders" (however defined by the society or group), intolerance, and hatred tend to have high rates of crime, in general, and to enable terrorists, in particular. For example, the last 40 years or so of terrorism in Northern Ireland was all but guaranteed by the policeable discrimination against Catholics by the Protestants in Northern Ireland. Fed by poverty and a long-sustained sense of disrespect and hatred in both communities for the other, the Irish Republican Army, on the one hand, and the Ulster Defense force, on the other side, soon hijacked the Gandhian civil rights movement of the 1960’s, turning peaceful protests into a campaign of assassinations, bombings, bank robberies, and a scramble to monopolize the drug trade. Economic development and social justice are essential factors for both crime and terrorism.

Still, societies with high levels of prosperity, tolerance, and a respect for
man dignity harbor terrorists and are not immune from terrorism. The United States, Timothy McVeigh, and Ted Kaczynski come to mind. Likewise, other societies with great intolerance and little respect for human dignity escape terrorist incidents. Eastern Europe during the 1980s as it threw off the Soviet yoke comes to mind.

A third general condition enabling crime, including terrorism, occurs whenever a population is experiencing a youth bulge. A youth bulge is a demographic phenomenon that occurs whenever the 15-24-year-old age cohort reaches or exceeds 20% of a population, thereby throwing off the symmetry of a normal age pyramid (Fuller & Pirsig, 1983). Unless some means can be found to dissipate the youth bulge and return the population to a more normal age distribution, all indicators of social tension, including crime, will predictably rise significantly. Mexico has succeeded in managing its youth bulge through illegal immigration to the United States. The United States was somewhat less successful in managing its last youth bulge during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The current upsurge in social turmoil, including terrorism, in Islamic countries is not in surprise of all the large youth bulges that these countries are experiencing now. In general, then, societies experiencing youth bulges predictably experience significant increases in social tension, including increased rates of crime.

In addition to these three general conditions that enable terrorism, three more specific factors greatly facilitate or inhibit an individual in choosing to become a terrorist: history, leadership, and presence or absence of sympathizers. An enabling history teaches that "power grows out of the hatred of a generation" and that a resort to terror is "honorable." This is especially true in cultures of vengeance. A dis-enabling history does the opposite. One of the saddest examples of an enabling history is W. B. Yeats' (1983) poem, Easter, 1916, commemorating the fallen "heroes" of the Easter Rebellion in Ireland:

For England may keep faith: For all that is done and said. We know their dream; enough To know they dreamed and are dead; And what in excess of love Rewardeth them still they died! I write it out in verse— MacDonagh and MacSwine. Now and in time to be, Wherever green is worn, Are changed, changed utterly. A terrible beauty is born. (p. 182)

An enabling leadership promotes intolerance and hatred in pursuit of some absolute goal, either the Moslem goal of "having the world by destroying it" or some political end, such as independence, that is said to justify terrorism in all its means. A dis-enabling leadership does the opposite, as Gandhi and King illustrate. Enabling sympathizers accept, even if they do not encourage, both the acts of terror and the theatrical criminals who commit them as in some sense justified. Minimally, enabling sympathizers are sills and do nothing either to condemn or thwart the terrorists. Dis-enabling sympathizers do the opposite. To paraphrase Mao, enabling sympathizers are the water in which the terrorists swim. A small subgroup of youth within the enabling sympathizers, what might be called "wannabe" terrorists, form the pool from which terrorists can be recruited easily.

In terms of the social milieu that enables terrorists, the obvious strategy is to turn the sympathizers from enabling into dis-enabling, to drain away the social water in which the terrorists swim. This goal cannot be accomplished by arresting, otherwise removing enabling sympathizers. Indeed, arresting or displacing enabling sympathizers, experience shows, only increases their sympathy for the terrorists, fear of false arrest or removal to concentration camps now being added to the list of their grievances. However, if enabling sympathizers cannot be arrested, what is to be done to turn them into dis-enabling sympathizers? This is the point at which politics and social policy often become crucial to ending episodes of terrorism. The grievances that cause them to sympathize and the theatrical criminals must be identified and remedied. These grievances are often, but not always, some injustice.

Ideally, one would live in a society without either terrorists or terrorism. Such a society would possess (a) a dis-enabling leadership, (b) a dis-enabling history, and (c) an absence of sympathizers as well as grievances. Such an ideal society would also be characterized by a normal age profile, relative prosperity and justice, and a culture of respect and tolerance. More realistically, in a society with terrorists and terrorism, the first line of defense is good police work. As a second line of defense, however, one must dis-enable both the general and the more specific social factors that enable terrorists.